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ABSTRACT
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by Marcus D. Cobden
The ability to judge the trustworthiness of information is an important and challenging
problem in the eld of Semantic Web research. In this thesis, we take an end-to-end
look at the challenges posed by trust on the Semantic Web, and present contributions
in three areas: a Semantic Web identity vocabulary, a system for bootstrapping trust
environments, and a framework for trust-aware information management.
Typically Semantic Web agents, which consume and produce information, are not de-
scribed with sucient information to permit those interacting with them to make good
judgements of trustworthiness. A descriptive vocabulary for agent identity is required to
enable eective inter-agent discourse, and the growth of trust and reputation within the
Semantic Web; we therefore present such a foundational identity ontology for describing
web-based agents.
It is anticipated that the Semantic Web will suer from a trust network bootstrapping
problem. In this thesis, we propose a novel approach which harnesses open data to
bootstrap trust in new trust environments. This approach brings together public records
published by a range of trusted institutions in order to encourage trust in identities
within new environments.
Information integrity and provenance are both critical prerequisites for well-founded
judgements of information trustworthiness. We propose a modication to the RDF
Named Graph data model in order to address serious representational limitations with
the named graph proposal, which aect the ability to cleanly represent claims and prove-
nance records. Next, we propose a novel graph-based approach for recording the prove-
nance of derived information. This approach oers computational and memory savings
while maintaining the ability to answer graph-level provenance questions. In addition,
it allows new optimisations such as strategies to avoid needless repeat computation, and
a delta-based storage strategy which avoids data duplication.Contents
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Introduction
Trust is an integral part of modern society: it plays a crucial role in our everyday lives
and is the foundation upon which our societies are built. We unconsciously rely on trust
in everything we do: when we buy our groceries, we trust that they were produced and
handled in a safe environment; when we leave our homes, we trust that they will not
be broken into while we are away; and when we get up each morning, we trust in our
internal models of the world that getting up is a wise decision.
The World Wide Web is increasingly regarded as an important and convenient source
of free information, despite the fact there are no guarantees that information published
on the Web will be accurate or honest. In the physical world, the logistical hurdles of
publishing, the reputations of publishing companies, and the threat of libel generally
discourage the widespread publication of dishonest or grossly inaccurate information.
On the Web, the barriers to content publishing and wide distribution are almost non-
existent, and the prolicacy of free and anonymous publishing platforms has undermined
the risks present in the oine world. Thus, it is all the more important that we are able
to judge the trustworthiness of an information source, before we rely on its information.
It is despite all this that we have come to increasingly regard the World Wide Web as
an important source of free information.
The Semantic Web [Berners-Lee et al. 2001] promotes the notion of a Web of information,
built upon a common data model and a foundation of World Wide Web technologies.
The aim of the Semantic Web movement is to create a Web of information that is as
powerfully interlinked as the Web of human-readable pages, but where the facts are not
obscured by language and visual markup. It is hoped that this Web of interlinked data,
the vocabularies which arise from it, and the technologies built around it, will allow
easier information discovery and integration. In turn, it is hoped that this will enable
the development of innovative applications and powerful information analysis.
As it is an uncontrolled environment, the Semantic Web will suers from similar prob-
lems of trust to the World Wide Web. That is, we must expect some actors in this
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environment to exhibit untrustworthy behaviour, as there are few incentives to discour-
age it. Trust remains an acknowledged research problem among the Semantic Web
community [O'Hara et al. 2004, Richardson et al. 2003, Artz and Gil 2007]; however, we
have yet to see Semantic Web systems which can judge the trustworthiness of real-world
Semantic Web data routinely and eectively.
Against this background, in this work, we present a number of mechanisms which provide
a foundation for the future growth of the trust on the Semantic Web, and better enable
us to make reasoned judgements of trustworthiness.
We continue this chapter by rst outlining the problem trust poses for the Semantic
Web (Section 1.1) and identifying the key objectives of our work (Section 1.2). Next, in
Section 1.3, we explain the contributions we have made to the state of the art. We then
conclude this chapter in Section 1.4 with outline of the remainder of this thesis.
1.1 Trust and the Semantic Web
Briey, we consider trust to be the act of relying on something in the face of risk, and
trustworthiness to be a judgement of the degree of condence that something can be
relied upon in a specic risky context1.
The Semantic Web is a digital environment built upon the technologies of the World
Wide Web and the Internet. Berners-Lee et al.'s visionary article for the Semantic
Web [Berners-Lee et al. 2001] proposed an ecosystem of intelligent articial actors, `Se-
mantic Web agents', who are able to evaluate the trustworthiness of other agents and
services, and are able to make intelligent informed decisions on behalf of their users.
However, in this digital context, judging the trustworthiness of some entity or artefact
is dicult.
In the context of the Semantic Web, there are two primary situations in which trust-
worthiness becomes important: when acting on information gleaned from the Semantic
Web, or when relying on other Semantic Web agents. With little to no information
about the identity and characteristics of other Semantic Web agents it is not possible
to make eective assessments of their trustworthiness. In turn, it is also impossible to
judge the trustworthiness of any information they may have provided you with, as there
are no assurances that it was not maliciously altered.
Unlike face-to-face human interactions, where there are a multitude of factors (such
as facial expressions, posture, attire and conversational manner) which we employ to
gauge trustworthiness, in a digital context there are very few intrinsically observable
characteristics on which trustworthiness can be judged. Web user-agent identiers and
1We give this brief denition of trust and trustworthiness for the sake of clarity, in lieu of a fuller
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Internet Protocol (IP) addresses are among these observable characteristics, however
neither are likely to be of particular use for assessing trustworthiness. The former is
provided on an honesty basis and thus is of little worth, and the latter, IP addresses,
are unlikely to prove good predictors of individual trustworthiness as they cannot easily
be resolved to a single individual due to the processes by which they are allocated.
In the digital environment that is the Semantic Web, the challenges of trust and trust-
worthiness are often technological as well as sociological in nature. In this thesis, we
aim to better identify these challenges and, where possible, to also propose solutions to
them.
1.2 Research Aims and Objectives
The ultimate aim of this thesis is to advance the state of the art in trust research for
the Semantic Web, and to further the vision of the Semantic Web as an ecosystem of
intelligent, and trust-aware, autonomous actors. Specically, this work aims to advance
the state of the art on three fronts:
1. Understanding Trust
Our work aims to develop an understanding of trust, both to clarify the terms in
which we will frame our research, and to improve how trust is understood in the
wider picture of Semantic Web research.
Trust is studied in a number of disciplines, including psychology, sociology, philos-
ophy, and management. Each of these disciplines approaches trust from their own
perspective. Perhaps as a result of this, Semantic Web research appears to have
approached the subject of trust from subtly dierent directions.
As part of this thesis, we aim to develop a clear understanding of trust, and, to
some extent, reconcile the dierent approaches of existing Semantic Web research
in this area.
2. Enabling Trust
Next, we then aim to address what we believe to be the core challenges on the
road towards a trust infrastructure for the Semantic Web.
In particular we focus on the architectural issues whose resolution is crucial for
the development of an eective trust ecosystem on the Semantic Web.
3. Building and Harnessing Trust
Finally, we aim to demonstrate how we might begin to grow Trust within the
Semantic Web, and to investigate what improvements we must make to our infor-
mation management systems if we are to be able to make eective judgements of
trustworthiness on Semantic Web information.4 Chapter 1 Introduction
1.3 Research Contributions
Based on the aims and objectives described above, and our study of the research area,
we present the following as our primary contributions in this thesis:
1. Semantic Web identity vocabulary
The challenge of describing an identity on the Semantic Web is one which has
been wisely avoided for some time, as general purpose solutions are dicult to get
right. However, in order to perform eective judgements of trustworthiness, we
need to be able to describe (and potentially also communicate) the behaviour and
characteristics of other agents. Therefore we have developed an identity vocabulary
to describe web-based agents, including Semantic Web agents. This vocabulary is
intended to act as a foundation for the growth of trust and reputation systems for
the Semantic Web.
2. Grounding Trust in existing authorities
Trust is dicult to create; trustworthiness is usually earned by one's actions and
thus gaining trust takes time and eort. In a new environment, such as the Se-
mantic Web, where there are very few or no established trustworthy actors, every
interaction involves more risk. As a consequence, the interactions required to build
a trustworthy reputation in this type of environment involve more risk.
To avoid the elevated risk, we present a website identity dashboard which demon-
strates how we might harness trust transfer to `bootstrap' trust in Web-based
identities. Our system seeks to provide users with information which lends cred-
ibility to an identity and identies its links with existing real-world entities. It
is by drawing on information from trusted institutions, that it seeks to encourage
trust transfer, and thereby help to bootstrap trust in an identity.
3. Trust-aware information managementThe ability to make sound judgements
of trustworthiness depends entirely on having information of a known trustworthi-
ness upon which to ground one's assessment. One of the advantages of Semantic
Web systems is their ability to combine heterogeneous information and to draw
new information from it.
In this vein, we rst propose an improvement to the Named Graph data model in
order to permit advanced representations while maintaining data integrity. Then,
we propose a novel approach to recording provenance information, which scales
with the number of graphs, rather than the number of statements. This approach
also enables computational and memory optimisations for information manage-
ment, while maintaining the ability to answer questions of trustworthiness.Chapter 1 Introduction 5
1.4 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows: in Chapter 2, in order to illustrate the
role of trust in the Semantic Web, we describe a number of ctional scenarios involving
Semantic Web agents, in which trust plays some part. These scenarios highlight certain
challenges and questions which have shaped the direction of our work.
Then, in Chapter 3, we study `trust' in more detail, discussing what it means to trust,
and what forms of trusting decision may be made. We also look at attempts to introduce
trust mechanisms in articial environments, and the role encryption algorithms have
played (Section 3.4).
Next, Chapter 4 discusses the World Wide Web and the Semantic Web in greater detail,
giving an introduction to their basic concepts and processes, before returning to the
subject of trust in the context of the Semantic Web (Section 4.3). Concluding this
chapter, we identify the key Semantic Web research challenges with respect to trust
(Section 4.4).
Against this background, in Chapter 5, we present a web server identity vocabulary
intended to form the foundation of a Semantic Web identity infrastructure. We begin
this chapter by rening our requirements in this endeavour (Section 5.2) before we
undertake a specialised review of related work in Section 5.3. Section 5.3.4 presents
our web server identity vocabulary, providing a detailed description of its terms, and the
rationale for our design decisions, particularly those related to co-reference (Section 5.5).
Then, in Section 5.7, we review whether we have met our requirements.
Continuing, Chapter 6 proposes trust transfer as a means to address the chicken and
egg bootstrapping problem faced by young trust networks, and presents a website iden-
tity service which demonstrates this approach. This service, presented in Section 6.3,
employes identity information in order to improve the appropriate perception of entita-
tivity, and thereby encourage trust transfer. This builds on our work thus far, providing
a means by which we can bootstrap trust in the identities of Semantic Web agents. In
Section 6.4 we discuss the potential of our prototype, the questions it raises, and its
shortcomings and avenues for potential future work.
In Chapter 7, we examine the problem of making judgements of information trustworthi-
ness. We identify the limitations of graph `acceptance' and the implications this has on
provenance records and the named graph data model (Section 7.1), before proposing a
potential solution in Section 7.1.2. Extensive provenance records are necessary for sound
assessments, however recording such information for inferred data has traditionally been
costly (Sections 7.1, 7.2.3). We then propose a graph-based provenance recording ap-
proach which exhibits signicantly better scaling behaviour than previous approaches
(Section 7.2.4).6 Chapter 1 Introduction
Finally, Chapter 8 concludes our work, recapitulating our contributions and discussing
avenues for future work.Chapter 2
Use Cases
In this chapter we present short scenarios describing interactions between people and
hypothetical Semantic Web agents; intelligent articial actors able to make intelligent
informed decisions on behalf of their users. Each scenario aims to illustrate dierent
aspects of their interactions, and the role of trust in each. We follow each scenario with
a discussion of the key trust-related challenges it presents for the Semantic Web.
The rst use case (Section 2.1) describes an e-commerce scenario in which Semantic
Web agents manage searches and transactions on behalf of their owners. The second
(Section 2.2) tells of a reputation scenario, where a cautious individual investigates the
identity and reputation of potential gift vendors in order to determine their trustwor-
thiness.
The third (Section 2.3) is an information management scenario, describing the challenges
involved in acting on information of unknown quality, and reacting to errors. We examine
each scenario in the context of our research objectives (Section 1.2), in order to identify
the key challenges they present.
2.1 Semantic Web Agents and Services
Berners-Lee et al.'s article on the Semantic Web [Berners-Lee et al. 2001] described a
vision of personal software agents which employed Semantic Web technologies for their
users' benet. This use case considers a similar scenario involving assistive Semantic
Web Agents, in an business-to-business e-commerce situation.
2.1.1 Use Case #1
Susan, the owner of small retail company, owns a Semantic Web agent which publishes
her catalogue online and also operates an e-commerce service interface.
78 Chapter 2 Use Cases
Tom's personal Semantic Web agent is investigating the prices of certain goods on his
behalf and, during the course of this activity, requests some information from Susan's
agent. Alongside the information on goods, Tom's agent also records the means by
which it came to hold this information, which includes a description of Susan's agent
and records of the `conversation' which took place.
The following day, Tom shares the results of the investigation - which showed that Susan
oers the best price - with his colleague Hubert, including his agent's description of her
agent's identity. Hubert's agent is able to contact Susan's agent using that description,
and also be suciently condent that it is in fact the same agent { the description of
her agent matches its observations. Hubert instructs his agent to purchase of a small
quantity of the goods, as a trial purchase.
Meanwhile, due to the continued success of her business, and the increased demand on
her Semantic Web agent, Susan upgrades her e-commerce agent from a single server to
a powerful multi-server deployment.
On receipt of the goods Hubert and Tom decide that they are pleased with their quality
and the level of service, and Hubert instructs his agent to purchase a larger quantity of
the same item. When Hubert's agent attempts to place the second order, it notices that
Susan's agent seems substantially dierent from its previous description. It decides that
it cannot proceed with the transaction as it does not have enough condence that they
are the same agent, and must seek advice from Hubert.
Hubert contacts Susan directly in order to conrm the changes, and then instructs his
agent that the identity of Susan's agent can be trusted. His agent records the change in
apparent identity, and proceeds to place the order.
Hubert's agent shares the new identity information with Tom's agent, including the fact
that Hubert has vouched for its legitimacy in this context. As Tom's agent has already
been advised to trust Hubert's judgements, it will be able to conduct future business
with Susan's agent condently, without needing to request Tom's advice.
2.1.2 Key Challenges
The creation of eective personal software agents brings together a number of problems
which are signicant research challenges in their own right. In light of this, the key
challenges we identify in this scenario are only those directly relevant to our study of
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 Describing identity
The ability to distinguish between dierent entities is a prerequisite of an eective
trust system. One must be able to identify and record the denitive character-
istics that identify a certain entity in order to be able to recognise it when it is
encountered at a later date. Therefore, the ability to describe the identity of an
entity to be a key challenge for Semantic Web agents.
 Describing relationships
If agents are operating in concert we must be able to describe the relationship
between them to some degree, so that we may factor it into our trusting decisions,
where approriate.
 Communicating identity
Next, if we wish to share our experiences of certain entities with others, we must
be able to communicate our description of that entity's identity. If we cannot
communicate a usable description of identity, shared records of our experiences
become less useful as they cannot be linked to real entities or used to inform
trusting decisions.
 Comparing identities
Finally, assuming we can both eectively describe and communicate the identities
of other actors, the last key challenge is the comparison of identity descriptions.
If we encounter the same agent on two separate occasions, we must have some
means by which we can condently determine whether or not it is the same agent.
Additionally, if we have received information about trustworthy agents from a
trusted peer, we must be able to identify whether an agent was or was not featured
in those recommendations.
Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) alone are not sucient to solve these challenges;
they are primarily a means of encoding an address, and generally do not themselves give
any assurance of identity1. By analogy, you may have recorded an acquaintance's home
address but you cannot be sure from the address alone whether or not they still live
there.
In summary, from the scenario we described, we identied three key requirements for an
identity infrastructure; the ability to describe, communicate and compare the identities
of agents. As we argued above, an identity system is a prerequisite for an eective trust
system, thus these requirements are important in ensuring that trust systems are built
on a robust foundation.
1HTTP based URLs delegate ownership and identity to registries of Domain names or IP addresses.
HTTPS URLs add to this some cryptographic assurance of identity through the Public Key Infrastruc-
ture (PKI) (Section 3.4.2.3), however the level of assurance varies with the type of certicate. Other
URL schemes may have stronger identity assurances, however few are in common use.10 Chapter 2 Use Cases
2.2 Trusting Decisions
This scenario describes the process by which one might arrive at a trustworthiness
judgement for a previously un-encountered web site.
2.2.1 Use Case #2
Martin is a cautious individual; when using the Web he takes the time to be condent
in the identity and trustworthiness of a Web site before deciding to do business on it. In
anticipation of the holiday season, Martin is on the lookout for novel gifts for his friends
and family, and has found a number of new gift vendors.
The rst vendor presents a Transport Layer Security (TLS) certicate, using it to encrypt
the communications between itself and Martin, and assure its identity. Martin's browser
warns him that he has never visited this website before, suggests that he rst investigate
its reputation further before continuing. None of Martin's peers report having any
experience of this vendor, so he turns to other sources of information.
Consulting a number of online reputation repositories turns up a number of favourable
reviews for this merchant in one review repository. Martin decides that he can trust
this vendor as, in previous situations, he has found this repository to be accurate, and
generally trusts the reviews of its contributors.
Martin moves on to the next vendor, who also presents a TLS certicate. This certicate,
however, only certies certain cryptographic keys for use at this address, and does not
provide any assurances of identity, so Martin decides he must look for more information.
Unfortunately, Martin is unable to obtain any information on the vendor's legitimacy
from reputation repositories or his peers After further investigation, Martin is able to
associate the vendor's Web presence with a company registered with his national gov-
ernment, using publicly available records. Martin has past experience of this company
from visiting their brick-and-mortar stores, and so is happy to place his trust in them.
Martin realises that his dilligent investigations have taken a considerable amount of
time. He wishes that he could delegate the investigation of trustworthness to somebody
else, so that he could focus on selecting the best gifts.
2.2.2 Key Challenges
This scenario describes a setting where a number of trusting decisions are to be made
in the context of the World Wide Web. One of the visionary goals of the Semantic Web
community is to work towards a world where we can construct autonomous articial
Semantic Web agents which can undertakes these kinds of tasks on a person's behalf.Chapter 2 Use Cases 11
While we described the actions of a human browsing the Web, without signicant changes
it could also describe the actions an autonomous articial agent. The trusting decisions
in the scenario are equally relevant for articial agents.
We have highlighted the following separate research challenges from how these trusting
decisions are approached and undertaken:
 Assessing trustworthiness
The primary challenge here is the assessment of whether or not a vendor is trust-
worthy. In our scenario we have assumed that Martin has made this kind of
assessment before, and thus already has his own personal criteria for this. Assess-
ing trustworthiness is a complex task, there are many factors on which a decision
could be based, and the degree of trustworthiness required may vary with the sit-
uation. The choice of factors, and the degree of trust needed, are generally highly
subjective decisions.
 Discovering reputation
We cannot expect every actor to already have sucient knowledge to make a
trust judgement of another actor they have never before encountered. It follows
therefore that the Semantic Web needs reputation discovery mechanisms. This,
in turn, requires solutions to the challenges which we highlighted in Section 2.1.2;
identity description, communication and comparison.
 Bootstrapping trust
Building a favourable reputation is a chicken-and-egg problem; it is dicult to
gain one without interacting with others, and it is dicult to do so without a
favourable reputation as it increases the risks involved.
In order to boost the growth of reputation information on the Semantic Web, and
thereby improve judgements of trustworthiness, we should seek ways to reduce the
risks of interaction. One potential means for achieving this is to look for sources
of identity and legitimacy which currently lie outside of the Semantic Web, which
may be harnessed by Semantic Web agents.
From the scenario we described, we identied three key challenges; the judgement of
trustworthiness, the sharing and discovery of reputation information, and the building
of reputations, particularly in new environments.
2.3 Information Management
The World Wide Web is an open platform, internet connectivity and technical skills are
the only barriers to publishing information on it. The Semantic Web, being built upon12 Chapter 2 Use Cases
the World Wide Web, is no less open. There no inbuilt controls on what content may be
published on the Web and the Semantic Web; social norms and the threat of prosecution
are the primary control mechanisms.
It follows then that information gleaned from the Semantic Web may be of varying,
unknown or even questionable quality. Therefore, in order to eectively harness this
uncontrolled information to inform decisions of trust, we require robust information
management systems. This scenario describes an organisation using an information
management and integration system to inform their strategic decisions in an environment
where information may be of unknown quality.
2.3.1 Use Case #3
As an information analyst, Grace works with an information management system to
deduce valuable observations and insights from the facts and information stored in the
system's knowledge-base. While the system itself has some limited reasoning and de-
duction capabilities, there remain areas where humans are better at spotting changes,
trends, or at combining seemingly-unrelated facts. When Grace, or the system's inbuilt
reasoning unit, deduces new information, it is added to the system's knowledge-base.
All this information feeds into the decisions made by her employer's strategic planning
team, who are responsible for putting this information to use.
New and fresh, information is regularly added to the system's knowledge-base by another
team. This information comes from a range of publication sources; some sources are well
informed and rigorous in their methods, and some gather information from rumours and
anonymous sources. As a result, the quality of information may vary greatly, and both
the information analysts, and the automated reasoning system, have to pay particular
attention to the information's source and whether the information is corroborated by
other sources.
In the event that information is discovered to be incorrect { be it through simple error
or through subterfuge { Grace's employer wants be able to track the implications of that
discovery. They want to be able to identify which of the planning team's decisions are
aected, so that they may take corrective action where appropriate.
2.3.2 Key Challenges
One of the key benets of Semantic Web technologies is their ability to combine data
from heterogeneous sources and enable powerful analysis of it. This scenario highlights
information management challenges which are a consequence of combining information
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The information management system we described already contains a complete record
of how each piece of information came to exist in the system. With additional records
of the planning team's decisions, and which pieces of information were key to them,
Grace's employer will have all the information they need to track the implications of
changes.
While the aected human deductions may need to be reviewed by analysts themselves, it
should be possible for the automated reasoning system to validate whether its deductions
are still supported by current facts without assistance.
If we wish to eectively work with information collated from various sources, we must
have robust systems for handling this kind of task. Thus, we identify the following
challenge from the above scenario:
 Provenance and reasoning over heterogeneous data
When performing inference over a collection of documents of varying provenance
is is important that adequate provenance information is maintained.
With inadequate information, there may be no means by which to determine the
original sources of a newly inferred piece of information. Without this ability, it
would be become prohibitively dicult to correct errors in one's knowledge-base, as
the number of included documents increases. The retraction of a single statement
would require a complete re-computation of all inferred information.
The lack of adequate provenance records would also signicantly impact any judge-
ment of trustworthiness. If records of the source of inferred information is not kept,
we have no basis on which to judge its trustworthiness.
As we have argued, to make decisions based on reasoned trust { rather than blind faith
{ requires a certain degree of information. Thus with Semantic Web technologies we
must take care to maintain adequate provenance data so that we have such information.
2.4 Summary
In this chapter we presented short use cases in order to illustrate the role trust may
come to play in the Semantic Web, and to help shape the direction of our research.
From these use cases we identied a number of research challenges, these broadly fall
into the categories of identity, trust and reputation, and provenance. Some of these
research challenges relate specically to trust on the Semantic Web, however others are
more general challenges faced by articial trust systems.
Before we seek to address these research challenges, we must rst develop a better
understanding of trust, and mechanisms of trust. Thus, in the next chapter, we focus14 Chapter 2 Use Cases
on the concept of `trust', rst discussing forms of trust and the various uses of the term,
before progressing to study existing work on trust systems in articial environments.Chapter 3
Trust
Trust is a concept which has been studied in a wide variety of disciplines, each of
which has developed its own unique perspective and understanding of the term. In this
chapter we review the literature surrounding trust in order to improve and clarify our
understanding of the term and its relation to our work.
We begin by exploring the term `trust' itself, looking at how it is understood and used as
a term (Section 3.1). Against this background, we consider how we choose to trust, i.e.
how trustworthiness is assessed (Section 3.2), both in the context of other actors, and
in information. Next, in Section 3.3, we discuss the approaches which previous works
have employed in order to model trust mathematically.
Continuing, Section 3.4 begins our investigation of trust in articial environments; we
rst discuss trust mechanisms from the Multi-Agent Systems literature (Section 3.4),
then continuing to discuss trust in digital environments { the forms it takes and the
technologies which have been developed to underpin it (Section 3.4.2), and then nally,
in Section 3.4.3, we discuss trust on the World Wide Web.
3.1 Trust and its Forms
There is no single widely accepted denition of trust; each discipline coins its own
denition on dierent terms, taking dierent elements of the concept into consideration.
For example, psychologists have considered trust a personal attribute [Erikson 1994],
economists are likely to consider trust a result of a rational choice process [McKnight
and Chervany 1996], and sociologists discuss the societal structures which are supported
by trust [Shapiro 1987]. A number of denitions of trust are quoted below to illustrate
these dierent perspectives.
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\[Trust is] condence in or reliance on some quality or attribute of a person
or thing, or the truth of a statement." [Oxford English Dictionary 2011]
\[Trust is] the extent to which one is willing to ascribe good intentions to
and have condence in the words and action of the others." [Cook and Wall
1980]
\[Trust is] an individual's behavioural reliance on another person under a
condition of risk." [Currall and Judge 1995]
\[Trust is] the expectation that arises, within a community of regular, honest,
and cooperative behaviour, based on commonly shared norms, on the part
of other members of that community." [Fukuyama 1995]
\[T]rust, in general, is taken as the belief (or a measure of it) that a per-
son (the trustee) will act in the best interests of another (the truster) in a
given situation, even when controls are unavailable and it may not be in the
trustee's best interests to do so" [Marsh and Dibben 2005]
\Trust indicates the willingness of an agent to engage in a transaction in the
absence of adequate safeguards." [Berger et al. 1995]
\Trust is \the rm belief in the competence of an entity to act dependably,
securely, and reliably within a specied context". [Grandison and Sloman
2000]
\Trust of a party A to a party B for a service X is the measurable belief
of A in that B behaves dependably for a specied period within a specied
context (in relation to service X)."[Olmedilla et al. 2005]
\(a) An individual is confronted with an ambiguous path, a path that can
lead to an event perceived to be benecial (V a+) or to an event perceived
to be harmful (V a ); (b) he perceives that the occurrence of V a+ or V a 
is contingent on the behaviour of another person; (c) and he perceives the
strength of V a  to be greater than the strength of V a+.
If he chooses to take an ambiguous path with such properties, I shall say
he makes a trusting choice; if he chooses not to take the path, he makes a
distrustful choice."[Deutsch 1962]Chapter 3 Trust 17
There are two main themes among these denitions of trust; some describe trust as
choice between action whereas others describe it as a bond. Those which dene trust as
a choice generally agree that it involves the question of whether or not to rely in the face
of uncertainty. To further understand the concept of trust, we believe it is benecial to
consider the dierence between the two main forms of the term, trust as an act, and
trust as a bond. We explore these in the following sections.
3.1.1 An Act of Trust
Trusting is the act of relying on something in an uncertain environment, where it is
perceived that the outcome of the situation is contingent on the behaviour of the trusted
item. In most denitions of trust the expected potential variance in the outcome is
described as the risk.
It is common for us to say that we have trust in some inanimate object { this usage
raises some interesting questions. For example, what does it mean to place one's trust
in a safety harness; our safety is certainly contingent on the behaviour of the harness,
however, the behaviour of the harness, having of course no free will of its own, is entirely
derived from our usage of it. Exploring this further; in reality we have not trusted the
harness itself, instead we have trusted our judgement that the harness appears safe and
then that those who were responsible for constructing and maintaining the harnesses
have done so with due care and diligence.
The decision of whether or not to trust is a choice between dierent courses of action, of
which one or more is a trusting path, and one or more is a path which does not rely on
trust, which Deutsch named trusting choice and distrustful choice, respectively. When
dealing with complex, multifaceted decisions, potential paths may include measures to
decrease the degree of risk or selectively avoid particularly risky factors. Thus, it is
often possible to take a trusting path which does not rely on trust in every respect. The
degree of risk, the context of the choice, and the utility of potential outcomes all play a
role in the decision of whether to trust, as such one must remember that the evaluation
and weighting of these factors are inherently subjective.
Deutsch's denition of trust, which we quoted in Section 3.1, is the closest to our un-
derstanding of trust as an act, although we don't consider it necessary for the outcome
V a  to be harmful and greater in relative strength than the outcome V a+, only that
it be less preferable than V a+.
To state this explicitly, in our opinion, to trust is to choose an ambiguous path where
the desired outcome is contingent on the past, present or future behaviour of another.
Trusting decisions may be contingent on past actions only if some aspect of the action
remains unknown or uncertain. For example, if one knows that a friend had earlier
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done so. Or, if one acts based on known information, one is trusting that the source
of that information properly conveyed the accuracy of, and their condence in, that
information.
3.1.2 A Bond of Trust
Trust as a bond is the notion that two or more individuals are able to comfortably rely
on the behaviour of each other. Thus a bond of trust is the condence that each will
act in the best interests of the other when placed in a scenario where the utility of
the other is contingent on their own actions. In eect, to say a bond of trust exists is
to say that, if an ambiguous path of action were encountered, the participants of the
bond would be comfortable taking the trusting path and relying on the behaviour of the
other participants. This implies that some judgement of trustworthiness { the degree
of condence that something can be relied upon { has already taken place between the
two people.
Trust within society arises from the condence that other members of the society share
the same core values and ideals as oneself, and the conjecture that they will therefore
behave in a manner which is consistent with these. These behavioural expectations
| or social norms | are enforced within the group and breaching them can lead to
punishment and exclusion [O'Hara 2004]. As with bonds of trust, this implies that for
trust to exist within a society, its average member would judge another equally average
member as trustworthy.
3.1.3 The Costs of Trust
Undeniably, there are benets to be gained from considering trust, however, there are
also costs involved in making trusting decisions [O'Hara et al. 2004]. While it is `cheap'
to assess trustworthiness based only on known information, strategies which involve
active research in order to better estimate risk may prove more eective. The costs
of dierent techniques can inuence how we choose to evaluate trustworthiness; which
methods we employ and how rigorous we are in their execution. These costs fall into
three categories which come from the broader economic literature:
Operational costs
Operational costs are the expenses of operating a particular trust system, this
includes both the cost of setting up and operating the whole trustworthiness as-
sessment system.
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This is the cost of a missed opportunity, the benet a trusting path of action would
have conferred over the benet conferred by the non-trusting path.
Deciency costs
The deciency cost is the cost of betrayal or the failure of trust. The size of this
cost plays a large part in the amount of risk which is taken in a trusting decision.
3.1.4 Motivations to Trust
Deutsch's denition of trust permits us to identify trusting decisions but, appropriately,
does not attempt to consider the motivations which might drive someone to choose a
particular path. In his later work, Deutsch lists nine dierent motivations for a single
trusting choice, employing the tale of `The Lady or the Tiger' [Stockton 1884] as a means
of demonstrating them.
To briey summarise the tale: the story tells of a suitor to a princess, who is discovered
by the king. Unfortunately, the king is displeased, and orders the suitor thrown into
a pit with two exits. Behind one exit is a ferocious tiger, behind the other a beautiful
lady. The young man is about to make a choice, when he notices the princess pointing
subtly to one of the doors. He immediately chooses that door and the reader is left to
imagine the results.
Below, we discuss our understanding of each of the nine motivations and how they relate
to trust in our context, summarising from Marsh's review of Deutsch's work [Marsh
1994].
 Trust as condence
Trust as condence is perhaps the most obvious trusting decision; it is attractive
because the benets of co-operation often outweigh the benets of decreased risk
through operating alone. In this case the suitor trusts the princess because he is
condent that she will have his best interests at heart. Deutsch emphasised the
point that, for this to still qualify as a decision of trust, a perceived element of risk
must remain a part of the decision { a point which is echoed by others in the eld.
 Trust as social conformity
In some social circles, trust may be expected and showing signs of distrust may lead
to severe sanctions or punishments. In our running example, displaying distrust
might have lead to social exile or shame, to the suitor (were he to survive the result
of the choice) or perhaps to his family.
We note that social conformity would only begin to impact the behaviour of actor
once they begin to operate in a suciently complex social environment. It might
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noting that social conformity concerns need not alter the true beliefs held by an
actor, they need only alter the actor's behaviour such that it appears to hold the
same beliefs as the rest of the social circle.
 Trust as innocence
A trusting decision founded on the innocence of the trustee is a result of the
trustee's lack of understanding of the full dangers or consequences of the course
of action. Marsh [1994] suggests that this innocence may be rooted in lack of
information, cognitive immaturity, or cognitive defect. In the story, this might
perhaps be choosing a particular door simply because it was the rst action which
was considered.
In our understanding, a trust choice can only be classied as due to innocence by
an external and more informed observer. From the perspective of the actor making
the choice, the decision must fall under one of the other categorisations, or may
not be perceived to be a trusting decision at all.
 Trust as impulsiveness
Cognitive immaturity, defect, or certain attitudes toward the future may lead
to trust as impulsiveness, a result of not giving proper regard and consideration
to the consequences of a particular trusting choice. We consider this choice to be
similar to a decision of trust based on innocence, except that it may be a conscious
decision.
Deutsch suggests that individuals who are dominated by the pull of immediate
gratication may be prone to this form of trusting decision due to their disregard
of the future consequences. Again, in the story, this might be embodied in choosing
a particular door simply because it was the rst action which was considered.
 Trust as virtue
Deutsch [1973] argues that trust and trustworthiness are necessary for co-operative
action and friendly social relations, this trust is naturally considered a virtue in
social groups. We suggest that, generally, and also in our story, one might trust
selshly simply to demonstrate one's virtue, or altruistically under the ethical
motivation to \Do unto others as you would have them do unto you." This ethical
code is often known as `the Golden Rule' and is found in a wide range of cultures,
and has also been shown to have an evolutionary basis [Axelrod and Hamilton
1981]. This form of trust has a similar eect to social conformity except that
the incentives arise from the hope of later rewards rather than fear of possible
sanctions.
 Trust as masochism
Trust as masochism is dicult to rationalise. Our interpretation of it is that the
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trust. Subsequently, a positive outcome (encountering the lady beyond the door)
will be perceived as more rewarding than it would have been otherwise.
This form of trust crucially requires the trustee to have low expectations, the
cause of which is beyond the scope of our discussion. We do not expect this form
of trusting decision to be of immediate use to software agents, however in non-fatal
circumstances it could be used as a demonstration of prowess of some kind.
 Trust as despair
Trust as despair may occur when the negative consequences of not reaching a
trusting decision (i.e. either actively distrusting or not reaching any decision) are
so great or so certain that the trusting choice is the only decision. In the story of
The Lady or the Tiger, indecision means certain death by execution thus reaching
a decision is preferable. Additionally, this may be an opposite or sorts to `trust as
masochism', if the suitor decides to trust the princess because the other conclusion
{ that his aections were unrequited { would lead to despair.
We consider this form of trust to be easy to imagine in interactions with service
providers, where the consequences of not procuring a service are far greater than
the potential risk. In the context of trusting information this may represent the
choice to rely on information not on its own merit, but on the realisation that if
it were not true the situation would be dire beyond the point of rescue.
 Trust as faith
Faith, by its very nature, is again dicult for us to rationalise. The decision to
trust based on faith is built on the fact that the agent holds core beliefs which
oset the consequences of any decision rationalised by faith. In this example the
suitor may have faith in `the gods' or in their `destiny' such that either he has
conviction that the lady will be behind the door, or that whatever lies behind
the door is his pre-ordained path. Whether the door is picked impulsively, or the
princess' gesture is heeded as a `sign', is completely down to the convictions of the
suitor.
Trust as faith is likely `trust as condence' under another guise. If one's core
beliefs include a spiritual force or being which has control of, or inuence over,
events, then one could well percieve this as a rational descision of condence.
Again it would take an external observer with dierent beliefs to identify this as
a faith-based decision.
Taking this further, belief in some spiritual force may be no dierent - in a decision-
making context - to other beliefs about the nature of the world, such as gravity.
Spiritual belief does not preclude self-consistent rational trusting decisions. The
dierence is perhaps that we can identify `belief in a spiritual force or being' as
the primary factor in the condence-based trusting decision.22 Chapter 3 Trust
 Risk-taking or gambling
If the potential gains of a successful trusting decision are subjectively far greater
than the potential losses, the gambling suitor may be prepared to take the risk, even
in the face of poor odds. The suitor may also not value his life highly or otherwise
decide that life is not worth living without the lady, thus further increasing the
subjective attractiveness of a gambling choice.
We note that the estimations of the value of losses or gains are often irrational
in practice, thus some gamblers will take ill-advised risks. There is space for
gambling decisions in trust mechanisms, when the potential gain is high, and/or
the potential losses low, particularly in environments where the failure of a single
interaction would not signicantly impact the overall outcome.
The diversity of this list highlights how much the motivations for making a trusting
choice may vary. It is worth noting that while only one or two of the motives are
immediately identiable as rational motives, in certain situations each of them may
oer an advantage, particularly within the context of a complex environment or large
society. For example, while trust as social conformity discourages actions which lead
to personal gain, such as theft, it often oers a societal benet, such as reduced crime
levels.
We ascribe the trusting behaviour of the agents in our use cases (Chapter 2) to `trust
as condence'. It is this form of trust that we which we wish to promote through the
application of trust mechanisms. In order to be able to trust based on condence, our
systems will require sucient information to judge the risk of a particular course of
action, and also eective strategies and analytical techniques to do so.
3.2 Assessing Trustworthiness
The assessment of risk and trustworthiness are important challenges in condence-based
trusting decisions. Reaching a trusting decision in a high-risk situation would require
a higher level of trustworthiness to counteract the risk. Risk assessment has long been
a subject of research in management disciplines, such as project management, public
health, and safety and security planning. In this thesis we are primarily interested in
the assesment of trustworthiness, and so we place the challenge of risk assessment beyond
the scope of our current work.
Almost all of our quoted denitions of trust in Section 3.1 describe trust between two
or more actors. In the context of our study of trust, we also wish to consider the act
of relying on information, as the Semantic Web is an information-driven environment.
Thus we consider the challenge of assessing trustworthiness on two fronts: the assessment
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3.2.1 Trustworthy Information
Trusting in information is fundamentally dierent to trusting in an actor; information
may be inaccurate or incorrect, but it cannot act or change of its own accord as an actor
could. Thus the judgement of the trustworthiness of a piece of information must be based
on the qualities of the information. This judgement must be made in a given context
as dierent situations may have fundamentally dierent requirements on the attributes
of information, such as accuracy, precision or certainty. We expect this judgement to
incorporate the history of the information: its sources, and the trustworthiness of the
source in this context.
Na ve approaches have, in the past, simply adopted the perceived trustworthiness of
the information source as the sole indicator of the quality of information. This fails
to consider a number of important issues; information may have multiple sources, may
have been re-published, or may be derived from other information [Hartig 2010]. In
some situations, the history of the information may be as important as the information
itself [Hartig 2009b].
There are documented occurrences of bogus information being introduced into the popu-
lar online encyclopaedia, Wikipedia, which then became dicult to remove.1 The bogus
fact happens to be reproduced by a more traditional publication, which in turn is cited
as a justication for the fact's existence in wikipedia, on the assumption of due diligence
by the publisher. In circumstances like these, the full information history { if it were
available { would bring this incorrect justication to light.
Returning to the subject of judging trustworthiness, any judgement of information trust-
worthiness must be made in the context of some perceived risk-bearing decision. If there
is no perceived dierence in risk between paths, then there is no trusting decision to be
considered. We note that this is an uncommon choice, because there are almost always
paths of inaction which present dierent risks.
In the absence of a concrete choice between actions, the purpose of information trust-
worthiness assessment instead becomes the choice of belief. In this new context the
judgement criteria would include such factors as account one's readiness to accept facts
from that source, and the possible implications of belief.
If this information is accepted as a belief these beliefs might be called upon in a trust-
ing decision at a later date. In which case the beliefs would then be re-evaluated for
trustworthiness in the new context.
Work by Gil and Ratnakar [2002] built on early Semantic Web technologies to demon-
strate a powerful information annotation system designed to allow information analysts
1Reliability of Wikipedia: See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reliability_of_Wikipedia#
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to decompose statements into composite facts which can then be individually assessed on
criteria such as credibility and reliability. Gil and Ratnakar's TRELLIS system allows an
information analyst to decompose information content into its constituent statements,
and justify or dismiss them based on the source of the information as well as any other
corroborating evidence, allowing analysts to document their analysis processes.
TRELLIS is a tool which helps people to make the kind of informed information trust-
worthiness assessment which we discussed briey above. Although Semantic Web tech-
nologies have advanced considerably since this work was carried out, we still consider
it relevant, as it demonstrates the capabilities we believe a fully-edged Semantic Web
information management system should have.
3.2.1.1 Information Quality
The form of information trustworthiness assessment we are considering has been studied
elsewhere under the guise of Information Quality (IQ) assessment [Naumann 2002]. IQ
assessment is a key challenge for any system which integrates information retrieved from
many sources, including the unmoderated Web.
Although judgements of information trustworthiness and credibility are undertaken for
dierent purposes, they are both forms of IQ assessment. Naumann presents a range of
criteria on which IQ can be assessed (shown in Table 3.1), the results of which, in his
system, are combined through some process into an overall IQ score [Naumann 2002].
While Naumann's list covers most common IQ criteria, it should not be thought of
as exhaustive; there may exist criteria which have not yet been considered. Also, the
selection of criteria to be evaluated may vary depending on the context of the assessment,
as some may be neither relevant nor important in certain situations. We note that
some of Naumann's criteria, notably Reputation, stray beyond the assessment of the
information alone, assessing the behaviour and attributes of the information sources.
We discuss synthetic reputation mechanisms further in Section 3.4.
3.2.1.2 Information Provenance
Provenance concerns the origins and known history of an artefact; information prove-
nance is specically concerned with the origins and history of a particular piece of infor-
mation. Information provenance is vitally important to the assessment of information
trustworthiness. Unless we have recorded information from rst-hand experiences, we
are put in a position where we must rely on information from external sources. Moreover,
the information we do receive from others might not be from those who have directly
experienced it.Chapter 3 Trust 25
Category Criteria
Content-related
Accuracy
Completeness
Customer Support
Documentation
Interpretability
Relevancy
Value-added
Technical
Availability
Latency
Price
Quality of Service
Response time
Security
Timeliness
Intellectual
Believability
Objectivity
Reputation
Instantiation-related
Amount of data
Representational conciseness
Representational consistency
Understandability
Veriability
Table 3.1: Naumann's IQ criteria [Naumann 2002]
As we mentioned in Section 3.2.1, it is not sucient to consider only the immediate
source of information when judging its trustworthiness. Information may have been
collated or derived from multiple sources, or simply re-published by a third party. Each
actor involved in the history of an informational artefact has had some opportunity to
inuence the nal result. Thus, when we consider the trustworthiness of information, we
must take into account the actors and processes which have played a role in the creation
of the information we have received.
The World Wide Web Consortium (W3C) PROV family of documents describes a frame-
work for interoperable interchange of provenance information [Moreau and Missier 2013,
Lebo et al. 2013]. It is the result of a community eort to to achieve inter-operability
in provenance information systems.
3.2.2 Trustworthy Actors
Of the two challenges of trust assessment, information and actors, assessing actors is
the most important because, as we argued in Section 3.2.1, the trustworthiness of infor-
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trustworthiness of actors based on either observable factors, or on information provided
by other actors.
3.2.2.1 Observable Signals
Trustworthiness is most often judged on observable factors such as appearance and be-
haviour. The eld of signalling theory, from the discipline of evolutionary biology [Krebs
and Davies 1978], demonstrates that there can be an evolutionary advantage in doing
so.
When considering a trusting decision, one will almost certainly never have complete
information, or the time to examine it, thus we must turn to heuristic-based indica-
tors to help us to judge trustworthiness. Heuristic take advantage of readily accessible,
but often loosely applicable, information to provide approximate answers to problems.
Appearance is one such heuristic factor, although it does not directly relate to trust-
worthiness, it can be a strong indicator of trustworthiness in certain circumstances. For
example; wearing a smart outt, and presenting a polite and friendly manner requires
a certain level of investment, and this perceived investment is interpreted as a signal of
trustworthiness.
Other forms of dress may send dierent signals; certain outts might indicate member-
ship of a social group or movement, for which stereotypes may suggest other patterns
of behaviour or attitudes. Membership of trade groups or professional bodies is another
signal that people employ to suggest trustworthiness, as they suggest certain standards,
codes of conduct, or attention to detail as well as some investment of resources towards
gaining membership. We may also employ other heuristics which judge behaviour rather
than appearance. For example, it may be possible to guess when someone is practic-
ing deception by looking for specic behaviours, or `tells', which are common in these
situations.
Of course, these indicators are not perfect and it is often possible to imitate them and
thereby appear more trustworthy than one deserves. Untrustworthy actors may seek
to appear trustworthy without making the full investment of resources. To counter
this, each new signal aims to be harder to imitate, and to be a better indicator of
trustworthiness. Thus there is a perpetual arms-race between the trustworthy population
and the untrustworthy population.
3.2.2.2 Reputation
Reputation is a factor on which humans judge trustworthiness; we judge based on recom-
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mechanism to allow us to judge trustworthiness without the costs of building up sucient
direct experience.
Reputation is not an observable characteristic of an individual and must be gleaned from
other members of a community. Although is not a directly observable signal, reputation
can be a strong indicator of trustworthiness as it has a number of desirable properties:
 It can be linked to past behaviour within a community.
 The investment required is trustworthy behaviour itself.
 Any untrustworthy behaviour puts any previous investment at risk.
 It cannot be faked by a lone individual.
It is worth emphasising that reputation is an indicator of trustworthiness according to
community norms; i.e. there may be some variation in the assessment of each interac-
tion, but in aggregate the reputation should reect the expectations of the community.
Thus if one's preferences deviates from the community norm it will be necessary to re-
interpret the reputation information before it can be incorporated into a trustworthiness
assessment.
3.3 Modelling Trust and Belief
In order to analyse trust, research often has need to measure or quantify it in some way
Commonly, researchers employ either discrete or continuous representations of trust:
Discrete range
In systems which interact with humans, trust is often represented as a discrete
range, either numeric or otherwise. Such approaches usually include a descriptive
label for each value, for example: (1) Distrusts absolutely (2) Distrusts highly
(3) Distrusts moderately (4) Distrusts slightly (5) Trusts neutrally (6) Trusts
slightly (7) Trusts moderately (8) Trusts highly (9) Trusts absolutely [Golbeck
et al. 2003].
Continuous range
Continuous representations of trust often represent trust as a value between 0 and
100, or perhaps 0 and 1. As any continuous range can be converted to any other,
given an appropriate transform function, there is little practical dierence between
them. Continuous ranges are rarely used when humans are asked to rate trust,
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Marsh [1994] chose to represent trust and distrust in a continuous measure in the range
[ 1;1], where  1 denotes complete distrust, 1 denotes complete trust, and 0 denotes a
neutral stance. Interestingly, Marsh noted that at the edges of this range ( 1 or 1), the
labels we assign to this measure break down, for example if we dene trust to require
some degree of risk to be involved, complete trust implies that there is no longer any
risk, then the choice is clearly no longer a question of trust. While we agree with this
observation, we believe that for practical purposes this technicality can be safely ignored.
The trustworthiness of in information is closely related to belief in information; we would
not trust information in which we do not believe, unless perhaps the information comes
with strong assurances from the trustworthy source. Marsh's representation of trust can
be also be applied to the task of modelling belief; where the three points in the range
([ 1;0;1]) denote belief that it is false (disbelief), belief that the information is true,
and a mid-point of no conviction either way.
3.3.1 Untrustworthiness, Disbelief and Uncertainty
When considering information with the aim of making better trusting decisions it is easy
to forget the antonyms of trustworthiness and belief: untrustworthiness and disbelief,
respectively. If one considers an more active target of trust, such as an agent or person,
we are more likely to remember that they may be untrustworthy.
Hartig [2009a] models trustworthiness on a per-statement basis, proposing a similar
representation to that of Marsh [1994] but adds to the interpretation of the range. For
a statement in Hartig's model, the value of the measure indicates belief or disbelief for
the values 1 and  1 respectively, while between these the uncertainty increases such
that a value of 0 represents complete uncertainty. This interpretation, as illustrated by
Figure 3.1, makes intuitive sense, as one can only completely believe or disbelieve in a
statement if one is also completely certain of one's stance. Conversely, if one neither
believes nor disbelieves in a statement, one must be wholly uncertain of its validity.
disbelief belief
 1 0 1
uncertainty
1
Figure 3.1: Meaning of trust values. Reproduced from [Hartig 2009a]
The exact function of the line illustrated in Figure 3.1 is highly likely to vary between
individuals; some will be more willing to believe in the face of uncertainty than others.Chapter 3 Trust 29
3.4 Articial Trust Environments
In addition to investigating trust among humans and other animals, research has also
explored the challenge of trust in articial environments. These articial environments
can give us insights into how the trust mechanisms we see today might have evolved.
Simulated environments and populations give us the opportunity to explore the eects
that dierent changes in behaviour may have on the bonds of trust within a society.
3.4.1 Trust in Multi-Agent Systems
Trust is an active area of research in Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) or Distributed Arti-
cial Intelligence (DAI) research, as, in some systems, the benevolence and co-operation
of agents cannot be relied upon. In the eld of Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) the term
`Agent' is used to denote a hardware or software-based computer system which exhibits
autonomy, social ability, reactivity and pro-activeness [Wooldridge and Jennings 1995].
Research on trust from the multi-agent systems perspective is particularly valuable as
it is both analytic and synthetic; environments are constructed, and their emergent
properties and behaviour are analysed. In these controlled simulations, it is possible to
analyse the macro eects of small changes in incentives or behaviour.
3.4.1.1 Trust Strategies
O'Hara et al. [2004] described the costs and risks of ve basic strategies, which serve as
a good starting point for consideration:
Optimistic trust systems The optimistic strategy assumes all agents are trustworthy
until proven otherwise. In environments where the benets of co-operation are large,
or the costs of betrayal are relatively small, risk may be considered low, and the gains
from trusting by default are likely to outweigh the gains of distrust. Systems in these
environments are likely to benet from decentralisation and self-policing mechanisms,
to ensure that the shared ethics of the user population determines the policies of trust
[Kamvar et al. 2003].
Pure optimism, as a strategy, has very low operational costs, but in non-ideal environ-
ments does not perform well. It is, however, useful in bootstrapping systems where
there is not yet sucient information to perform a more complex strategy. Optimism
also performs well in distributed environments, as there is no central point of failure.
Pessimistic trust systems Pessimistic strategies, conversely, assume all agents are
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as that of optimism, as they share a common simplicity. It also is as well suited to
distributed environments as optimistic strategies.
Generally pessimistic strategies are employed in tandem with a whitelist which lists
known trusted agents; otherwise a pessimistic agent cannot ever make a trusting decision.
While pessimistic strategies will have low, if not zero, deciency costs, their opportunity
costs are likely to be high.
Centralised trust systems Centralised trust strategies delegate the investigation of
trustworthiness to a central authority. Centralised strategies do not preclude the need for
trust judgements; an agent must instead weigh whether or not to trust the judgements
of the central authority. The central authority incurs the costs of investigating the
trustworthiness of each agent, but, at a system-level, prevents the duplication of eort
through repeated investigations.
By their nature, centralised strategies introduce a central point of failure, however, it can
be mitigated to a certain degree so long as there exist multiple, competing, authorities
for the same domain. So long as a healthy competitive environment is maintained,
having competing authorities may encourage the reduction of costs and the increase of
eciency.
Trust investigative systems Investigative strategies seek to reduce uncertainty, and
thereby risk, through active investigation. Investigative agents actively seek information
on an unknown agent from third parties, undertaking extra computational tasks in order
to determine the trustworthiness of an unknown agent. Iterative credential disclosure
negotiation is another example of trust investigation, where both parties are concurrently
investigating each other [Winslett et al. 2002].
The operational and opportunity costs of investigative strategies are high; investigating
other agents requires time and resources which may cause opportunities to be missed.
Deciency costs are likely to be low, as good investigation ought to have reduced the
risk of interaction with malicious agents.
Transitive trust systems Transitive trust systems exploit the trust network built
by the links formed by interactions between individual agents to aggregate reputation
reports as a single reputation metric [Richardson et al. 2003]. Small-world phenomena,
which mean that any two people in a social network may be linked by a relatively short
chain of acquaintances, are the main reason transitive trust systems can be eective.
However, the degree to which trust may be considered transitive is a contested issue,
rstly because the context of trust is generally not modelled for each link, and secondly
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between trusting someone to do X, trusting someone to recommend someone to do X
and trusting someone to recommend someone who can recommend someone to do X.
The costs of running a transitive trust system depends on the properties of the network
in question; larger networks are more likely to nd a link between any two individuals,
however, risk rises as the trust chain length increases. Transitive trust systems are
susceptible to false recommendations, however, over repeated iterations it should be
possible to isolate the sources of bad information. The permanence of identities is an
important factor here; if it is trivial to abandon tainted identities and coin new ones,
malicious agents will be free to supply false recommendations without recrimination,
and will likely over time poison the wider network.
3.4.1.2 Reputation Mechanisms
Reputation-based trust systems use reported experience from others to reach a decision
of trust about another entity. As well as providing a quality on which to evaluate
unknown agents, and generally improving judgements of trustworthiness, functioning
reputation systems provide an incentive for good behaviour, and a disincentive against
bad. Reputation systems may be constructed with varying degrees of centralisation and
distribution. However, the exact balance needed for such a system to function eectively
at Web scale, while remaining robust against malice or deception, is dicult to judge.
In the multi-agent systems literature, Huynh et al. [2006] present Certied Reputation
(CR), a trustworthiness evaluation mechanism which is informed by reputation informa-
tion provided by prospective interaction partners. The prospective partner may provide
third-party references about its previous performance in order to prove its reliability.
The authors acknowledge the inherent problem in relying on third-party referee infor-
mation sources, and include in CR the means to record and evaluate the credibility of a
referee based on the historical accuracy of its recommendations. This strategy appears
reasonable, though further work is needed to see how this might perform at Web scale,
with a constant turnover in users and actively malicious behaviour.
The Hierarchical And Bayesian Inferred Trust Model (HABIT) trust model presented
by Teacy et al. [2008] describes an internal model for representing reported interac-
tion outcomes, a raw measure of reputation, from a variety of sources. The authors
have recognised that dishonest agents may report reputation inaccurately and that even
benevolent agents may judge the outcomes of an interaction dierently. Thus, the key
contribution of the HABIT model is that it facilitates the analysis of the the reputation
reporter as well as the agent under discussion. From this, the relationships between
actual and reported interaction outcomes can be analysed, and generalisations can be
made between dierent sources and contexts.32 Chapter 3 Trust
3.4.2 Trust in a Digital Context
In the past, trusting decisions were generally grounded in ones personal rst-hand expe-
riences. As communication technologies have advanced, we have stretched the reach of
trust across ever wider distances to support our global economy. Along the way, these
communication mediums have, to some extent, lost contact with the factors on which we
would normally have based trusting decisions. Mail fraud schemes and telephone scams
have been some of the symptoms of this, and anti-fraud legislation and distance selling
regulations have been our attempts to address them.
Electronic communications domains such as the Internet and email have stretched the
limits of trust further still. Aside from the content of the communication, very few
features of identity remain, making it ever harder to judge the identity of remote cor-
respondents. The design of the internet infrastructure also gives no assurance that
messages passed among its routers have not been read and/or modied along their trav-
els. In face-to-face communication, one has at least a chance of catching an eavesdropper
in the act, and one can be certain that one's words have not been modied in the time
they pass from one's lips to the ears of the person receiving them.
As we described in Section 3.2.2.1, we observe certain `signals' as indicators of trustwor-
thiness. The transition of human interactions to a digital context has forced us to create
and adopt new signals. Unfortunately, as copying is trivial in a digital context, imitation
is also trivial. This has meant that certain signals which are purely informational { i.e.
those not tied to independently observable characteristics { are quickly subverted by
untrustworthy actors.
In order to combat this, and to provide assurances of authenticity in a digital context,
we have turned to cryptography.
3.4.2.1 Cryptography
Throughout history, cryptographic algorithms have been used to provide secure and
private communications. Cryptographic algorithms do not directly enable trust, but they
provide four principal assurances, each of which can support trust in certain situations:
Condentiality
Condentiality requires that no unauthorised parties may eavesdrop on an ex-
change.
The assurance of condentiality allows agents to assume that their communication
will not cause agents other than the recipient to change their behaviour, thereby
reducing the risk of incorrect action.Chapter 3 Trust 33
Authentication
Authentication ensures that the other party is who they claim to be.
Judgements of trustworthiness often depend on the the identity of the agent; au-
thentication provides a means of verifying identity.
Integrity
The message received has not been tampered with since it was sent by the other
party.
Integrity assurances allow agents to assume that they are not operating on infor-
mation which has been maliciously tampered with.
Non-repudiation
The sender cannot later claim not to have sent the message.
Non-repudiation provides an insurance policy of sorts, the assurance that either
side cannot later deny what they have said.
There are two main classes of cryptographic encryption algorithms: symmetric and
asymmetric. Symmetric algorithms encrypt a message with a secret key, and can decrypt
the resulting cipher-text using the same key. Asymmetric algorithms employ key-pairs,
of which either may be used to encrypt information, however, only the key not used to
encrypt the message can decrypt the cipher-text.
Generally, one half of an asymmetric key-pair is designated the public key and dissem-
inated freely, and the other half, the private key, is kept only by its owner. Assuming
that an agent A acquired the public key for agent B from a trusted source, A can be
condent that any message sent to B which is encrypted by B's public key cannot be
read by anyone except B. Building on this, bidirectional encrypted communication using
asymmetric encryption can be achieved using 2 sets of key-pairs.
Symmetric key algorithms rely on the secrecy of the secret key to assure condentiality,
authentication and integrity; they only weakly provide non-repudiation, as any party
privy to the secret key could have sent a particular message. Asymmetric cryptography
algorithms generally rely on one half of the key remaining private and the conjecture
that it is computationally intractable to compute any private key that corresponds to a
given public key, and that no two individuals will generate the same key-pair randomly.
All four assurances are provided more robustly by asymmetric key algorithms than by
symmetric key algorithms; both parties must be privy to the key in order to use a sym-
metric algorithm and thus either party could compromise the communication. In con-
trast, if the private key of one key-pair from an asymmetrically encrypted communication
were compromised, only the communications in one direction would be compromised.34 Chapter 3 Trust
3.4.2.2 Public Key Cryptography
Public key cryptography is a cryptographic approach whose distinguishing characteristic
is the use of asymmetric encryption algorithms2.
Integrity can also be guaranteed for non-encrypted information using public-key cryp-
tography. A one-directional hash of a resource is generated using a known algorithm and
the output is encrypted with a private key. From this, anyone possessing the document,
the encrypted hash and the public key of the signatory can verify whether the docu-
ment is unmodied, providing they can perform the same one-way hashing algorithm.
This process is generally know as cryptographically, digitally or electronically `signing'
a document, thereby producing a cryptographic, digital or electronic signature.
Non-repudiation is also achievable with public key cryptography by requiring the pub-
lisher to cryptographically sign the document before publishing. However, it relies on
the assumption that the public key is intrinsically tied to the identity of the signing
individual, thus the individual cannot also claim to not have possessed that key pair. In
practice, a false denial would be unlikely to go unnoticed as others would have witnessed
the individual's use of the disputed key-pair, however it would not be possible to rule
out a claim that the key was compromised by a third party.
3.4.2.3 Public Key Infrastructure
The Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a set of technologies, policies and procedures
used to create, manage, store, distribute, and revoke digital certicates. Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) is built upon the ability of public key cryptography to sign docu-
ments, and the aordance that public keys may be published and disseminated widely.
Each PKI scheme has a root Certicate Authority (CA) which maintains and underwrites
a collection of unique user identities. In practice, it does so by signing a certicate
document containing a user's public key and other information intended to verify the
identity of the user. The public nature of PKI schemes deter repudiation of key pairs
because a third party, the key signer, can vouch for who that the key was held by.
The most commonly used PKI scheme is the X.509 system specied by the ITU Telecom-
munication Standardization Sector (ITU-T), which describes a strict hierarchical system
of certicate authorities [REC. 2008]. Modern operating systems and Web Browsers are
commonly distributed with a set of certicates for root Certicate Authorities (CAs)
who are considered trustworthy by the software vendors. These root CAs underwrite the
2Commonly, when communicating using asymmetric key encryption, exchanges will actually use a
per-session symmetric key, which was negotiated securely using asymmetric key algorithms. This is a
optimisation measure as asymmetric cryptography algorithms are generally signicantly more computa-
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identities of secondary CAs, who either underwrite further CAs or sign identity certi-
cates for users, for things such as internet host names, or email addresses. PKI creates
a chain of trust through each CA and is a primarily centralised trust strategy, although
the central authority does not need to be involved in each interaction.
The degree of information in an underwritten identity varies considerably between types
of certicate. Extended Validation (EV) Certicates oer a stronger layer of assurance
compared to standard X.509 certicates; users requesting such a certicate must un-
dergo more extensive investigation of their legal identity and domain name ownership
before issuers will issue one, and issuers of EVs must also undergo periodic audits by a
recognised and independent third party organisation.
The PKI can be regarded as a set of centralised authorities in which we place our
trust. Recently, a series of high-prole security breaches at certain certicate authorities
has thrown some doubt onto the trustworthiness of this system [British Broadcasting
Corporation 2011, Arthur 2011]. The certicate authorities are perhaps too far divorced
from the users who (usually unknowingly) rely on their cryptographic assurances. As
a result it can be dicult for users to have condence in organisations which they are
unlikely to ever met, and which does not have a direct incentive to care about their
wellbeing.
3.4.2.4 The Web of Trust
In contrast to the hierarchical nature of PKI, the Web of Trust is a grassroots, decen-
tralised, peer-to-peer trust system. Rather than build the foundation of trust on a few
select organisations, the Web of Trust relies on a network of people who vouch for each
other's credentials.
The Web of Trust predates the recent, high prole, breaches of certicate authorities by
many years. The Web of Trust is built on the OpenPGP standards [Callas et al. 2007]
which were evolved from the existing Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) computer program,
developed by Phil Zimmermann.
The Web of Trust is extended by creating a certicate of a user's identity (including
public key and owner information) and then having it cryptographically signed by other
users who, by doing so, endorse the association of that public key with the person or
entity described in the certicate. While key signing may often be done on a one-o
basis, a common method of building this social network of trust is through key signing
parties, where a number of users meet to verify each other's credentials.
PGP is often used in email clients as a security and/or privacy measure, but is not often
used elsewhere; PKI is, on the other hand, supported by almost every operating system36 Chapter 3 Trust
and Web Browser application. In contrast to PKI, the Web of Trust is a decentralised
network and has much in common with transitive trust strategies.
3.4.3 Trust on the Web
The World Wide Web is an unmoderated publishing system with very few technical
restrictions on content publication. The Web has no inbuilt mechanism to restrict what
content can be published; social norms and the threat of prosecution are the primary
forces moderating publised content. As a result, almost anyone can publish anything on
the Web (see Section 4.1). As a consequence of this, when browsing the Web, users are
faced with questions of trust for every page they visit [Golbeck 2006]. These questions
range from decisions such as whether or not the information on the page is true, to
complex and critical decisions such as whether it is safe to engage in a nancial trans-
action with a particular website. These questions are all the more dicult because, as
we discussed in Section 3.4.2, in digital environments it is easy to copy the appearance
of trustworthiness.
The study of trust is continually inuenced by our observations of human society; mod-
els of human trusting behaviour oer insights into the inner workings of existing trust
systems. McKnight et al. [2002] present an e-commerce trust model based on the Theory
of Reasoned Action (TRA); they posit that trusting beliefs (perceptions of specic Web
vendor attributes) lead to trusting intentions (intention to engage in trust-related be-
haviours with a specic Web vendor), which in turn result in trust-related behaviours.
Figure 3.2 illustrates the relationships between these high-level constructs, and Fig-
ure 3.3 illustrates how these are composed of more directly measurable sub-constructs.
Models of trust in e-commerce environments, such as the aforementioned model, of-
fer insights into how trusting decisions are made in digital environments, and through
analysing them we can hope to identify how cases of misplaced trust might be prevented.
Disposition to Trust
Institution-Based Trust
Perceptions of the
Internet environment
Trusting Beliefs
Perceptions of speciﬁc 
Web vendor attributes
Trusting Intentions
Intention to engage in trust-
related behaviours with a 
speciﬁc Web vendor
Trust Related Behaviours
Figure 3.2: McKnight et al.'s Web Trust Model - Overview. [McKnight et al. 2002]
From a technological point of view, the Web relies on the Public Key Infrastructure to
provide a grounding of trust, assuring the identity of Web servers, and condentialityChapter 3 Trust 37
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Figure 3.3: McKnight et al.'s Web Trust Model - Constructs and Nomological Net-
work. [McKnight et al. 2002]
of communications. Unfortunately its use is optional and users often do not recognise
its presence, or absence, nor understand the implications thereof. Dhamija et al. [2006]
found that only 23% of participants in their study of online phishing looked at the address
bar of the Web browser when asked to comment on the legitimacy of a website. Further,
a full 59% of participants did not pay attention to the presence of https:// in the
address bar, which denotes a Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure (HTTPS) connection.
It is clear from their work that visual cues are a signicant factor in people's assessment
of Web site identity, indeed 23% of their participants looked only at the content of the
website itself to evaluate its authenticity. Wang and Emurian [2005] summarise the
design features which have been shown to induce trusting attitudes in users into four
categories:
Graphic Design
Graphical rst impressions and professional appearance.
Structure Design
Information organisation and accessibility, navigational simplicity and consistency.
Content Design
Informational content including branding, seals-of-approval and professional as-
surances.
Social-cue Design
Human touches such as photos of people, live chat, and video pitches.
Unfortunately, while these features demonstrate a certain level of investment and care
in the design and upkeep of a website, they are a poor measure of identity. This is due38 Chapter 3 Trust
to the fact that, as we discussed in Section 3.4.2, it is trivial to copy them verbatim
from another website.
3.4.3.1 Online marketplaces
Online marketplaces, such as the auction website eBay3 and Amazon.com's4 Market-
place, have engineered and integrated reputation systems into their marketplace as a
means of enforcing and encouraging trustworthiness among their users. Resnick and
Zeckhauser [2002] examine the reputation system in use by eBay, concluding that it
does appear to have the desired eect of increasing trustworthy behaviour, even though
it may not be mathematically reliable or sound; they postulate that it continues to
function, despite being unsound in a mathematical sense, due to the fact that its users
believe that it works.
Both these marketplace reputation systems are centralised systems which solicit and
aggregate reviews of agents' behaviour.
3.5 Summary
In summary, in this chapter we have examined the concept of trust, the forms in which it
manifests, and a range of motivations for trusting. We conclude that `trust as condence'
is the form of trust which we wish to promote on the Semantic Web (Section 3.1).
Judging trustworthiness is the primary challenge of trust; we divide it into assessing the
trustworthiness of information and of actors. Although they are closely related, these
two challenges have separate problems (Section 3.2).
Next, we reviewed dierent methods by which previous research has quantied trust
(Section 3.3). Finally, we discussed research into trust in articial environments, from en-
tirely simulated environments, to the World Wide Web (Section 3.4). We also discussed
the technologies which provide the crucial foundations for trust in these domains, includ-
ing cryptography (Section 3.4.2.1), and the Public Key Infrastructure (Section 3.4.2.3).
Against this background, in the next chapter, we focus on the Semantic Web and the
role which trust plays within it. We discuss the current state of the art in that area,
and identify a number of research challenges.
3eBay.com: See http://www.ebay.com
4Amazon.com: See http://www.amazon.comChapter 4
The Semantic Web
Before we can discuss trust in the context of the Semantic Web, it is important that we
rst understand the nature, purpose and principles of the Semantic Web. To that end,
we begin this chapter with a brief history of the World Wide Web, the technology stack
which underlies the Semantic Web and which has shaped many of its design decisions
(Section 4.1). We then consider the Semantic Web in detail (Section 4.2), discussing
its core formats and protocols (Sections 4.2.1, 4.2.2.3), and the Linked Data movement
(Section 4.2.3). Against this background, in Section 4.3, we return to the study of trust,
now in the context of the Semantic Web. Finally, before summarising this chapter,
Section 4.4 concludes with a review of the relevant research challenges which we have
identied in this chapter.
4.1 Hypertext and the World Wide Web
The World Wide Web (or colloquially, the Web) [Berners-Lee et al. 1992] was rst
proposed in March 1989 by Sir Tim Berners-Lee at The European Organization for
Nuclear Research (CERN)1 [Berners-Lee 1989] as a collaboration tool for the High-
Energy Physics research community.
The World Wide Web is, at its core, a hypertext information system inter-linked across
a global network of computers, the Internet. Hypertext is a form of information pre-
sentation that is intended to overcome limitations of linear text | text which has a
predened narrative which runs from beginning to end. Rather than remaining static
as plain text must, hypertext makes possible a dynamic organisation of information
through links and connections (called hyperlinks). Hypertext systems often go beyond
this to incorporate interactive elements (for example when a user `clicks' or `hovers' over
1CERN: See http://www.cern.ch/
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an element on the page with a cursor), multiple media (such as images, sound and video)
or adaptive content such that they display dierent information for dierent users.
The Internet has become an open communication network on which anyone who has
the means to communicate may communicate. The cost of Internet access varies across
regions, but prices are generally decreasing, and one can often nd free access in public
facilities such as libraries. The barriers to internet access are low enough that almost
anyone can take advantage of the information or services which are oered on the Web.
The only prerequisite to publishing or oering services on the World Wide Web is a
publicly routable IP address. Although most do, some low-cost Internet access packages
do not include a public IP address. Public IP address can also be leased from online
service providers, often in a shared form at a lower cost. In addition, there are now many
online services oering free Web publishing platforms, often supported by advertising
or services. As a net result of these dierent factors, any reasonably determined person
can publish information or oer services on the Web.
Web pages are requested and transferred over the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP)
[Fielding et al. 1999] | or its counterpart HTTPS [Rescorla 2000] which employs Trans-
port Layer Security (TLS) | and their content is typically described using Berners-Lee
et al.'s Hypertext Markup Language (HTML).
The Hypertext Markup Language has undergone a number of revisions: it was rst for-
mally specied, at version 2.0, by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) [Berners-
Lee and Connolly 1995], and since 1997 updates to the HTML specication have been
standardised by the World Wide Web Consortium (W3C)2. Extensible Hypertext Markup
Language (XHTML) [McCarron and Ishikawa 2010] is a variant of HTML which is based
on the Extensible Markup Language (XML), and has a more strict serialisation for-
mat than HTML. Recently the W3C's HTML working group has been working towards
HTML version 5, which adds many new features including new interactive element types,
new semantic markup elements and also renes some existing elements.
Seeking to re-purpose the Web as a universal medium for information and knowledge
exchange, the W3C began promoting the research and development of new technologies
towards the design of a new `Semantic' Web [Berners-Lee et al. 2001].
4.2 The Semantic Web
The Semantic Web movement is centred around the desire to expose data on the Web
in machine understandable formats, and interlink datasets with each other to create a
Web of data as powerful as the World Wide Web is today. As information and meaning
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are the focus of the Semantic Web, Semantic Web documents do not include the visual
formatting information present in traditional HTML documents. The choice of how to
visualise information (e.g. as a table, network graph or bar chart) is left as an exercise
for the application designer processing the data.
As we discussed in Section 1.1, Berners-Lee et al. [2001]'s article described a World Wide
Web where personal software agents could seamlessly, and autonomously, access and
exchange data with one another, acting intelligently and benevolently on their owners'
behalf. In a distributed environment, where information is exchanged so frequently, and
is, more often than not, consumed by autonomous machines { articial agents { the
validity of data becomes increasingly important. As such, security and trust are crucial
to the Semantic Web vision, and it is important that we consider their implications to
the design of the Semantic Web [Finin and Joshi 2002].
The design of the Web took the simplest features of of hypertext systems, added globally
scoped Uniform Resource Identiers (URIs)(see Section 4.2.1) and relaxed link consis-
tency constraints. Social dynamics are one of the factors which has made the Web so
successful, compared to other hypertext systems. Without the overhead of link consis-
tency and the collaborative element it entails, people needed only to agree on the few
design constraints of HTML and Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) in order to get
a signicant return on their investment. By analogy, the Semantic Web borrowed from
simple database and logic systems, and used URIs for column names and symbol terms.
[Connolly 2006]
Traditionally, hypertext systems modelled links as either uni- or bidirectional point-
ers between documents, and in some cases, as typed relationships [Halasz and Schwartz
1994, Halasz et al. 1987]. The signicance of adopting simple unidirectional pointers and
relaxing link consistency constraints should not be underestimated; more complex link
systems require signicant degrees of cooperation between systems and people. Simple
links greatly simplify the social dynamics involved in creating new Web content, con-
tributing to the Web's potential for exponential growth. Whether there are constraints
which need relaxing or social norms which will result in exponential growth are still
open questions for the Semantic Web. By using HTTP, a core Web technology, as its
delivery platform of choice, the Semantic Web inherits much of the open nature of the
Web, and as a result there are few (if any) constraints left to relax.
As an example of the sort of social dynamic that Connolly describes, consider the rise
of blogging (a contraction of `Web logging'). Web logs, or blogs, are websites on which
people publish serial entries on any topic, such as descriptions of events and personal
experiences, or re-broadcast content which the author nds appealing. The sudden
increase in the growth rate of blogging is linked, in part, to the addition of a single
feature known as `trackbacks' [Six Apart 2002] to most common blogging platforms.
The trackback system noties another blog when you directly link to one of its articles.42 Chapter 4 The Semantic Web
Although at rst glance this seems simple and unexceptional, it dramatically improved
the social dynamic of comment on the Web. Instead of comment being constrained
to the silo of an individual post, trackback links created an open network of comment
across the Web, which encouraged communities to form around common interests.
We do not expect there to be a single feature or application which will alone spur the
explosive growth of the Semantic Web, rather a collection of applications and datasets
which demonstrate the value of the Semantic Web and bring a variety of incentives
for dierent classes of users to contribute. Taking inspiration from the popularity of
blogging; if Semantic Web publishing platforms were able to notify each other when
data which links datasets was asserted, it might incentivise the creation of intra-dataset
links.
Salvadores et al. [2010] present a back-link discovery service which can be queried to re-
trieve a list of documents which mention a particular URI; however, its scope is limited
to the documents the service has the time and resources to crawl. A trackback-style
Semantic Pingback back-link notication system is presented by Tramp et al. [2010].
While this may be a more decentralised and timely alternative than Salvadores et al.'s
back-link service, it requires uptake of the Pingback system by all parties, whereas Sal-
vadores et al.'s service does not. Further, publishers newly adding support for Semantic
Pingback must wait for back-link information to be reported over time.
In this scenario, Salvadores et al.'s service would provide an ecient means of bootstrap-
ping the back-link database. In addition, pingback can only notify publishers interested
in back-link; consumers of data searching for foreign references do not benet. Alone,
back-link services are unlikely to spur the exponential growth of the Semantic Web as
they did for blogging, however, they may prove to be part of a larger puzzle of success.
4.2.1 The Resource Description Framework
The core Semantic Web information language, Resource Description Framework (RDF) [Hayes
2004, Manola and Miller 2004], was developed and standardised by the W3C as a plat-
form in which to model information. RDF is primarily a knowledge representation model,
based around making factual assertions about resources in the form of subject-predicate-
object statements, which are known as \triples" or \statements" in RDF terminology.
The components of a triple may be one of the following 3 types: [Hayes 2004]
 Uniform Resource Identier (URI) [Berners-Lee et al. 2005]
Uniform Resource Identiers are a string of characters used to identify or name a re-
source on the Internet. Web addresses, or more precisely, HTTP URLs (e.g. http:
//www.example.com/) are the most common type of URI, probably followed closelyChapter 4 The Semantic Web 43
Tortoise Joe
is a
Subject Predicate Object
(a) A statement represented as a triple
<http://example.org/id/joe> <http://example.org/ont/Tortoise>
<http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#type>
(b) A statement represented as an RDF triple
Figure 4.1: The statement \Joe is a Tortoise" represented as a conceptual triple (a),
and as an RDF triple (b)
by the mailto: URI scheme. URIs encompass URL schemes | which provide a
means to de-reference them and resolve an identier into an informational repre-
sentation | and Uniform Resource Name (URN) schemes | which are intended
to identify resources and do not specify any means of location, such as the ISBN
Uniform Resource Name (URN) namespace [Hakala and Walravens 2001].
URIs may form any part of a triple.
 Anonymous Resources (Blank Nodes or BNodes)
Blank Nodes are anonymous identiers intended for use when it is considered un-
desirable to coin a URI identifying a particular resource. Blank Nodes be assigned
custom identiers in some serialisations of RDF models, however, these are for
convenience only. These identiers convey no meaning, and cannot be referenced
externally as they are valid only within the scope of a particular serialisation.
Blank Nodes may be used as the subject or object of a triple.
 Literal Values
Literals are a string of characters representing data in a given encoding. In contrast
to the other types, literals have two optional attributes in addition to their value:
(i) a datatype - denoting, for example, that the value is an integer - and (ii) a
language.
Literals may be found only in the object component of a triple.
Figure 4.1 illustrates a simple statement represented as a triple. Note that in this
example the RDF representation uses a URI for each component of the triple.
The advantages of RDF over other Web-friendly technologies, such as XML [Bray et al.
2008] or JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) [Crockford 2006], can be unclear to some.
RDF is primarily a knowledge representation model, whereas XML and JSON are data
formats. More specically, RDF formats describe factual assertions, whereas XML and44 Chapter 4 The Semantic Web
JSON simply encode information, and do not dene how to extract factual assertions
from that information. That is not to say that XML or JSON cannot describe factual
assertions. Rather, in order for those assertions to be widely understood, it would require
a consensus on how to encode and interpret such assertions. Crucially, the RDF data
model represents such a concensus; it describes a data model which may be encoded in
a number of dierent serialization formats. Looking beyond information representation,
the Linked Data movement (Section 4.2.3) oers a second advantage over plain data
serialization formats. The Linked Data movement combines RDF with open-access
publishing and community conventions in order to create and promote a commons of
open data.
4.2.1.1 Serialisation Formats
There are a number of dierent serialization formats for the RDF data model; the
rst, and most common, is RDF/XML [Beckett 2004] (Listings 4.1 and 4.2) an XML-
based format [Bray et al. 2008]. A family of non-XML serialisation formats, designed
to be easier to write by hand, have arisen. These share many characteristics and dier
mainly in their expressiveness. The most prominent non-XML formats are Notation 3
(N3) [Berners-Lee 2006b], Turtle [Beckett and Berners-Lee 2008], and N-Triples [Hayes
2004]. Listing 4.3 demonstrates an unabbreviated N-Triples serialisation (line wrapping
and indentation is optional and has been added for the sake of presentation).
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax -ns#">
<rdf:Description rdf:about="http://example.org/id/joe">
<rdf:type rdf:resource="http://example.org/ont/Tortoise" />
</rdf:Description >
</rdf:RDF>
Listing 4.1: RDF/XML serialization of the RDF graph depicted in Figure 4.1
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax -ns#"
xmlns:ont="http://example.org/ont/">
<ont:Tortoise rdf:about="http://example.org/id/joe" />
</rdf:RDF>
Listing 4.2: Abbreviated RDF/XML serialization of the RDF graph depicted in
Figure 4.1
<http://example.org/id/joe>
<http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax -ns#type>
<http://example.org/ont/Tortoise > .
Listing 4.3: NTriples serialization of the RDF graph depicted in Figure 4.1
Fragment identiers identify fragments of a Web page; when resolved in most Web
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<?xml version="1.0"?>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax -ns#"
xmlns:ont="http://example.org/ont/">
<ont:Tortoise rdf:ID="joe">
<has-name>Joe</has-name>
</ont:Tortoise >
</rdf:RDF>
Listing 4.4: Example use of a fragment identier
they are interpreted as identiers scoped within a particular document, this allows one
to declare an identier and authoritatively state information about it in a single le.
Listing 4.4 demonstrates the use of a fragment identier; the identier joe corresponds
to the fragment #joe within the document. If the document were to be found at the
URL http://example.org/doc then the full URI for joe would be http://example.
org/doc#joe.
More recently, to facilitate the embedding of Semantic Web information into human-
readable web-pages, RDF in Attributes (RDFa) has been standardised [Adida et al.
2008]. Using XML namespaces, it species how HTML content should be embellished
with extra mark-up to encode Semantic Web information. Figure 4.5 demonstrates how
a simple HTML page might be embellished with semantic information using RDFa.
<html
xmlns="http://www.w3.org/1999/xhtml/"
xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax -ns#"
xmlns:rdfs="http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#">
<head ></head>
<body>
<p about="http://example.org/id/joe" >
<span property="rdfs:label" >Joe</span>
is a
<span rel="rdf:type">
<span about="http://example.org/ont/Tortoise" property="rdfs:label" > -
tortoise</span>
</span>
</p>
</body>
</html>
Listing 4.5: A small HTML document embellished with RDFa to include the RDF
graph depicted in Figure 4.1, and two additional literal triples.
4.2.1.2 Reication and Named Graphs
In knowledge representation `reication' involves the representation of factual assertions
such that they can be referred to by other factual assertions. Reication is an important
feature of advanced modelling languages, as it enables the recording of metadata to an
unlimited degree.
Listing 4.6 demonstrates the reication of a single RDF triple; one triple becomes four
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a blank node denoted by :s. Unfortunately, as the RDF semantics [Hayes 2004] state
that neither a triple nor its reication entails the other, the practical applications of
reication are limited.
_:s rdf:type rdf:Statement .
_:s rdf:subject <http://example.org/id/joe> .
_:s rdf:predicate rdf:type .
_:s rdf:object <http://example.org/ont/Tortoise > .
Listing 4.6: Reication of the triple depicted in Figure 4.1, in NTriples format
Named graphs [Carroll et al. 2005] are an alternative, or complement, to reication;
they allow an RDF graph { a collection of triples { to be identied by a URI. Unlike
reication, named graphs do not allow you to identify a single triple, although it is
possible to describe a graph containing a single triple.
4.2.1.3 Signed RDF Graphs
Certain applications of RDF require the assurances of authenticity and non-repudiation
that cryptographically signed documents aord. There are two approaches to signing
and verifying RDF graphs: the rst is to sign a serialisation of the subject graph just
as you would a normal document, and then reconstruct a copy of the graph from the
signed serialisation and compare with the graph to be veried. Verication involves
checking whether the graphs are isomorphic, however, the graph isomorphism problem
is assumed to exceed the bounds of polynomial time [K obler et al. 1993] and so cannot
be relied upon to be computationally tractable.
The second approach is to translate both graphs into a canonical serialisation and com-
pare checksums of the canonical serialisations, assuming that one of the checksums was
extracted from a cryptographic `signature'. Unfortunately, generating a canonical seriali-
sation of a graph is also a non-trivial problem. Carroll [2003] demonstrated a pragmatic
canonicalisation algorithm which makes small, semantically meaningless, additions to
an RDF graph in order to ensure that canonicalisation will operate in O(nlogn) time.
While this approach slightly increases the size of graph to be signed, we would argue
that the reduction of computational complexity justies the increase.
The W3C has yet to standardise an ocial algorithm for signing RDF graphs.
4.2.2 Querying, Reasoning and Inference
To complement the information description capabilities of RDF, we have the ontology
languages of RDFS, and OWL, which allow more complex semantic expression, as well
as the derivation of additional statements through inference. Perhaps most importantly,
to enable the advanced querying of RDF datasets, we have the SPARQL query language.Chapter 4 The Semantic Web 47
4.2.2.1 RDF Schema
RDF Schema (RDFS) adds basic ontology description features and limited inference to
RDF, including classes, sub-classes and global property domains and ranges [Brickley
and Guha 2004], and is designed to be a reexive vocabulary for dening other RDF
vocabularies.
4.2.2.2 The Web Ontology Language
The Web Ontology Language (OWL), also standardised by the W3C, oers more ex-
pressive and powerful tools for building and reasoning over ontologies. The Web Ontol-
ogy Language (OWL) comes in three variants, Lite, DL and Full, which oer dierent
trade-os between expressiveness and computational tractability [McGuinness and van
Harmelen 2004]. OWL has been updated by OWL 2, which also has 3 sublanguages: EL
| which has polynomial time reasoning complexity, QL | which is designed to make
accessing and querying databases easier, and RL | which is a rule subset of OWL 2
[Motik et al. 2009b,a].
4.2.2.3 The SPARQL Protocol and RDF Query Language
In order to construct applications built on Semantic Web technologies, it is desirable to
be able to perform queries over RDF data. The W3C has standardised the SPARQL
Protocol And RDF Query Language (SPARQL), which provides a means of querying
an RDF data store, and a HTTP based protocol for submitting queries, Listing 4.7
demonstrates an example SPARQL query [Prud'hommeaux and Seaborne 2008, Motik
et al. 2009a]. A SPARQL query denes an RDF graph pattern which the query processor
tries to match in the data store, binding variables to parts of triples where possible.
PREFIX foaf: <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/>
SELECT ?name ?mbox
WHERE {
?x foaf:name ?name .
?x foaf:mbox ?mbox
}
Listing 4.7: An example SPARQL query
Table 4.1 illustrates the results of the SPARQL query from Listing 4.7 on the data in
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@prefix foaf: <http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/> .
_:a foaf:name "Johnny Lee Outlaw" .
_:a foaf:mbox <mailto:jlow@example.com> .
_:b foaf:name "Peter Goodguy" .
_:b foaf:mbox <mailto:peter@example.org> .
_:c foaf:mbox <mailto:carol@example.org> .
Listing 4.8: Example RDF Data in N-Triples format
name mbox
\Johnny Lee Outlaw" <mailto:jlow@example.com>
\Peter Goodguy" <mailto:peter@example.org>
Table 4.1: The output of the query from Listing 4.7 on the data in Listing 4.8
4.2.3 The Web of Linked Data
The Web of Linked Data is not a new Semantic Web, rather a realisation of where
the true power of the Semantic Web lies: its ability to link anything to anything. To
begin with, most published Semantic Web data came in the form of custom-tailored
ontologies contained within individual archives, using fragment identiers to identify
resources. The premise of the Linked Data movement, drawing on observations of how
the Web has grown and prospered, is that the value and usefulness of data increases
the more it is interlinked with other data [Berners-Lee 2006a, Heath and Bizer 2011].
This has helped motivate the the adoption of Semantic Web technologies and has shifted
the focus of Semantic Web research from theoretical research on reasoning systems into
more pragmatic areas such as information integration.
Before the value of publishing as Linked Data became clear, there was little dierence
between many Semantic Web systems and traditional knowledge based systems. Se-
mantic Web technologies may have had some novel features such as a globally resolvable
identier scheme, but if the scope of Semantic Web technology was limited to private
reasoning systems the impact of any innovation it demonstrated would be limited.
Th four principles of Linked Data, as proposed by Berners-Lee [2006a], are:
1. Use URIs as names for things.
2. Use HTTP URIs so that people can look up those names.
3. When someone looks up a URI, provide useful information in RDF.
4. Include links to other URIs, so that they can discover related things.
These basic principles encourage the organic growth of a commons of open data which,
through network eects[Katz and Shapiro 1994], increases in value as people bring newChapter 4 The Semantic Web 49
sources online and link them with existing data. Furthermore, through the use of globally
scoped identiers, a community consensus on term meanings can emerge and evolve into
a shared vocabulary.
If the principles are not adhered to, Linked Data would be eectively useless; published
data would be in wildly varying formats, reside in isolated silos and it would be near
impossible to nd authoritative information sources. All of these premises are important
to the growth of the Web of Linked Data; a publisher which adheres to some but violates
others will diminish the value of their data, rendering its discovery and use dicult or
impossible. For example: not using URIs or HTTP URIs to identify things forces anyone
interested in your data to implement a custom identier resolution algorithm for your
data; not providing useful information when an identier is resolved prevents anyone
from using your data after stumbling upon an identier from it; and not linking to
other datasets makes it dicult to place your data in a context and makes it dicult to
integrate with other data.
The W3C's Linking Open Data community project3 is an incubator project aiming to
bootstrap the Semantic Web data commons with Linked Data. In October 2007, Linked
Datasets consisted of over two billion RDF triples, which were interlinked by over two
million RDF links. By May 2009 this had grown to 4.2 billion RDF triples4, and around
142 million RDF links. In September 2011 the number of triples had grown to 31 billion,
with around 504 million links5. The impact and importance of these incubator groups
cannot be underestimated; they address the `chicken and egg' problem that besets the
bootstrapping process of most new technologies.
4.2.3.1 Publishing Linked Data
On the Web, HTTP URIs commonly refer to Web pages. This has led to some discussion
and dispute as to how URIs should be interpreted on the Semantic Web, which states
they refer to `resources'. In response to this confusion, the W3C Technical Architecture
Group (TAG) identied two dierent types of resource which might be identied by a
URI [Lewis 2007]:
 Information Resources
Information resources identied by URIs are resources whose essential character-
istics can be conveyed in a message. Pages and documents on the Web, which
users of the Web will be familiar with, are information resources: they typically
3Linking Open Data community project: See http://linkeddata.org/
4Linked Data Dataset Statistics: See http://esw.w3.org/topic/TaskForces/CommunityProjects/
LinkingOpenData/DataSets/Statistics
5Linked Data Linking Statistics: See http://esw.w3.org/topic/TaskForces/CommunityProjects/
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have one or more representations that can be accessed using HTTP. These rep-
resentations of the resource are used to convey the informational resource in an
HTTP message conversation. Dereferencing a URI refers to the act of retrieving
a representation of a resource identied by a URI. Applications, such as browsers,
render the retrieved representation so that it can be perceived by a user.
 Non-Information Resources
Non-informational resources are those which do not fall into the above category:
things which cannot be converted into an informational representation. For ex-
ample, if one were to dereference a URI representing the Eiel Tower, one would
not expect to receive a physical copy of the Eiel Tower somehow transmitted to
one's computer. As a rule of thumb, all `real-world objects' that exist outside of
the Web are non-information resources.
It is, however, not unreasonable to expect to receive a concise bounded descrip-
tion[Stickler 2005] of the resource being dereferenced. For example, a description of
its characteristics and relationships with other resources. Crucially, the document
bearing information about the resource is distinct from the resource itself, and
thus we must be able to distinguish between them with separate identiers. The
W3C TAG advised that the HTTP 303 `See Other' redirect code should be used
in order to associate an informational resource with a non-information resource
[Lewis 2007].
Thus, we have two means of publishing Semantic Web vocabularies: document frag-
ments (hash namespaces) or redirection (slash namespaces). Following this advisory the
Semantic Web Best practices working group published a set of recipes describing and
demonstrating the dierent approaches [Berrueta and Phipps 2008].
4.2.3.2 Fragment Publishing
The original means of publishing RDF data, in a single document using fragment identi-
ers (as described in Section 4.2.1.1), is still a valid method of publishing. Use of a URI
containing a fragment identier implies agreement to information published at the doc-
ument returned by resolving that URI after the fragment has been removed [Connolly
2006]. It conforms to the principles of Linked Data publishing, however, it is inadvisable
to publish large datasets in this manner as it places a signicant burden on clients inter-
ested in the data: they must load the entire document even if they are only interested
in a fragment of it.
For this reason it is advisable to publish only small vocabularies, such as ontologies, in
this manner. In practice, ontologies should be cached at an application level, and thus
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core RDF vocabularies, such as RDF Schema (RDFS), into Semantic Web applications,
as they are unlikely to change often and it is unlikely that an application could cope
with their changing. It would also prevent unnecessary requests for those documents
from being made, unnecessarily burdening the server publishing them.
4.2.3.3 Redirection Publishing
Redirection based publishing is built upon the redirection pattern proposed by the TAG.
When URIs representing non-informational resources are resolved over HTTP, as illus-
trated in Figure 4.2, the HTTP 303 `See Other' response code is employed to redirect
the client to the URI of a related informational resource.
Importantly it is good practice for the redirection step to distinguish between requests
based on the `Content-Type' request headers; if the client prefers RDF data, redirect
to an appropriate RDF document, or if the client prefers HTML, redirect them to an
HTML page [Heath and Bizer 2011, Berrueta and Phipps 2008].
GET [resource URI]
303 See Other
Location: [vocabulary URI]
GET [vocabulary URI]
200 OK
Figure 4.2: Illustration of HTTP 303 Redirection publishing technique (Sec-
tion 4.2.3.3)
Alternatively, in situations where it is undesirable to directly redirect the request, or if
the client did not request RDF data, an HTTP `Link' header could be used to make
the client aware of the availability of additional metadata. This negates the need for a
client to make two requests to the same URI to nd the location for both content and
metadata. The HTTP Link header was rst specied in HTTP 1.0 [Berners-Lee et al.
1996], however was not included in HTTP 1.1 [Fielding et al. 1999], and has since been
formally specied in its own right [Nottingham 2010].
4.3 Trust and the Semantic Web
The Semantic Web inherits many of the features and characteristics of the Web, includ-
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Section 3.4.3, regarding trust on the Web, also applies to the Semantic Web. Indeed,
research agendas have expected Semantic Web agents to experience the same quan-
daries of trust on the Semantic Web as faced by users of the hypertext Web [Kalfoglou
et al. 2004]. Against this background, this section focusses on Semantic Web research
regarding trust.
4.3.1 Reputation mechanisms
On the reputation front, Semantic Web research has, for the most part, explored the suit-
ability of network-based, transitive trust strategies. Richardson et al. [2003] presented a
path-algebra with which network-based trust computation functions can be described.
Subsequent works applied similar approaches to a number of dierent social applications
including email ltering and recommender systems [Golbeck 2005, Golbeck and Hendler
2006]. As we discussed in Section 3.4.1.1, the value of trust network analysis as a metric
for trustworthiness is a contested issue. The contextuality of trust is ignored by most
approaches, and we question the value of assessments which follow long chains as each
link in a chain of trust adds additional risk that the assessment is inaccurate.
4.3.2 Policy-based trust
Policy-based trust systems are a means of encoding the criteria of a particular trusting
decision as policies in an automated system. Policy-based access controls are often
applied within large organisations as they mesh well with organisational structures and
responsibilities. Kagal et al. [2003] applied Semantic Web technologies to this eld,
creating a exible language for describing rights, credentials, and trust policies, upon
which Semantic Web policy based trust systems can be created. Kagal et al. also present
a policy engine which harnesses the semantics of their policy language, demonstrating a
exible and dynamic policy management system.
Policy-based systems still demonstrate some undesirable properties, which include the
following: First, the verication of any credential almost always involves the credential
issuer out of necessity. This necessitates a central point of authority, and of work, which
can in turn contribute to problems of security and scalability. Second, the satisfaction
of trust policies is often very one-sided { only one party in the exchange has any say on
the criteria which the other must meet.
Nejdl et al. [2004] developed the PeerTrust language which goes some way to addressing
these problems. PeerTrust recognises that it is desirable for negotiations not to directly
involve a centralised credential authority as this is contrary to the decentralised, peer-
to-peer nature of the Web and the Semantic Web. Cryptographically signed rules allow
them to accomplish this; authorities may issue pre-endorsed credentials through cryp-
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party recognises the authority of the issuer and that the signature can be veried, the
negotiation can include the credential without needing to involve the issuer directly.
PeerTrust also addresses the second shortcoming we highlighted; it considers the whole
interaction to be a negotiation by both parties. Both parties may specify criteria which
the other must meet before negotiation can advance. In addition to this, PeerTrust
recognises that trust policies (or elements thereof) may be sensitive in their own right,
and may also have pre-requisites for their disclosure.
The ability to cryptographically sign RDF graphs is a prerequisite for the implementation
of decentralised credential systems; unfortunately, signed RDF has not yet been ocially
standardised (Section 4.2.1.3). Despite this, policy based trust systems may enable us
to build sophisticated autonomous agents which can make trust-aware decisions with
some semblance of intelligence.
4.3.3 Provenance
As we discussed in Section 3.2.1.2, information provenance is a key factor in assessing
information trustworthiness. Provenance remains just as important in the context of the
Semantic Web [Halpin 2009]. Good information provenance records should describe the
complete history of a dataset, i.e. its original sources, the processes by which sources
were combined, and the actors responsible for each process.
Named graphs, which we discussed in Section 4.2.1.2, have been proposed as a means of
recording provenance information [Watkins and Nicole 2006]
Information interoperability is another of the primary motivations of the Semantic Web
movement. Semantic Web technologies have also been applied to provenance research
for the purposes of interoperability.
Hartig and Zhao has contributed a provenance model tailored for the `Web of Linked
Data' [Hartig 2009b, Hartig and Zhao 2010]. Their ontology contains terms in which
the actions and concepts of Web interaction patterns can be described.
Hartig and Zhao went on to contribute to the W3C PROV framework as part of
the W3C's `Incubator Group'. The `PROV' family of documents describes a general-
purpose, Semantic Web compatible, provenance framework designed for describing prove-
nance information from any domain [Moreau and Missier 2013].
4.4 Research Challenges
Against the background of our discussion of trust and the Semantic Web, we have
identied areas where further research would advance the state of the art:54 Chapter 4 The Semantic Web
4.4.1 Identity
Identity is one of the most fundamental parts of any trust system; whether it be identity
at an individual or a group level, before anything can be trusted it is rst necessary to
be able to identify it. Trust on an individual basis is necessary for attitudes such as
friendship between two people, whereas trust at a group level is necessary for generali-
sations such as stereotypes of groups; both of these are desirable mechanisms in robust
trust systems.
In systems where agents cannot be relied upon to be truthful, there is risk in relying
on their self-stated identities for questions of trust. Most multi-agent systems are either
designed with an inbuilt and authoritative identity system, or do not permit deception,
and so do not face this problem. In these uncertain environments it is necessary to base
identities on observable (and hopefully dicult to spoof) characteristics. We, as humans,
generally use visual and audible characteristics to identify people as they are dicult
to impersonate well; electronic environments must, however, rely on dierent character-
istics. For example, network addresses and demonstrable possession of cryptographic
keys might serve as appropriate characteristics.
The Friend of a Friend (FOAF) ontology is perhaps the most commonly used Semantic
Web ontology[Cyganiak 2011] which might be classed as an identity ontology. Using
the properties listed in Table 4.2, FOAF facilitates the description of the activities,
friendships and acquaintances of people and articial agents. It is also widely used
throughout Semantic Web research [Golbeck 2005, Golbeck and Hendler 2006] and has
become the `de facto' standard for making assertions about people. Unfortunately, as
Friend of a Friend (FOAF) documents describe the state of the non-digital world, the
information in them is generally not demonstrable. As a result there is little to stop
anyone claiming the ownership of a given FOAF identier, as it is little more than a
URI.
Story et al. [2009] proposed the FOAF+SSL extension, which, in a nutshell, allows a
FOAF prole to specify a cryptographic public key, and an address on which it can be
contacted to prove ownership of the corresponding private key. The Secure Socket Layer
(SSL) connection protocol allows both sides of the exchange to present cryptographic
certicates, thus the cryptographic identity of both sides of the exchange can be veried.
A person can then demonstrate possession of the cryptographic key to demonstrate
ownership of the URI (assuming that the key has not been compromised).
WebID is the result of a W3C incubator group6 which has formed around the FOAF+SSL
propsal, to develop vocabularies and protocols for a system of distributed identity for
the Semantic Web.
6WebID incubator group: See http://www.w3.org/2005/Incubator/webid/Chapter 4 The Semantic Web 55
account homepage pastProject
accountName icqChatID phone
accountServiceHomepage img plan
age interest primaryTopic
aimChatID isPrimaryTopicOf publications
based near jabberID schoolHomepage
birthday knows sha1
currentProject lastName skypeID
depiction logo status
depicts made surname
dnaChecksum maker theme
familyName mbox thumbnail
family name mbox sha1sum tipjar
rstName member title
focus membershipClass topic
fundedBy msnChatID topic interest
geekcode myersBriggs weblog
gender name workInfoHomepage
givenName nick workplaceHomepage
givenname openid yahooChatID
holdsAccount page
Table 4.2: FOAF properties and relationships
For our objectives, there remain some unsolved issues in FOAF and WebID; 1. FOAF's
vocabulary terms apply primarily to people, not software agents 2. there are no disin-
centives to the discarding of `tarnished' identities in favour of new ones 3. there remains
the problem of coining identities for entities who do not do so themselves, such as Web
servers which serve only static RDF documents, or Web servers which serve dynamic
RDF documents but do not support WebID .
4.4.2 Reputation
Direct experience is generally accepted as the best grounds on which to make a trusting
decision. Unfortunately, as population sizes increase so dramatically do the odds of
any two individuals having previously interacted. In addition, any new members of
a population will always begin with no direct experiences of other members. Against
this background we can see that there is a need for mechanisms which assist in making
trusting decisions without a priori experience of the other parties.
Reputation is one such mechanism, one which we as humans are known to employ and
which has been studied in a number of disciplines, including Multi-Agent Systems, (see
Section 3.4.1.2). As we have yet to see the Semantic Web community widely adopt any
particular reputation mechanisms, we consider it be an ongoing challenge. To complicate
this challenge, we expect any reputation mechanism to suer from a similar bootstrap56 Chapter 4 The Semantic Web
problem until it achieves a sucient adoption level. Solving this problem, even partially,
would greatly improve any mechanism's chances of adoption.
4.4.3 The Coreference Problem
As people publish more Linked Data, it is inevitable that multiple URIs will be coined for
the same resource. However, discovering and publishing URI equivalences is non-trivial,
and forms part of the coreference problem.
Coreference is not a new problem, rather the manifestation of an old problem in a
new domain; it has been encountered in elds such as natural language processing and
Articial Intelligence (AI). The AI research community often chooses to make the `unique
name assumption', enforcing a one-to-one relationship between resources and identiers
[Russell and Norvig 2003], however, we cannot make this assumption for the Semantic
Web.
A centralised registry for URIs could avoid this problem altogether. However there
are number of reasons why a centralised approach is not acceptable: (i) it will not
scale adequately as the Semantic Web approaches the scale of the Web, (ii) it places a
signicant burden on a single point of failure, (iii) it invests a single entity with signicant
power and responsibility, and (iv) crucially, equivalence is generally a subjective decision
and thus does not lend itself to centralised administration.
Jari et al. [2007] propose and demonstrate a Coreference Service (CRS) which allows the
publication an maintenance of coreference information in a single store. They envision
that each Linked Data publisher might maintain their own CRS of equivalences they
hold to be accurate.
In practice, it remains common for datasets to use the owl:sameAs predicate to denote
the equivalence of identiers. Jari et al. and Halpin et al. [2010] argue that, due to
the subjective nature of this assertion and its implications to reasoning, owl:sameAs
is often misused. Halpin et al. discuss the subject of similarity at some length, and
empirically demonstrate how widely the uses of dierent similarity predicates vary. This
illustration of how subjective things are further supports the case that coreference should
be a distributed system.
4.4.4 Provenance
In Section 3.2.1.2 we argued that the trustworthiness of information depends heavily
on its provenance. The challenges of recording, maintaining and integrating provenance
information remains an active area of research within the Semantic Web (Section 4.3.3).Chapter 4 The Semantic Web 57
We still have some way to go before we can expect to see Semantic Web agents which
routinely use provenance information in their trusting decisions. It must rst become
the norm to maintain, and publish, accurate provenance records for RDF data, and also
a sucient portion of the community must converge on a set of vocabularies which are
easy to work with or interoperate between. To enable this we should seek to lower the
adoption barriers of provenance technology, perhaps by improving support for prove-
nance in popular tools and frameworks, or by nding techniques to reduce the burdens
of storing and maintaining provenance information.
4.5 Summary
We began this chapter with a brief introduction to hypertext and the World Wide Web
(Section 4.1) before approaching the main focus of this chapter, the Semantic Web
(Section 4.2). We then described the fundamental data models underlying Semantic
Web technologies (Section 4.2.1), and the more advanced reasoning and query languages
which are build upon them (Section 4.2.2). Next, in Section 4.2.3, we discussed the
Linked Data movement which has given rise to the Web of Linked Data, and the dierent
publishing practices which are commonly employed. Section 4.3 returns to the subject of
trust, discussing Semantic Web research on the subject. Finally, against the background
of our discussion so far, Section 4.4 identies a number of research challenges which
arise from our study of trust and the Semantic Web. Principally these challenges are
(i) identity, (ii) reputation, (iii) co-reference and (iv) provenance.
Against this background, in the next chapter, we introduce our rst contribution towards
these challenges; an identity vocabulary for the Semantic Web.Chapter 5
A Semantic Web Identity
Infrastructure
The ability to uniquely identify agents is a key requirement for Semantic Web applica-
tions involving trust, provenance or inter-agent interactions. Our use case in Section 2.1
highlighted the importance of identity in inter-agent relations, in particular the need
to be able to refer to an entity as a subject of discourse. Without an eective identity
infrastructure for the Semantic Web, such discourse is not possible.
Work to date has generally sidestepped the challenges of discovery and representation
| assuming that all agent identities are known, and modelling them only as members of
the foaf:Agent class [Hartig and Zhao 2010, Raimond et al. 2007, Moreau et al. 2010].
If we are to allow our Semantic Web agents o `in the wild', to crawl the breadth and
depth of the Web, and operate autonomously, we must address these challenges.
Due to the nature of the Web, its size, popularity and rate of growth, developing an
identity infrastructure based around a centralised registry is not feasible. Instead we
seek to provide the necessary tools from which a decentralised identity infrastructure
can grow organically. The rst, and perhaps most important requirement of an identity
infrastructure are vocabularies in which discourse can take place.
In this chapter, we begin by further exploring the challenge of identity description (Sec-
tion 5.1). We then catalogue the requirements for a Semantic Web agent identity vo-
cabulary (Section 5.2), and discuss related work which has inuenced our understanding
of and approach to this problem (Section 5.3). Next, we describe our vocabulary in
detail, explaining aspects of its design (Section 5.4), demonstrating its usage against
one of our earlier use cases (Section 5.6), and reviewing how well it satises our origi-
nal requirements (Section 5.7). Finally, in Section 5.8 we conclude this chapter with a
summary.
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5.1 Describing Web Agents
As our use case in Section 2.1.1 described, an identity description should allow one agent
to recognise another with a high degree of condence. Identity descriptions must also
be communicable without sacricing recognisability, so that reputation information can
be shared among agents to that they can apply it in inter-agent interactions.
There are two dierent perspectives from which an identity description can be authored:
(i) authoritatively { by the subject of the description itself, or (ii) observationally { by
an agent which has interacted with or made some observation of the subject .
There are shortcomings to approaches which rely solely on identity descriptions writ-
ten from one perspective; (i) one can only identify agents which provide their own
descriptions, and must trust that the agent included sucient information for condent
identication (ii) the description is limited to information which has been observed by
the writer . Thus, to develop a robust identity infrastructure, we seek an approach which
can combine information from both perspectives.
While encouraging non-authoritative identity descriptions helps to address the boot-
strapping problem an identity infrastructure will face, it will also cause many agents
to coin new identiers for the same entity. This will create an unavoidable coreference
problem (Section 4.4.3), and we must take care to encourage the inclusion of information
that will enable eective co-reference resolution.
Creating a vocabulary to describe the identity of arbitrary agents of unknown form is
most likely an impossible task, since we cannot know the features which adequately
describe their identity. Identity descriptions are more likely to combine a number of
specialist vocabularies, each maintained by their own set of domain experts.
Pragmatically, we limit the scope of our vocabulary to describing Web agents { agents
which understand and communicate over HTTP { which also includes Semantic Web
agents. As HTTP clients and servers operate in adherence with open technical speci-
cations, describing them is a much more approachable task. In future we expect that
more specialised vocabularies will be combined with ours in order to better describe the
nature and identity of the subjects.
5.2 Requirements
In Section 2.1.2, we identied three key challenges for enabling discourse on Semantic
Web agents: i) the description of identities, ii) the communication of identity descrip-
tions, iii) the eective comparison of identity descriptions. Marrying these challenges
with our research thus far, in this section we identify a number of functional and non-
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5.2.1 Functional Requirements
Our decision to limit the scope of our vocabulary to describing only Web-based agents
allows us to identify specic functional requirements for the descriptiveness of the vo-
cabulary:
1. Able to describe a single agent hosted on a single dedicated web server
The vocabulary must be able to describe the simplest case: a single web server,
hosting only a single web agent.
2. Able to describe an agent hosted on a shared web server
The vocabulary must be able to accurately describe a web agent hosted on a
server which also serves a number of other web sites. From the perspective of
trustworthiness, shared hosting environments are fundamentally dierent because:
i) the shared server is administered by a third party, ii) aws in the shared server
environment might allow one agent to impersonate another on the same server.
3. Able to describe a web agent spanning multiple web servers
The vocabulary must be able to describe the multi-server environments common
in high performance web site architectures. Again, there are specic trust concerns
in this environment: i) while they are dierent servers, they are part of the same
agent ii) one or more servers might become compromised, and thus untrustworthy.
4. Able to describe a web agent which employs public-key encryption
The vocabulary must be able to describe the association between an agent and a
public-private key pair. Cryptographic keys, if managed with care, can be a strong
indicator of identity.
5.2.2 Non-functional Requirements
Next we identify non-functional requirements which cannot be as strictly veried, but
are still important in the design of a vocabulary.
Returning briey to the key challenges we identied in Section 2.1.2; providing that
information using our vocabulary can exist in a communicable form (such as the RDF
data model), the requirement for communicable descriptions is met. Therefore, we
choose not to include this as an explicit requirement.
The issue of coreference, which we discussed in Sections 4.4.3 and 5.1 suggests some
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5. Must provide sucient data for coreference
The vocabulary must be suciently descriptive so as to enable eective coreference
identication.
6. Must avoid exacerbating the problem of coreference
The vocabulary should take measures to discourage the minting of new URIs wher-
ever possible.
In Section 3.4.1.1 and Section 3.4 we reviewed the dierent strategies and mechanisms
which are common in existing trust environments. There are a range of trust strategies,
diering in both approach and architecture, which are often suited to particular sce-
narios or environments. In order not to articially hamper the eectiveness of dierent
strategies, a strategy neutral vocabulary is desirable.
5.3 Related Work
There are existing specications which seek to model similar information about web
servers. We review them in light of the requirements we identied in the previous
section, highlighting their shortcomings where appropriate.
5.3.1 WebID and FOAF
As previously discussed in Section 4.4.1, the FOAF vocabulary allows the description
of the activities, friendships and acquaintances of people and articial agents. WebID
builds on FOAF, adding a vocabulary for describing cryptographic key pairs, and an
authentication protocol using cryptographic keys. There are two main fronts on which
WebID fall short:
Firstly, few of the properties and relationships in the FOAF vocabulary (see Section 4.4.1)
can be meaningfully applied to Web agents. Some describe characteristics such agents
are unlikely to have, such as depictions or family names, and others describe things
which are neither observable or demonstrable { with the exception of some online ac-
count identiers. For this reason, WebID fails to meet requirements #2 through #5.
Secondly, the means of advertising a WebID identier for casual discovery are insucient
to satisfy requirement #6. An agent can advertise its identity by adding a foaf:maker
property into response documents. However, this is not appropriate in cases where
the agent is not the author of the document in question, or if RDF statements cannot
be inserted into the response content. Additionally, if inserted in this way it would
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statement was received from an agent which had not inserted this information, one
might erroneously assume that this was that agent's identier.
5.3.2 Nokia Web Architecture Vocabulary
The Web Architecture vocabulary [Stickler 2003, Stickler] has similar objectives to ours,
in that it is designed to describe web servers and the relationship between them and
other resources.
It does not meet our representational requirements #2-4, as it is not able to represent
the dierence between exclusive and shared use of a Web server. As we discussed in
Section 5.2.1, this information may be important to trusting decisions.
The Web Architecture vocabulary predates the practice of Semantic Web URI resolv-
ability. Concequently, its recommendations for URI choices lead to representational
problems once we consider URI resolvability.
The vocabulary makes the following recommendations:
\It is recommended that a web site be denoted by an http: URI consisting of
only the web authority component, or a path prex identifying a user-specic
web space, followed by a single slash `/' character."[Stickler]
\It is recommended that a web server be denoted by an http: URI con-
sisting of only the web authority component, with no trailing punctuation."
[Stickler]
These recommendations take an extensional approach to the coreference problem, giving
every web server a canonical URI, and thus passing requirements #5 and #6.
Crucially, in practice, the Web site address (as dened above) is commonly used as the
URL of the site's HTML-based homepage, and thus is unlikely to be available for use as
an identier. Using the same URI for both purposes conates an information resource {
the site's homepage { with a non-information resource { the identity of the web server
(the service which responds to the HTTP request), which are fundamentally dierent.
However, in the rare case that this URI did not already identify some other resource, it
would be an acceptable identier.
Next, there is a problem when we consider two identier recommendations in tandem.
While at rst glance, according to URI specication, the two URIs are dierent, on
closer inspection they are not. The URI specication's scheme-based normalisation
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specication, i.e the HTTP URI scheme, in order to normalise a URI. The HTTP spec-
ication states that a missing path component should be translated to a single `/' char-
acter [Berners-Lee et al. 1996, Fielding et al. 1997, x5.1.2]. Thus, HTTP URLs such as
http://example.org and http://example.org/ should be considered equivalent. The
result of this is that, as before, one would conate the identiers of two fundamentally
dierent resources.
These representational problems render this vocabulary unusable for our purposes.
5.3.3 The IRW ontology
The Identity of Resources on the Web (IRW) ontology [Halpin and Presutti 2009] exists
primarily as a tool for modelling the Web architecture, helping to clarify the discussion of
proposed changes. It describes the relationship between web servers, informational and
non-informational resources, URIs and the results of resolving them. Halpin and Presutti
demonstrate this by casting a recent architectural debate in terms of a disagreement over
the denition of certain terms in the ontology.
This ontology declares a WebServer class but it has no properties, and thus can only
be described in terms of the individual URIs which resolve to it. Whilst technically it
meets requirement #1, we cannot see it proving useful in practice as it is impractical
to exhaustively create relationships for every URI which resolves to a single server. In
addition, the IRW ontology does not consider the delegation of HTTP requests between
servers, so it fails to meet requirements #2-4.
In summary, the IRW ontology meets only requirements #1, #5 and #6. Despite these
failings, it has a good conceptualisation of the problem, which we draw on for our
vocabulary.
5.3.4 The Web of Trust Ontology
The Web of Trust ontology is a lightweight vocabulary for describing the artefacts of
public key encryption use (Figure 5.1), and the relationships between them (Figure 5.2).
The core classes of the ontology are User, PubKey { a public key, EncryptedDocument
{ an encrypted document, Endorsement { a document containing a cryptographic sig-
nature of another document, SigEvent { an event representing the signing of one public
key by another. To lend meaning to its terms, the Web of Trust ontology denes its core
classes as subclasses of terms from a number of other ontologies; Figure 5.1 illustrates
these relationships.
The Web of Trust ontology should not be confused with the Web of Trust movement
which we discussed in Section 3.4.2.4. While they share a very similar name, the Web ofChapter 5 A Semantic Web Identity Infrastructure 65
wordnet:Endorsement-4
wot:PubKey
wot:SigEvent
cal:Vevent
foaf:Document wot:EncryptedDocument
wordnet:Credential
wot:Endorsement
wordnet:Event
foaf:Agent
owl:Thing
wot:User
Figure 5.1: Web of Trust Ontology class hierarchy
foaf:Document
wot:PubKey
wot:SigEvent
wot:Endorsement
wot:EncryptedDocument
wot:User
wot:signer
wot:signed
wot:identity
wot:pubkeyAddress
wot:assurance
wot:encrypter
wot:encryptedTo
wot:hasKey
rdfs:subClassOf
rdfs:subClassOf
Figure 5.2: Web of Trust Ontology object relationships
Trust ontology is equally suited to modelling the hierarchical Public Key Infrastructure
as it is a decentralised one.
The Web of Trust ontology does not solve our identity vocabulary problem, it fails to
satisfy all but our fourth requirement; the ability to associate a public key with an agent.
5.3.5 POWDER
The Protocol for Web Description Resources (POWDER) is designed to provide a mech-
anism by which one can record structured metadata about groups of web resources {
anything from two web pages, to entire websites. Primarily POWDER is an XML-based
format, however Semantic POWDER (POWDER-S) de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convert POWDER documents into formal OWL semantics. As OWL does not include
any means by which to lter or restrict entities based on their URIs, POWDER-S de-
clares an extension to OWL which allows pattern matching over URIs. POWDER-S
encodes each lter as a regular expression, using a dierent expression template for each
restriction. The result of this can be seen later in Figure 5.6.
Since it is designed primarily to describe the web resources and their URIs, POWDER
does not fully meet any of our requirements for an identity description vocabulary. It
does, however, solve the problem of how to group a set of resources, which we require
in order to describe certain website structures.
5.3.6 WSDL
The Web Services Description Language (WSDL) allows the description of web-based
service types, instances thereof, and the accepted methods by which they may be inter-
acted with. WSDL does support our simplest requirement; dening a service endpoint
at a given URI eectively denes an agent with a given contact point. However, while
we could likely model request delegation in WSDL, it is not worthwhile as the semantics
of this relationship would be obscured by the WSDL denition. Therefore, we consider
it to meet only the rst of requirements #1-4.
WSDL can be used for simple co-reference discovery, as multiple services may be dened
in the same document. Service type denitions might also permit coreference identi-
cation, however not in the case of common service types. Therefore we consider WSDL
to pass only #6 of our non-functional requirements.
5.3.7 Summary
1 2 3 4 5 6
WebID & FOAF 4
Nokia 4 4
IRW 4 4 4
Web of Trust 4
POWDER
WSDL 4 4
Table 5.1: Identity vocabulary requirements satised by related work
As we have illustrated in Table 5.1, none of the related works discussed above meet all
of our requirements for an identity vocabulary. We note that while some of them full
our co-reference related requirements (#5 & 6), we believe it is mostly a side-eect of
their design, rather than a design choice itself. Therefore, in the next section we present
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5.4 Web Server Identity Vocabulary
Against this background, in this section we propose a new web server identity vocabulary.
Our vocabulary is designed as foundation upon which we can build an identity and
reputation infrastructure, and upon which a more complete picture of agent identity
can grow organically.
Our vocabulary describes agent identity with an intensional denition style; it models
web servers as agents described by their relationships to other things, such as the parts
of their behaviour which is expressed over web-based channels. In more detail, instead
of describing agents directly, our vocabulary describes their observable interfaces, i.e.
the parts of them which perform HTTP exchanges.
Our Web Server identity vocabulary consists of 11 classes, most found in two main hier-
archies, classifying agents and their behaviours, respectively. It is a minimal vocabulary,
designed to act as an interface between existing vocabularies, in order to encourage an in-
tensional approach to identity denition. We reproduce its full denition in Listing A.1,
in Appendix A.
5.4.1 Agent Types
The most notable is the agent hierarchy, which consists of classes for `Agent', `We-
bAgent', `WebClientAgent' and `WebServerAgent'. As illustrated in Figure 5.3, these
are each subclasses of the previous class, except for `WebClientAgent' and `WebServer-
Agent' which are non-disjoint subclasses of `WebAgent'. This means, for example, that
an agent could be both a `WebClientAgent' and a `WebServerAgent' at the same time.
These classes categorise agents by the behaviours which they exhibit, and are declared
as equivalent to terms in a number of other vocabularies, as listed in Section 5.5.4.
Examples of how these classes can be used are given in Section 5.7.
Agent
WebAgent
WebServerAgent WebClientAgent
Figure 5.3: Subclass relationships within the Agent hierarchy
The vocabulary provides two data properties which link an Agent to a particular be-
haviour it exhibits, and vice-versa: `hasBehaviour' and `isBehaviourOf', illustrated in
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AgentBehaviour Agent
isBehaviourOf
hasBehaviour
Figure 5.4: Agent behaviour properties
5.4.2 Agent Behaviours
Next is the `AgentBehaviour' hierarchy, which consists of classes for `AgentBehaviour',
`HTTPBehaviour', `HTTPClientBehaviour', `HTTPServerBehaviour' and `HTTPSServer-
Behaviour'. The subsumption hierarchy is dened as illustrated in Figure 5.5. These
behaviours are modelled distinctly from the agent itself as an agent might have a number
of each behaviours, each operating slightly dierently. For example, a single agent might
act as an HTTP client, gathering data, and also act as an HTTP server, re-publishing
that data in a new form. Or an agent might operate across multiple domains, which we
would model with two HTTPServerBehaviour instances.
AgentBehaviour
HTTPBehaviour
HTTPServerBehaviour
HTTPSServerBehaviour
HTTPClientBehaviour
Figure 5.5: Subclass relationships within the AgentBehaviour hierarchy
5.4.3 Web Location
The WebLocation class can describe a single URI or a collection of URIs. Unlike the
IRW ontology which must describe each URIs individually, we employ the POWDER-S
vocabulary to describe groups of URIs which match certain patterns.
Listing 5.1 demonstrates the denition of ve dierent WebLocation instances. First is
the denition of http://www.example.com/, identied in the listing as #www ex com,
which combines of three separate restrictions on the protocol, hostname and port of
the URI. The POWDER-S specication encodes these restrictions as regular expression,
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<#www_ex_com > a ident:WebLocation;
owl:intersectionOf (
[ # normal http protocol only
a owl:Restriction;
owl:onProperty wdrs:matchesregex;
owl:hasValue "http\\:\\/\\/";
]
[ # hostname of only www.example.com
a owl:Restriction;
owl:onProperty wdrs:matchesregex;
owl:hasValue "\\:\\/\\/(([^\\/\\?\\#]*)\\@)?([^\\:\\/\\?\\#\\@]+\\.) -
?www.example.com(\\:([0-9]+))?\\/";
]
[ # port of only 80 (the default)
a owl:Restriction;
owl:onProperty wdrs:matchesregex;
owl:hasValue "\\:\\/\\/(([^\\/\\?\\#]*)\\@)?([^\\:\\/\\?\\#\\@]+\\.) -
*[^\\:\\/\\?\\#\\@]+\\:80\\/";
]
).
# Class of WebLocations using the http uri scheme.
<#schemehttp > a ident:WebLocation;
rdfs:subClassOf [
# normal http protocol only
a owl:Restriction;
owl:onProperty wdrs:matchesregex;
owl:hasValue "http\\:\\/\\/";
].
# Class of WebLocations using port 80 (the default).
<#port80 > a ident:WebLocation;
rdfs:subClassOf [
# port of only 80 (the default)
a owl:Restriction;
owl:onProperty wdrs:matchesregex;
owl:hasValue "\\:\\/\\/(([^\\/\\?\\#]*)\\@)?([^\\:\\/\\?\\#\\@]+\\.) -
*[^\\:\\/\\?\\#\\@]+\\:80\\/";
].
<#www_ex_net > a ident:WebLocation;
owl:intersectionOf (
<#schemehttp >
<#port80 >
[ # hostname of only www.example.net
a owl:Restriction;
owl:onProperty wdrs:matchesregex;
owl:hasValue "\\:\\/\\/(([^\\/\\?\\#]*)\\@)?([^\\:\\/\\?\\#\\@]+\\.) -
?www.example.net(\\:([0-9]+))?\\/";
]
).
<#www_ex_org > a ident:WebLocation;
owl:intersectionOf (
<#schemehttp >
<#port80 >
[ # hostname of only www.example.org
a owl:Restriction;
owl:onProperty wdrs:matchesregex;
owl:hasValue "\\:\\/\\/(([^\\/\\?\\#]*)\\@)?([^\\:\\/\\?\\#\\@]+\\.) -
?www.example.org(\\:([0-9]+))?\\/";
]
).
Listing 5.1: WebLocations matching the websites http://www.example.com/,
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the `WebLocation' denitions of http://www.example.org/ and http://www.example.net/,
we rst declare the protocol and port restrictions as separate classes in order to demon-
strate how they can be factored out. Then we declare `WebLocations' for http://www.example.net/
and http://www.example.org/, referencing those common restrictions using #schemehttp
and #port80.
5.4.4 Delegation
In order to model delegation we require a three-way relationship between two `HTTPServer-
Natures' and a `WebLocation'. Since RDF relationships are only two-way, we have rei-
ed this relationship as the Delegation class in order to represent its three-sided nature.
These relationship properties between `HTTPBehaviours', `Delegations' and `WebLoca-
tions', are depicted in Figure 5.6, and we demonstrate the use of this relationship later,
in Figure 5.7.
Delegation
HTTPServerBehaviour
WebLocation
hasDelegation
delegationTarget
delegatedBy
targetOfDelegation
isDelegated
delegatedLocation
Figure 5.6: Agent delegation model
5.5 Coreference
In Section 4.4.3 we discussed the coreference problem faced by the Semantic Web.
Loosely, it is the problem of determining whether two dierent identiers refer to the
same or dierent things. In order to avoid an adoption bootstrapping problem we have
allowed agents to non-authoritatively describe other agents.Chapter 5 A Semantic Web Identity Infrastructure 71
In an attempt to mitigate the coreference problem this may cause, we have take cer-
tain stances in the design of this vocabulary. Principally, we argue that agents should
be dened by their identifying characteristics and relationships, rather than by their
identifying URIs.
5.5.1 Distinguishing Information
In almost all cases, coreference analysis cannot be performed over URIs alone, as they
are generally opaque identiers. Therefore, in order to support eective coreference
analysis, there need to be sucient links and data properties surrounding an identier
for them to be compared meaningfully. Unfortunately we cannot dene exactly the
degree of data or links needed for good coreference analysis as it depends on the context
the decision is made in, as well as the degree of certainty required by that context.
In contrast to people, whose identifying characteristics are hard to create unique indexes
from, the identifying characteristics of Web-based agents are rooted in unique naming
schemes. The HTTP protocol operates over the Domain Name System (DNS) [Mock-
apetris 1987] and IP [Postel 1981] schemes which each have dened uniqueness properties
and central registries (Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN)
and Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA)). Therefore, our vocabulary recom-
mends that descriptions of agent identities are accompanied by records containing this
data.
Provenance records are another form of information which may be used to identify
agents. These can include transcripts of the HTTP exchanges which an agent has been
part of, and potentially also records of the DNS query which informed the network
connection over which the exchange took place. Although this data may may not be
uniquely identifying forever, as IP addresses or domain names may change ownership,
we can expect it to change relatively infrequently. When it does change, will be able
to identify that from our provenance records, giving us the opportunity to verify that
other important characteristics of the agent have remained the same, i.e. that it is still
the same agent.
The Semantic Web HTTP vocabulary [Koch et al. 2011] provides us with the tools to
associate an HTTP exchange with the network connection over which it took place.
Unfortunately, the connectionAuthority property provides only limited metadata on
the connection: a hostname, and a network port number. There are no properties to
describe the connection protocol, the IP address of the actual host connected to, or the
DNS request on which the connection was based. At the time of writing, there is no
mature Semantic Web vocabulary in which provenance records of DNS exchanges can be
recorded. Together, this means that while these provenance records may give us useful
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trust in these exchanges. For the moment, the development of this ontology is beyond
the scope of our current work.
5.5.2 Canonical URI Discovery
In order to reference an identity description, supporting agents will be forced to coin a
URI for the subject of each description. If each supporting agent were to coin a new
identier, this would create a serious problem of coreference.
Link: <http://www.example.org/id/HTTPserverNature > ; rel='http://purl.org/ -
mcobden/identity#isServedBy '
Listing 5.2: Example agent URI advertisement header
Link: <http://www.example.org/id/delegation01 > ; rel='http://purl.org/mcobden/ -
identity#delegatedBy '
Listing 5.3: Example delegating agent URI advertisement header
To combat this, we propose the use of a custom HTTP Link header, shown in List-
ing 5.2, with which agents may advertise the canonical URI by which they wish to
be identied. In addition, we also propose that agents in the delegation chain may
insert a similar header (as in Listing 5.3) into the HTTP headers in order to adver-
tise their presence. Note that this advertises the URI of a delegation record, rather
than the URI of the delegating agent, this allows breaks in the delegation chain to be
identied. Respectively, these two headers map directly to the ident:isServedBy and
ident:delegatedBy vocabulary terms. They are intended to carry the same implica-
tions, where the WebLocation in question is that of the current HTTP Request.
5.5.3 URI Pattern Equivalence
Our vocabulary employs the POWDER-S encoding of the POWDER URI description
format. The POWDER specication allows URIs to be ltered by the following compo-
nents restrictions: schemes, hosts, ports, and paths (exact, contains, starts with, ends
with). The XML encoding can encode these directly, however the POWDER-S encoding
employs regular expression patterns to dene these restrictions. The POWDER formal
semantics [Konstantopoulos and Archer 2009] denes a set of regular expression tem-
plates which specify how URL component restrictions should be converted into regular
expression restrictions.
In order for these URI patterns to be of maximum use to coreference analysis, it may
be desirable to extract the original semantics of the restriction, for example, to identify
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vocabulary explicitly states that wherever possible these templates should be employed
without modication.
5.5.4 Term Alignment and Interoperability
In order to interoperate well with data expressed in other ontologies and tools which
expect such data, our vocabulary declares a number of relationships to terms from other
ontologies, which we show in Table 5.2.
Our Term Relationship Other Terms
Agent owl:equivalentClass foaf:Agent
prov:Actor
terms:Agent
WebServerAgent owl:equivalentClass webArch:Server
irw:WebServer
WebClientAgent owl:equivalentClass irw:WebClient
WebLocation owl:equivalentClass irw:URI
usesPublicKey rdfs:subPropertyOf wot:hasKey
Table 5.2: Term equivalences with other vocabularies.
5.6 Worked Example
As an example, below we illustrate an identity description as earlier described by our
use case in Section 2.1.1. Suppose Susan's agent responds to HTTP requests under
http://susan.example.com/ Tom's agent would record the identity description shown
in Listing 5.4. This description includes Tom's agent's perceived model of Susan's agent,
and a record of an HTTP exchange between them.
In the our illustrative scenario, after Susan upgrades her Agent, Hubert's agent observes
a dierent set of agents. Listing 5.5 show the observations of Hubert's agent. Note
that after Susan upgraded her Agent it reported a dierent value for the `Server' HTTP
header, and an additional `Via' header; it is this kind of information which can indicate
a change in the nature of a web agent and indicate relationships with other web agents.
5.7 Requirements Evaluation
In this section, we look back to the requirements we described in Section 5.2, and evaluate
the vocabulary we presented in the previous sections against them.
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<#location_susan_example_com > a ident:WebLocation;
owl:intersectionOf (
[ # normal http protocol only
a owl:Restriction;
owl:onProperty wdrs:matchesregex;
owl:hasValue "http\\:\\/\\/";
]
[ # hostname of only susan.example.com
a owl:Restriction;
owl:onProperty wdrs:matchesregex;
owl:hasValue "\\:\\/\\/(([^\\/\\?\\#]*)\\@)?([^\\:\\/\\?\\#\\@]+\\.) -
?susan.example.com(\\:([0-9]+))?\\/";
]
[ # port of only 80 (the default)
a owl:Restriction;
owl:onProperty wdrs:matchesregex;
owl:hasValue "\\:\\/\\/(([^\\/\\?\\#]*)\\@)?([^\\:\\/\\?\\#\\@]+\\.) -
*[^\\:\\/\\?\\#\\@]+\\:80\\/";
]
).
<#susan_agent > a ident:Agent;
ident:hasBehaviour [
a ident:HTTPServerBehaviour;
ident:serves <#location_susan_example_com >;
].
<#conn> a httpv:Connection ;
httpv:connectionAuthority "susan.example.com:80" ;
httpv:requests ( <#req0> ) .
<#req0> a httpv:Request ;
httpv:absolutePath "/" ;
httpv:headers (
[ a httpv:RequestHeader ;
httpv:fieldName "Host" ;
httpv:fieldValue "susan.example.com" ;
httpv:hdrName <http://www.w3.org/2011/http-headers#host> ]
[ a httpv:RequestHeader ;
httpv:fieldName "User-Agent" ;
httpv:fieldValue "Tom's Agent" ;
httpv:hdrName <http://www.w3.org/2011/http-headers#user-agent > ]
... (full headers omitted) ...
);
httpv:httpVersion "1.1" ;
httpv:methodName "GET" ;
httpv:mthd <http://www.w3.org/2011/http-methods#GET> ;
httpv:resp <#resp0 > .
<#resp0 > a httpv:Response ;
foaf:maker <#susan_agent >;
httpv:body <#cont0 -bin> ;
httpv:headers (
[ a httpv:EntityHeader ;
httpv:fieldName "Server" ;
httpv:fieldValue "Susan 's agent 1.0" ;
httpv:hdrName <http://www.w3.org/2011/http-headers#server > ]
... (full headers omitted) ...
);
httpv:httpVersion "1.1" ;
httpv:reasonPhrase "OK" ;
httpv:sc <http://www.w3.org/2011/http-statusCodes#OK> ;
httpv:statusCodeValue "200" .
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<#susan_agent > a ident:Agent;
ident:hasBehaviour [
a ident:HTTPServerBehaviour;
ident:serves <#location_susan_example_com >.
].
<#server_agent1 > a ident:Agent;
ident:hasBehaviour [
a ident:HTTPServerBehaviour;
ident:delegates <#location_susan_example_com >.
ident:hasDelegation [
a ident:Delegation;
ident:delegatedLocation <#location_susan_example_com >;
ident:delegationTarget <#susan_agent >.
]
].
<#server_agent2 > a ident:Agent;
ident:hasBehaviour [
a ident:HTTPServerBehaviour;
ident:delegates <#location_susan_example_com >.
ident:hasDelegation [
a ident:Delegation;
ident:delegatedLocation <#location_susan_example_com >;
ident:delegationTarget <#susan_agent >.
]
].
<#conn> a httpv:Connection ;
httpv:connectionAuthority "susan.example.com:80" ;
httpv:requests ( <#req0> ) .
<#req0> a httpv:Request ;
httpv:absolutePath "/" ;
httpv:headers (
[ a httpv:RequestHeader ;
httpv:fieldName "Host" ;
httpv:fieldValue "susan.example.com" ;
httpv:hdrName <http://www.w3.org/2011/http-headers#host> ]
[ a httpv:RequestHeader ;
httpv:fieldName "User-Agent" ;
httpv:fieldValue "Hubert 's Agent" ;
httpv:hdrName <http://www.w3.org/2011/http-headers#user-agent > ]
... (full headers omitted) ...
);
httpv:httpVersion "1.1" ;
httpv:methodName "GET" ;
httpv:mthd <http://www.w3.org/2011/http-methods#GET> ;
httpv:resp <#resp0 > .
<#resp0 > a httpv:Response ;
foaf:maker <#susan_agent >;
httpv:body <#cont0 -bin> ;
httpv:headers (
[ a httpv:EntityHeader ;
httpv:fieldName "Via" ;
httpv:fieldValue "1.1 svr1.susan.example.com (Some Enterprise Proxy) -
" ;
httpv:hdrName <http://www.w3.org/2011/http-headers#via> ]
[ a httpv:EntityHeader ;
httpv:fieldName "Server" ;
httpv:fieldValue "Enterprise Agent 1.3" ;
httpv:hdrName <http://www.w3.org/2011/http-headers#server > ]
... (full headers omitted) ...
);
httpv:httpVersion "1.1" ;
httpv:reasonPhrase "OK" ;
httpv:sc <http://www.w3.org/2011/http-statusCodes#OK> ;
httpv:statusCodeValue "200" .
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Our vocabulary must be able to describe the simplest class of webservers, those serving
only single web agent from a single web server. Listing 5.6 is an example of such a
description, describing an agent which serves requests for http://www.example.com/.
[] a ident:Agent;
ident:hasBehaviour [
a ident:HTTPServerBehaviour;
ident:serves [
a ident:WebLocation;
owl:intersectionOf (
[ # normal http protocol only
a owl:Restriction;
owl:onProperty wdrs:matchesregex;
owl:hasValue "http\\:\\/\\/";
]
[ # hostname of only www.example.com
a owl:Restriction;
owl:onProperty wdrs:matchesregex;
owl:hasValue "\\:\\/\\/(([^\\/\\?\\#]*)\\@) -
?([^\\:\\/\\?\\#\\@]+\\.)?www.example.com(\\:([0-9]+))?\\/";
]
[ # port of only 80 (the default)
a owl:Restriction;
owl:onProperty wdrs:matchesregex;
owl:hasValue "\\:\\/\\/(([^\\/\\?\\#]*)\\@) -
?([^\\:\\/\\?\\#\\@]+\\.)*[^\\:\\/\\?\\#\\@]+\\:80\\/";
]
).
].
].
].
Listing 5.6: An RDF description, in N3 format, of an agent serving a single website.
Providing the POWDER WebLocation descriptions are correct, this captures the essen-
tial characteristics of a single website hosted on a single server.
2. Able to describe an agent hosted on a shared web server
Modelling a shared-hosting environment proves to be more complex than our rst re-
quirement. We model this using the delegation terms in our identity vocabulary; a single
agent handles all incoming requests for co-hosted websites, which delegates each request
to an agent responsible for the website in question. Listing 5.7 demonstrates this form
of description, though for the sake of brevity, this example references the WebLocations
dened in Listing 5.1, and includes only a single delegation record, where there might
normally be more.
Our vocabulary is suciently exible to describe shared-hosting environments, and thus
it meets our requirements in this area.
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<#agent1 > a ident:Agent;
ident:hasBehaviour [
a ident:HTTPServerBehaviour;
ident:delegates
<#www_ex_com >,
<#www_ex_org >,
<#www_ex_net >.
ident:hasDelegation [
a ident:Delegation;
ident:delegatedLocation <#www_ex_com >;
ident:delegationTarget <#agent2.
]
].
<#agent2 > a ident:Agent;
ident:hasBehaviour [
a ident:HTTPServerBehaviour;
ident:serves
<#www_ex_com >.
].
Listing 5.7: An RDF description, in N3 format, of an agent hosted on a shared server.
Next, our vocabulary must be capable of describing agents in high-performance environ-
ments where an array of servers may be employed to handle requests. Our model for this
resembles the inverse of the previous requirement's example; rather than a single agent
delegating to one agent per website, we model it as many separate agents delegating to
a single common agent. In our example, the dierent webservers elding the request
each run an instance of the same software to which they delegate the request. This
shared software embodies the common agent, despite the fact it is running on dierent
machines. We demonstrate a description of this example in Listing 5.8, also, for brevity,
referencing the WebLocations dened in Listing 5.1.
Again, our vocabulary is able to describe complex hosting environments, and thus meets
our requirements in this area.
4. Able to describe a web agent which employs public key encryption
The vocabulary must be capable of describing an agent employing a particular public
key, perhaps to provide connection security assurances to clients. Our representation of
this is simply an ident:usesPublicKey relationship between an agent and a public key
resource. An agent wishing to lend weight to such an assertion could employ a signed
RDF graph (see Section 4.2.1.3), or implement the WebID authentication protocol.
We demonstrate how to describe this relationship in Listing 5.9, again, for brevity,
referencing the WebLocations dened in Listing 5.1.
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<#site_agent > a ident:Agent;
ident:hasBehaviour [
a ident:HTTPServerBehaviour;
ident:serves
<#www_ex_com >.
].
<#server_agent1 > a ident:Agent;
ident:hasBehaviour [
a ident:HTTPServerBehaviour;
ident:delegates
<#www_ex_com >.
ident:hasDelegation [
a ident:Delegation;
ident:delegatedLocation <#www_ex_com >;
ident:delegationTarget <#site_agent >.
]
].
<#server_agent2 > a ident:Agent;
ident:hasBehaviour [
a ident:HTTPServerBehaviour;
ident:delegates
<#www_ex_com >.
ident:hasDelegation [
a ident:Delegation;
ident:delegatedLocation <#www_ex_com >;
ident:delegationTarget <#site_agent >.
]
].
<#server_agent3 > a ident:Agent;
ident:hasBehaviour [
a ident:HTTPServerBehaviour;
ident:delegates
<#www_ex_com >.
ident:hasDelegation [
a ident:Delegation;
ident:delegatedLocation <#www_ex_com >;
ident:delegationTarget <#site_agent >.
]
].
Listing 5.8: An RDF description, in N3 format, description of an agent hosted across
multiple servers.
<#agent > a ident:Agent;
ident:hasBehaviour [
a ident:HTTPServerBehaviour;
ident:serves <#www_ex_com >;
ident:usesPublicKey <#key>.
].
<#key> a wot:PubKey;
wot:hex_id "01234567";
wot:length 1024;
wot:fingerprint "0123456789 ABCDEF0123456789ABCDEF01234567";
wot:pubkeyAddress <http://www.example.com/pubkey.asc>.
Listing 5.9: An RDF description, in N3 format, of an agent employing public-key
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As we argue in Sections 5.5 and 5.1, it is important to have sucient distinguishing data
in an identity description to enable eective coreference resolution.
In an Internet setting, the primary identifying information of corresponding agents are
network addresses and cryptographic keys. Our vocabulary describes Web agents pri-
marily in terms of the HTTP locations they accept requests for, the cryptographic keys
they hold, and any delegation relationships they may be involved in. Delegation may
only be observable in some circumstances, but it is important relationship in the context
of trustworthiness, as it potentially involves other agents in a trusting decision.
A limitation of our ontology is that there remains a `gap' between network address in-
formation and HTTP locations served. The process of a URI resolution usually includes
at least one DNS query and a network connection to the resulting address. The result of
both of these depends on the state of the user's Internet connection when the attempt
is made, and they may be { knowingly or otherwise { behind a network rewall or con-
nection proxy. Fortunately, in most cases, one can assume that these resolution steps
proceeded normally, and then treat the host-part of HTTP URIs in a manner akin to
network address.
If, however, in order to perform eective coreference resolution, one must be certain
about the details of the lower-level URI resolution steps, then we suggest the use of
provenance information. Specically, we suggest that identity description of the subject
should be linked to, and distributed with, provenance records of the resolution stages
on which interactions with the subject were performed. They would provide provide the
necessary information to ll this `gap', without abandoning the temporal nature of URI
resolution.
The additional metadata captured in interaction provenance records might also provide
useful information for coreference analysis; for example: changes in HTTP `User-Agent'
may indicate changes in identity. Unfortunately, as we highlighted in Section 5.5.1, there
are key areas for which we do not have a mature vocabulary in which to record this
provenance information { DNS exchanges, and connection initialisation and encryption
negotiation. For the moment, we deem it sucient to trust that domain name resolution
and connection initialisation are not manipulated, and do not play a large role in agent
identity, and thus we do not seek to create vocabularies for these actions in this thesis.
6. Must avoid exacerbating the problem of coreference
The minting of new Semantic Web URIs for existing concepts is inevitable; one will not
always be able to nd an existing URI, coined by another entity, which one can be sure
represents the same understanding of a concept. Nevertheless, our vocabulary makes
some recommendations to in an attempt to reduce rate at which new URIs are coined.
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identication and conation of duplicated identiers. In addition, we suggest a URI
advertisement protocol, designed to facilitate discovery of existing identiers. These
measures, described in Section 5.5.2, employ custom HTTP headers to advertise the
URIs of identity-aware Semantic Web agents. The design of this vocabulary, and our
recommendations for its use, is sucient to full this requirement.
# Requirement Verdict
1 Able to describe a single agent hosted on a single
dedicated web server
Met
2 Able to describe an agent hosted on a shared
web server
Met
3 Able to describe a web agent spanning multiple
web servers
Met
4 Able to describe a web agent which employs
public key encryption
Met
5 Must provide sucient data for coreference Met with limitations
6 Must avoid exacerbating the problem of corefer-
ence
Met
Table 5.3: Summary of requirements analysis
In summary, we have almost completely met our original requirements for this vocabu-
lary, as shown in Table 5.3.
5.8 Summary
Our objective in this thesis is to advance us towards the vision of the Semantic Web as
an ecosystem of intelligent, and trust-aware, autonomous actors.
The ability to uniquely identify agents is a key requirement for many Semantic Web
challenges involving trust, provenance or inter-agent interactions. Work to date has
often sidestepped this representation problem | modelling agents only as members of
the foaf:Agent class [Hartig and Zhao 2010, Raimond et al. 2007, Moreau et al. 2010].
Therefore, in this chapter we take a pragmatic approach to the socio-technical problem
of describing identity, presenting an identity vocabulary for describing web-based agents
by their observable characteristics. This is intended to act as a minimal foundation of
identity upon which a more complete picture of identity can grow organically.
In order to avoid an adoption bootstrapping problem, our vocabulary encourages the
non-authoritative description of web-based agents, whilst encouraging co-reference iden-
tication through analysis and canonical URI discovery.
We began by outlining the requirements a web agent identity vocabulary must meet
(Section 5.2). Against this background, we reviewed relevant existing work (Section 5.3).Chapter 5 A Semantic Web Identity Infrastructure 81
Next, we presented our identity vocabulary and demonstrated its usage in Section 5.4,
and discussed our coreference considerations in Section 5.5. Finally, in Section 5.7, we
reviewed the vocabulary against our original requirements.
In the next chapter, to complement our work towards a better notion of identity on the
Semantic Web, we propose a novel approach for bootstrapping trust in new identities
by harnessing open information sources.
We follow this, in Chapter 7, by investigating the information-management challenges
that trust-aware agents will face if they are to manage information as we described
in Section 2.3. Specically, we identify the requirements it places on our knowledge-
bases and propose eective storage strategies for recording inferred information and its
provenance.Chapter 6
Grounding Trust on the Web and
Semantic Web
In the previous chapter, we proposed a Web server identity description vocabulary to
underpin a Semantic Web identity infrastructure, and encourage the growth of trust and
reputation on the Semantic Web.
Unfortunately, as research agendas have recognised [O'Hara and Hall 2008], systems of
this nature are known to suer from a bootstrapping problem, and we have no reason
to conclude that the Semantic Web will be an exception. A bootstrapping problem
exists where a certain adoption threshold must be reached in order for adoption itself to
have a positive return on investment. Early adoption is discouraged by the investment
required, and so the threshold is unlikely to be reached.
In this chapter, we propose a novel solution to this bootstrapping problem which can help
to build trust in new environments. Our approach is founded on the observation that
neither the Web, nor the Semantic Web exist in a vacuum { they exist as extensions
of human societies. We can address the bootstrapping problem by nding ways to
encourage trust transfer from other environments. Crucially, this chapter harnesses free
information sources in order to grow and strengthen the links between an online identity
and the identity of its real-world counterpart, thereby encouraging trust transfer. This
enables people to apply their existing knowledge of trustworthiness in a new environment,
something we described in Use Case 2 (Section 2.2.1).
This chapter continues with a discussion of trust transfer in 6.1, and a discussion of how
this applies to the Web domain in Section 6.2.
We then, in Section 6.3, present a website identity service which integrates a range of
publicly available information to provide a Website identity dashboard. This dashboard
is intended to enable users to quickly cross reference Website identity information from
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dierent sources, and aims to thereby enable trust transfer, and help prevent misplaced
trust through mistaken identity.
Following this, Section 6.4 presents an discussion of our identity service, including its
successes, its shortcomings and avenues for future work. We also discuss how this work
relates to the Semantic Web research agenda.
Finally, Section 6.5 concludes this chapter with a summary of what we have discussed.
6.1 Bootstrapping through trust transfer
Trust transfer describes the act of a person (the trustor) basing their initial trust in
a target entity on trust in some other related entity, or on a context other than the
one in which the target is encountered [Stewart 2003]. Stewart's study investigated the
trust transfer between online e-commerce organisations, and found empirical evidence to
support the hypothesis that greater perceived similarity and interaction between entities
enables greater trust transfer.
As we discussed in Chapter 3, human society has many ways with which to advertise
trustworthiness, and many factors upon which to judge it. Compared to the Web, human
society has had a long time to develop eective trust mechanisms and establish long-
standing reputations. Trust transfer provides a means by which we can harness these
trust mechanisms and reputations in new environments.
Thus, if we can encourage trust transfer between old and new environments, we can
combat the bootstrapping problem faced by new trust networks. While this approach
does require a pre-existing trust environment from which to transfer, only articial,
simulated, environments are truly this isolated. The Web and the Semantic Web are
certainly not isolated systems; their content and use are both expressions of human
society, and thus we expect there to be many opportunities by which we can achieve
trust transfer.
The concept of `entitativity' describes a continuum in the extent to which collections
of indiviuals are perceived as forming a cohesive unit [Hamilton et al. 1997]. Stewart's
study demonstrated that perceptions of similarity (i.e. entitativity) between individu-
als correlates with greater trust transfer in the perceiver. Our approach to the trust
bootstrapping problem is thus to encourage trust transfer by supporting the perception
entitativity.
More practically, we will assist individuals in identifying groups of high entitativity by
providing them with information from reputable channels which may highlight ties be-
tween individuals. Specically, in the Web and Semantic Web domains, we are referring
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6.2 Entitativity and Trust on the Web
As we discussed in Section 3.4.3, the world wide web is by no means immune to the
machinations of unsavoury individuals; individuals dishonestly exploit others online just
as they do in the oine world. Impersonation attacks attempt to induce incorrect
perceptions of high entitativity between the attacker and a trusted party, and then take
advantage of the trusted status which this aords them.
In Section 3.4.3 we also discussed the factors which inuence users' trusting decisions
on the Web. Dhamija et al. [2006] demonstrated that people rely heavily on the visual
features of Web page content, rather than the technical facts presented by their Web
browser. They found that 23% of their participants judged website legitimacy only on
the page content, and only 13% participants in their study had ever checked the content
of an SSL certicate. This suggests that one of the reasons impersonation attacks are
so successful on the Web, is that a signicant portion of Web users are not aware of, or
do not understand, the technical information which identies a website. The adoption
of Web technologies has likely outpaced the widespread education of its underlying
principles, such as urls, hostnames and public-key infrastructure. More needs to be
done to teach users these skills, and to equip them with information which can help
them to identify legitimate identities.
Since Dhamija et al.'s study, Web Browser vendors have begun to address these prob-
lems; newer versions of their software have included better interfaces to website identity
information. In addition, the use of Extended Validation (EV) certicates (see Sec-
tion 3.4.2.3), which provide better identity information and assurance, has become more
common. For example: Google's Chrome browser and Microsoft's Internet Explorer 8
highlight the domain name portion of the URL in their address bars, and Mozilla Fire-
fox and Google Chrome include a menu which displays a readable representation of the
encryption certicate presented by the Website. Figure 6.1 illustrates dierent views on
the same information from three dierent web browsers.
These interface changes help to highlight the presence of identity information, which
may in turn help to prevent false perceptions of entitativity. While this is undoubtedly
an improvement, we believe that there is much more to be gained from providing users
with additional identity-reated information.
6.3 Website Identity Service
To demonstrate how we can bootstrap trust in new environments through trust transfer,
we present a novel website identity service which aims to foster trust transfer to websites
from their oine identities. This service combines information from a range of sources86 Chapter 6 Grounding Trust on the Web and Semantic Web
(a) Google Chrome
(b) Mozilla Firefox
(c) Safari
Figure 6.1: Encryption certi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to describe a websites' identity and to highlight the ties a web presence has with oine
entities. These ties, if sucient, may increase the level of entitativity perceived by
users, and thereby support the transfer of a user's trust between the entities. Transfer
of trust from outside the Web onto the actors operating on this Web, which we earlier
described in Section 2.2.1, will directly address the bootstrapping problem by increasing
the number of trustworthy actors in the population.
In addition to promoting trust transfer, this service helps to bootstrap a trust ecosys-
tem by other means. By improving access to identity-centric information, it will help
to prevent cases of misplaced trust through mistaken identity. This will improve users'
ability to judge the identity of websites, so that they may reach better trusting deci-
sions, with more condence. In addition, the ability to quickly cross-reference identity
information from dierent sources will help users to identify inconsistencies, which may
in turn highlight deceptive behaviour. Decreasing the incidence of misplaced identity
would, over time, help to improve the level of trust in the Web as a platform.
Our website identity service combines (i) host IP records and canonical DNS names,
(ii) connection security information, (iii) domain name registration records, and (iv) na-
tional company registry information. Figure 6.2 demonstrates the information gathered
for the internet host www.nwolb.com; the online banking portal of National Westminster
Bank.
Figure 6.2: Website identity information for the internet host www.nwolb.com88 Chapter 6 Grounding Trust on the Web and Semantic Web
6.3.1 Network Information
The rst panel contains information on the internet address of the website in question,
listing all IP addresses referenced by the website's DNS address record. We also include
the result of a canonical hostname (DNS PTR) record query for each address, as it may
provide some information about who operates the website host, or owns the address at
which it resides. Figure 6.3 illustrates the content of this panel for three dierent hosts.
(a) www.bbc.co.uk (b) www.paypal.co.uk (c) www.tesco.com
Figure 6.3: Example network information for three dierent hosts
This panel primarily allows users to identify whether the website in question owns the
IP addresses which answer requests for this hostname. It can also be used to identify
shared-hosting environments, or the use of load-balancing or caching services, as in Fig-
ure 6.3(b), where www.paypal.co.uk is served by a host under the akamaitechnologies.com
domain.
6.3.2 Connection Information
In the `Connection' pane we include information about the possible security of the
network connection to the website. Specically, we identify whether the remote host
will accept HTTPS connections, which are negotiated over an encrypted protocol. This,
alone, can give users some assurance of privacy and security { assuming of course that
the encryption certicates are legitimate and have not been compromised.
Similarly to popular Web browsers (as discussed in Section 6.2), this panel displays
identity information extracted from the connection encryption certicate. Figure 6.4
illustrates the information displayed in this panel for three dierent hosts.
Aside from the benets of encrypted communication, this panel also provides further in-
formation which can be compared with the other panels. Name and address information,
if present, can be cross-referenced with the other information available. Certain certi-
cates also include registered company numbers in their metadata, which enables furtherChapter 6 Grounding Trust on the Web and Semantic Web 89
(a) www.tesco.co.uk (b) www.nwolb.com (c) www.boots.co.uk
Figure 6.4: Example connection information for four dierent hosts
investigation and cross-referenceing. In addition, holders of EV certicates (such as the
connection certicates pictured in Figure 6.1, 6.5 and the connection pane of Figure 6.2)
will have been subject to an identity investigation by the certicate issuer, which further
endorses the validity of the information present in the certicate.
When an website oers encrypted connections, we embed machine-readable RDF data
into this area of the page using RDFa (see Section 4.2.1.1). This information, illustrated
in Listing 6.1, employs our identity ontology from Chapter 5 to assert that the agent
answering requests at this domain possesses a certain cryptographic key pair.
6.3.3 Domain Registration Information
The domain panel displays information from the Internet WHOIS record [Daigle 2004]
of the host's domain name. The Internet WHOIS directory contains contact information
for the owners and technical contacts for every registered domain name, as well as the
creation, start and expiry dates of the registration. Figure 6.6 illustrates the information
displayed in this part of the interface. Domain registration information is another data
point which can be correlated and compared against other information.
While the correctness of WHOIS information is often not rigorously veried, it raises
the bar for impersonation attempts. It is common for phishing attacks to be hosted
from computer systems whose security has been compromised; attacks are then staged
from within the websites that these systems were originally hosting. Between October90 Chapter 6 Grounding Trust on the Web and Semantic Web
Figure 6.5: Encryption certicate for www.paypal.com
<#nwolb_agent > a ident:Agent;
ident:hasBehaviour [
a ident:HTTPServerBehaviour;
ident:usesPublicKey <#nwolb_key >;
ident:serves [
a ident:WebLocation;
owl:intersectionOf (
[ # https protocol only
a owl:Restriction;
owl:onProperty wdrs:matchesregex;
owl:hasValue "https\\:\\/\\/";
]
[ # hostname of only www.nwolb.com
a owl:Restriction;
owl:onProperty wdrs:matchesregex;
owl:hasValue "\\:\\/\\/(([^\\/\\?\\#]*)\\@) -
?([^\\:\\/\\?\\#\\@]+\\.)?www.nwolb.com(\\:([0-9]+))?\\/";
]
[ # port of only 443
a owl:Restriction;
owl:onProperty wdrs:matchesregex;
owl:hasValue "\\:\\/\\/(([^\\/\\?\\#]*)\\@) -
?([^\\:\\/\\?\\#\\@]+\\.)*[^\\:\\/\\?\\#\\@]+\\:443\\/";
].
].
<#nwolb_key > a wot:PubKey;
wot:hex_id "4E43C81D76EF37537A4FF2586F94F338E2D5BDDF";
wot:length 2048;
wot:fingerprint "DF85EAE713C5FFC71CFE803421F46644C26A9E2C";
Listing 6.1: Website identity information embedded as RDFaChapter 6 Grounding Trust on the Web and Semantic Web 91
(a) www.boots.co.uk (b) www.paypal.co.uk (c) www.ecs.soton.ac.uk
Figure 6.6: Example domain information for three dierent hosts
2007 and March 2008 Moore and Clayton [2009] found that 75% of phishing websites
encountered were hosted on compromised systems. Compromising a web serving sys-
tem is unlikely to grant the attacker permission to also edit the WHOIS records, as
they are generally only congurable via the domain agent's website, through a sepa-
rate credential system. This means that although compromised websites may be used
as an impersonation platform, the domain's WHOIS records are unlikely to match the
impersonation.
6.3.4 Company Information
The nal pane in the interface displays, where possible, information on companies regis-
tered in the United Kingdom. In some cases we are able to link a hostname to a specic
company; through information in either the domain name registration records, or in the
encryption certicate. The rst relies on the fact that UK domain name registrations
(ending .co.uk), often include the company number in the registrant name eld. The
second approach harnesses a eld in the encryption certicate metadata which is used
to record company registration numbers.
When this information is found, the website identity service queries the UK Companies
House database to retrieve the company's registered name and address to display in
the companies pane. This information provides a further opportunity to cross-reference
address data. Currently, our identity service only has means to query for records of
companies registered in the UK, so while other panels may show information about
non-UK hostnames, it cannot provide company information for non-UK companies.
Figure 6.7 illustrates the company information which is displayed in this pane. Note
that in Figure 6.7(a), we were unable to identify the company in question from the92 Chapter 6 Grounding Trust on the Web and Semantic Web
(a) www.paypal.co.uk (b) www.tesco.co.uk (c) www.bbc.co.uk
Figure 6.7: Example company information for three dierent hosts
identier which was found. In this case, the identier in question was gleaned from an
SSL certicate for www.paypal.com (see Figure 6.5) issued to a United States company,
so is likely to have been issued by a United States authority. Manual inspection of the
certicate indicates that this company was allegedly incorporated in the US state of
Delaware. A manual check through the Delaware state Division of Corporations website
veries that this identier does correspond to the registration of Paypal, Inc.
In the case of Figure 6.7(c), neither the SSL certicate, nor the domain registration
records contained any company registration numbers.
6.4 Discussion
Our service demonstrates a novel approach to bootstrapping new trust environments,
harnessing existing information sources to support identities by assisting the perception
of entitativity to encourage trust transfer. The Website Identity service signicantly
reduces the time and eort in cross-referencing website identity information. The ability
to quickly perform a cross-reference check may be sucient to prevent a large proportion
of online impersonation attacks. If it remains the case that 75% of phishing attacks
are hosted on compromised servers (see Section 6.3.3), a cross-reference check may be
sucient to identify the impersonation attempt. We do, however, still rely on the user
having the inclination and the skills to corroborate the information presented.
We believe that the website identity service has demonstrated the potential in the ability
to view and corroborate information across these sources; however, we acknowledge that
there remains room for improvement. We have identied a number of shortcomings in
our work; the most signicant arise from issues beyond our control, while the others
arise from our choice of implementation platform and data sources.
In order for our service to be of use, users must have the inclination to check the identity
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users must be able to understand the information which our service presents. While
some of the information displayed is highly technical, the bulk it consists of names and
addresses, which should be understood by most people. We have made every eort
to present the information in an accessible manner, however we cannot be assured our
eorts were successful without formal evaluation.
Our service is somewhat disadvantaged due to the platform on which it is currently
implemented: as a web-based service. As it is not integrated directly into users' browsers,
it cannot ensure that it has access to the exact information the user has received, such
as the network connection metadata. It is, however, signicantly more dicult to create
a web browser extension for a range web browsers, than it is to write a web-based
service. For this reason we maintain that it was the right approach for demonstrating
its potential, but we discuss integration as an avenue for future work in Section 6.4.1.
Additionally, as we mentioned in Section 6.3.4 our coverage of company information
is limited to companies registered in the United Kingdom. While this will reduce the
impact and usefulness of our service to users from outside the United Kingdom, we
do not believe it undermines the success of this work. Our aim was to demonstrate
the potential of this approach, rather than to develop a globally supported service.
Adding support for company information in new jurisdictions, where that information
is publicly available, is another area for further development. Where this information is
not available, this kind of service may help to motivate its publication.
6.4.1 Future Work
We have identied a number of avenues for future work, some of which aim to address
these shortcomings, while others aim to improve its overall value.
Formal evaluation
Before we take our identity service any further, we wish to undertake some for-
mal evaluation of its eectiveness. We are conscious that trust transfer is highly
subjective, therefore a formal study to determine the degree of transfer aorded is
necessary.
We plan to investigate the degree to wish our service aects the perceived trustwor-
thiness of a range of entity and website pairs, while also measuring for changes in
perceived entitativity. In addition, varying the combinations of information panel
presented would allow us to measure their eectiveness, as well as which work well
together.
Further work could also measure the service's eectiveness in thwarting phishing
attacks, by encouraging a decrease in percieved entitativity, though this is perhaps
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Semantic Web adaptation
Another principal area for future work is adapting the architecture of our system
for the Semantic Web trust ecosystem. We would re-architect our system as a set
of independent Linked Data publishing websites, each focusing on a particular in-
formation domain. We would then supplement this with tools and/or aggregation
platforms to help bring this information together. This would isolate each com-
ponent and allow other services to make use of the individual information sources
for other purposes.
Another opportunity for future work is the upcoming `Registered Organization
Vocabulary' [Archer et al. 2013], currently under discussion by a W3C Working
Group. It denes a vocabulary for describing organisations that have gained legal
entity status through formal registration. Our service could be extended both
publish and consume information in this vocabulary.
Public records publication
Ocial records by national agencies are generally a trusted source of information;
our service demonstrates how the online identity of a business can be supported
by these records. This further supports the case that more government datasets
should be publicly available online, as they may have unidentied uses which
benet the general population.
Public records improvements
In addition to this, our service has highlighted an area where the creation of new
government datasets could add signicant value to existing ones. Automated and
robust identication of the company responsible for a website is a non-trivial task
which could be made a lot easier through legislation.
Were the government to curate a dataset mapping domain names to company
numbers, by mandating their routine disclosure, the task would become trivial, at
least for UK companies. This would also make it possible to identify all domains
owned by a single company.
Currently, by UK law, companies are required to publish their company number
on their websites. However, as the legislation does not specify how or where, there
is no standard location in which to nd it. If the creation of additional datasets is
undesirable, standardising a means of disclosing company numbers in a machine
readable form might be a sucient alternative. Note that this approach would not
allow one to identify all domains owned by a single company.
A lightweight approach based around a well-known url scheme, like the Web Robots
exclusion standard [Koster 1996], is one possible implementation of this. Also, a
recent W3C `Working Group Note' presents a `Registered Organization Vocabu-
lary' [Archer et al. 2013] which may be an answer to the representational needs of
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In Section 6.3.4 we note that .co.uk registrations often include a company reg-
istration number. Regulation here could be tightened in order to mandate this
information, however this would not aect other domains hierarchies such as .com
or .org, so other approaches may be more worthwhile.
To take either of these approaches further would involve contacting the agencies
responsible for setting policies in both areas. The UK company register is main-
tained by Companies House, an Executive Agency of the UK government, whereas
the .co.uk domain tree is managed by Nominet UK, a non-prot company limited
by guarantee.
New information sources or targets
Another expansion point for future development is the addition of entirely new in-
formation sources. Any form of information which adds credibility to the subject's
identity may prove a worthwhile addition.
The scope of the service could also be expanded to build condence and trust
in other online entities, such as people. In which case, we could provide links
between people's online identities and membership endorsements for professional
organisations, or to proofs of qualication and certication.
Browser integration
As discussed briey above, one possible avenue for improvement is Web browser
integration. Instead of a pure web service based implementation, part or all of
the functionality could be implemented as a web browser extension. This would
allow direct access to network connection metadata, thereby addressing the prob-
lem of inaccurate information. Additionally, a browser extension could proactively
present users with the identity dashboard in certain situations. These could in-
clude, when a user visits a website for the rst time, or when they attempt to enter
information into a web page form.
Increased jurisdiction coverage
As we discussed above, our service currently only integrates information from the
United Kingdom Companies House database. Future work could improve its ability
to identify the jurisdiction of a company identier, and add support for querying
the company records in these new jurisdictions.
6.5 Summary
In this chapter, we turned our attention to the trust bootstrapping problem which aects
the Semantic Web. We proposed the use of trust transfer as a means of addressing this
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To enable trust transfer to occur, our approach encourages the growth and promotion
of identity links between trust environments. These links have the potential to boost
perceived entitativity and thereby encourage trust transfer.
To demonstrate this approach, in Section 6.3, we presented a website identity service
which brings together a range of information sources relevant which each describe an as-
pect of a website's identity. This service combines network address information, domain
name records, encryption certicate metadata and, where possible, company registra-
tion information. Each of these information sources acts as a link to some real-world
authority, and its role and reputation in society. These authorities act as the crucial
links back to the existing trust networks of the oine world.
In Section 6.4 we reviewed the shortcomings of our identity service, and discussed avenues
for future work. Chiey, these are a) the need to formally evaluate which information
sources, or combinations thereof, successfully promote entitativity, b) the identication
and integration of further information sources, and c) the adaption of this approach for
the Semantic Web environment.
In the next chapter we build upon our contributions thus far; a lightweight vocabulary
in which to describe the identity of web-based agents, and a strategy by which we can
bootstrap trust in their identities. Against this background, the next chapter focuses
on the challenge of combining Semantic Web information from a range of sources whilst
maintaining the ability to judge trustworthiness of inferred or queried information.Chapter 7
Eective Trust-Aware
Information Management
The primary aim of our work is to enable people, or Semantic Web agents, to make
eective trustworthiness judgements of Semantic Web information. Thus far, towards
this goal, we have proposed a vocabulary to form the basis of an identity ecosystem for
the Semantic Web (Chapter 5), and demonstrated how we might bootstrap the Semantic
Web trust ecosystem through trust transfer from existing trust ecosystems (Chapter 6.
In this chapter we consider the information management challenges which arise once
we have established systems for identity and reputation on the Semantic Web. These
systems will not, themselves, solve the problem of trust, but instead provide a stable
foundation for advanced information management systems.
As we described in our third use case (Section 2.3.1), one of the key challenges which
arises when handling and acting upon information from many heterogenous sources, is
judging the trustworthiness of information. Robust provenance information, both of
external information and information derived from it, is fundamental requirement of
dependable trustworthiness assessments.
In Section 7.1 we identify a critical incompatibility with quad-based statement storage
engines, the named graph data model's notion of acceptance, and the need to represent
potentially incorrect claims by other agents (Section 7.1.1). Section 7.1.2 discusses a
potential solution to this problem using unique graph identiers.
Next, in Section 7.2, we explore the need to answer questions of provenance for derived
statements, looking at existing approaches such as statement-based truth maintenance
(Section 7.2.3). In Section 7.2.4 we propose a novel graph-based approach, which al-
lows questions of provenance to be answered but scales with the number of graphs in
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the knowledge-base, rather than the number of triples. Then in Section 7.2.5 we pro-
pose a `graph delta'-based storage strategy which extends this, reducing the storage
requirements of this approach, and enabling certain optimisations.
Finally, we wrap-up this chapter with a summary in Section 7.3.
7.1 Named Graph Acceptance and Provenance
In order to combine, and query or reason over Semantic Web information, we import
our RDF documents into knowledge-bases, known as triplestores. Early knowledge-base
implementations stored RDF statements as triples, hence why they became known as
triplestores. However, if information from multiple source documents was imported into
the same triplestore, there was no way to determine the source of a single triple.
Since then, most triplestores now instead store RDF statements as quads { each triple
is stored along with an identier commonly used to describe the source graph { however
they are still often referred to as triplestores. This addition enables much more eective
information management, as it allows sets of statements to share a common identier
which, in turn, enables us to record provenance records for those statements. Recent
versions of the SPARQL query language [Harris and Seaborne 2013] have embraced the
quad form, to permit queries involving this graph identier.
The ORDI SG triple-store goes one further, storing statements as 5-tuples [ORDI-
Triplesets]. Their implementation uses the fth element to identify a list of `Tripleset'
memberships for a particular statement. This `tripleset' mechanism is employed to im-
plement Access Control List (ACL) features on RDF graphs, restricting viewing and/or
editing permissions.
In tandem with quad-based triplestores, we have the proposed Named Graph RDF
semantics [Carroll et al. 2005], which we discussed in Section 4.2.1.2. The RDF seman-
tics [Hayes 2004], as written, do not consider anything beyond triples { Named graphs,
quads and 5-tuples are not discussed. The named graph semantics associate every RDF
statement with a named graph, and allow a document to contain named subgraphs and
reference other named graphs. The semantics also allow globally scoped URIs as graph
names, allowing documents to assert statements about the content of other documents.
@prefix ex: <http://www.example.org/>
ex:doc/other {
ex:doc/other#alice foaf:knows ex:doc/other#bob .
}
Listing 7.1: An RDF document which makes a claim about the contents of another
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Just as it is possible in RDF to assert statements about identiers over which you
do not have authority, as we illustrate in Listing 7.1, using named graphs allows one
to claim that certain statements are present in a document over which you may not
necessarily have authority. The document shown in Listing 7.1 claims that the document
identied by http://www.example.org/doc/other contains one particular statement.
Unless additional precautions are taken, importing named graphs would allow malicious
documents to insert arbitrary information into other documents. The Named Graph
model suces when communication only uses traditional RDF documents, it is the use
of document formats which support named graphs which highlights this information
separation problem.
To combat this, Carroll et al. [2005] dene the notion of graph `acceptance'; the infor-
mation consumer chooses whether or not to `accept' a graph based on their individual
policies. Only the graphs `accepted' by these policies will be used by the information
consumer. The graph acceptance policies are left as an exercise for the information
consumer as they are expected to be both subjective and highly contextual. Carroll
et al. do, however, suggest that these policies may include some form of trustworthiness
assessment. The work of Kagal et al. [2003] presents a Semantic Web policy language
which may be suitable for this application.
Unfortunately this information separation problem resurfaces in applications where
graph acceptance cannot reasonably be decided before information is imported. If a
document were to assert statements into the graph of another document, we would have
no way of correcting, or even identifying this change. As a result, unless we take special
precautions, we cannot import unknown RDF documents employing the named graph
semantics without the risk of undermining provenance records.
7.1.1 Limitations of Graph Acceptance
There are a number of situations where it may not be possible or desirable to determine
whether or not a graph should be accepted before information is imported:
All graphs accepted
The simplest case is that of an information consumer whose acceptance policy
accepts all graphs. Legitimate applications of this policy include caching services
and search engines. The function of the information consumer requires that it
accept all graphs, so it cannot enact any policy that would protect its provenance
records.
Cannot judge acceptance early
An information consumer may not be able to judge acceptance of the information
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contextual. If information is to be used more than once, then it may need to
undergo two dierent acceptance assessments, as the context of the assessment
will change for each use. Thus, although information might not be accepted in the
rst context, it may still be accepted in the second, so we cannot simply discard
it after failing the rst time.
Acceptance may vary over time
Finally, our perception of an information source's trustworthiness may change over
time, as we learn more about its behaviour and reputation. Thus there may be
situations where we wish to retract our acceptance of certain graphs, or accept
a graph previously retracted. To achieve this we require an accurate means of
identifying the sources of all statements in our knowledge-base.
While these situations demonstrate that this problem is of some importance, graph
acceptance still serves a legitimate purpose. Graph acceptance's primary purpose is to
lter untrustworthy information from a knowledge-base before it is interpreted by an
application. Thus it remains applicable for applications which cannot work with named
graphs, or cannot themselves decide graph acceptance.
7.1.2 Representational Limitations of Named Graphs
The crux of the problem is that we cannot uniquely identify two named graphs, as-
serted in dierent places, which share a common name. Suppose documents B and
C (Listings 7.2 and 7.3) make some claims about document A (identied by the URI
http://www.example.com/doc/a), some of which are common, and some of which are
distinct. How do we separate which statements were in each?
@prefix ex: <http://www.example.org/>
ex:doc/a {
ex:doc/a#alice foaf:knows ex:doc/a#bob .
ex:doc/a#alice foaf:knows ex:doc/a#charlie .
}
Listing 7.2: Document B with the URI: http://www.example.com/doc/b.
@prefix ex: <http://www.example.org/>
ex:doc/a {
ex:doc/a#alice foaf:knows ex:doc/a#bob .
ex:doc/a#bob foaf:knows ex:doc/a#charlie .
}
Listing 7.3: Document C with the URI: http://www.example.com/doc/c.
A standard quad-based triplestore is not sucient here; the value of the graph component
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of the carrier document (B or C), not both. With either choice there is some loss of
information, the former means we lose track of where each triple came from, and the
latter prevents us from supporting named graphs.
A 5-tuple approach is the next most obvious answer to this problem, adding both the
graph and the carrier identier to the triple; for example (subject, predicate, object,
graph name, document name). Unfortunately this approach fails to solve our problem
in more complex scenarios. Consider another document D (Listing 7.4) which describes
the claims which were made in documents B and C. If we use the graph and document
names to annotate each triple then we have no means to distinguish between the separate
claims of B and C as described in D.
@prefix ex: <http://www.example.org/>
ex:doc/b {
ex:doc/a {
ex:doc/a#alice foaf:knows ex:doc/a#bob .
ex:doc/a#alice foaf:knows ex:doc/a#charlie .
}
}
ex:doc/c {
ex:doc/a {
ex:doc/a#alice foaf:knows ex:doc/a#bob .
ex:doc/a#bob foaf:knows ex:doc/a#charlie .
}
}
Listing 7.4: Document D with the URI: http://www.example.com/doc/d.
Another question is how would D assert that the claims in C were bogus, whereas the
claims in B were not? This requires an identier within the document D which can
separate the two graphs. The fact that this problem also aects documents encoding
named graphs, and is not conned to knowledge-base implementations, suggests that is
a wider problem with the Named Graph data model.
7.1.3 A Unique Graph Identier
To solve these representational issues, we propose that each graph is given a unique and
minimally scoped name, and the name present in the existing model should instead be
expressed as an RDF statement.
In more detail, our proposed solution is to replace the graph name with an anonymous
RDF blank-node identier (see Section 4.2.1) { blank-node identiers have dened mean-
ing only within the scope of a single encoding or knowledge-base. We note that in this
model the root graph within a document also receives a unique identier. With this, we
then have separate identiers for the notion of a document and for the graph it contains.102 Chapter 7 Eective Trust-Aware Information Management
We also propose that the existing method of naming a graph with a globally resolvable
URI be replaced by RDF statements to the same eect. We illustrate in our exam-
ples which follow, employing the straw-man vocabulary prex rdfg2 to propose some
provisional terms.
@prefix ex: <http://www.example.org/>
ex:doc/e a foaf:Document .
:_graphE {
...
:_graphE2 {
...
} .
} .
ex:doc/e rdfg2:encodingOf :_graphE .
:_graphE rdfg2:encodedBy ex:doc/e .
ex:doc/e rdfg2:includesEncodingOf :_graphE2 .
:_graphE2 rdfg2:encodedWithin ex:doc/e .
Listing 7.5: Statements recorded about a document and its root graph
Listing 7.5 demonstrates the statements that a knowledge-base might store about a
document ex:doc/e:
 ex:doc/e is a document
 There is a graph : graphE
 There is a graph : graphE2 which is a subgraph of : graphE
 ex:doc/e is an encoding of the graph : graphE (and the converse)
 ex:doc/e includes an encoding of the graph : graphE2 (and the converse)
We can re-use these properties in order to represent claims about other documents, such
as in Listings 7.6 and 7.7.
:_graphF { ... } .
:_graphF rdfg2:encodedBy <http://www.example.com/doc/f> .
:_graphG { ... } .
:_graphG rdfg:equivalentGraph :_graphH
:_graphH rdfg2:encodedBy <http://www.example.com/doc/f> .
Listing 7.6: Two equivalent claims over the content of a document
Crucially, by looking at the graph that these triples are asserted in, we can treat some
as claims, and others as fact. For example, the triples we discuss in Listing 7.5 might be
asserted in a graph which we created to record provenance information, and therefore
be treated as facts. Whereas the triples in Listings 7.6 and 7.7, when asserted within a
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:_graphI { ... } .
:_graphI rdfg2:encodedWithin <http://www.example.com/doc/i> .
:_graphJ { ... } .
:_graphJ rdfg:subGraphOf :_graphK .
:_graphK rdfg2:encodedBy <http://www.example.com/doc/k> .
Listing 7.7: Two equivalent claims that some sub-graph exists within a document
Finally, we note that, since we retain a quad-based data model, with some interworking
this approach may be backwards compatible with existing quad-based triplestores. This
would involve ensuring graph identiers are unique, perhaps through a private URI
scheme, translating graph names and converting them to statements.
7.1.4 Future Work
Fundamental changes to core data models are not to be taken lightly, thus it goes almost
without saying that we must undertake future work in this area. Furthermore, we cannot
make these changes alone, these changes will require the scrutiny, review and approval
of the Semantic Web community, through academic publication and collaboration with
W3C working groups.
Future work is also warranted in exploring how we might enable references to named
subgraphs within other documents. It is desirable to reference them directly, however we
have deliberately removed the ability to assign global identiers to them. One possible
solution is to permit allow graph identiers to also be fragment identiers. We wish to
undertake further work here in order to investigate the importance of this requirement,
and to explore and evaluate dierent approaches.
7.2 Managing Derived Information and Provenance
As Semantic Web agents increase in sophistication, we can expect them to do more than
simply collate facts from downloaded documents. They may gain the ability to publish
new information, perhaps from rst-hand observations, formal reasoning, or from data
aggregation and analysis. To retain the ability to answer questions of trustworthiness
we will require provenance information recording the origin of this new information.
7.2.1 Inference
Performing complete inference over a knowledge-base can be a very resource intensive
task, in terms of both computation and memory. As a result, reasoning is perhaps
employed less often than we might think. To combat this, there are certain optimisation
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Forward chaining & materialisation
Forward chaining involves performing inference ahead of time and materialising
(or asserting) the inferred triples in the knowledge-base. Queries will then be able
to take advantage of inference by virtue of the fact that every entailment is already
present in the knowledge-base.
Backward chaining & query rewriting
Backward chaining works from a given goal query, applying the inference rules
against the goal in order to nd matches in the knowledge-base. While this may
make queries more expensive, it avoids the up-front cost of reasoning, as well as the
costs associated with storing the materialised statements. However, the amortised
additional query cost may eventually exceed the up-front cost of reasoning.
Hybrid
A hybrid approach, which combines forward and backward chaining, is also pos-
sible. Harris and Gibbins [2003] describe one such hybrid implementation in the
3store knowledge-base. They identied certain inference rules for which the re-
sults were seldom queried, or had signicant storage costs. These rules, specically
rdfs inference rules 6 and 9 concerning sub-property and sub-class inference, were
applied only through backward chaining. Their engine then performed forward
chaining for all inference rules.
Some degree of forward-chaining is attractive in most applications, as amortised costs
and query execution times are lower. As we discuss in Section 7.1.1, there are cer-
tain factors, such as trust, which may prompt us to add or remove information from
our knowledge-base. Unfortunately, the addition or removal of information from a
knowledge-base has the potential to invalidate all inferred and materialised information.
Unless the reasoning engine can determine the full implications of the change, it will
necessitate a complete re-computation of materialised inference results. If a complete re-
computation happens too frequently the costs of approaches involving forward-chaining
will exceed that of a pure backward-chaining approach.
As an aside, Fensel and van Harmelen [2007] suggest a novel optimisation, noting that
often applications do not necessarily require complete inference over a knowledge-base.
Instead, an application could query and reason over a small subset of the knowledge-
base, iteratively growing the size of that subset until sucient result quality is achieved,
or some time limit is reached.
Against this background, there is a need for strategies which minimise the need to
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7.2.2 Provenance
Assuming that an application has performed some derivation over its knowledge-base,
such as inference, in order for us to judge the trustworthiness if its results, we again
require good provenance records. The degree of provenance information recorded for
inferred information can vary considerably. Some implementations will not record any
provenance information at all. Some will indicate only that information was the re-
sult of inference. Some may go further, detailing which graphs were included in the
inference task. The most extensive (and also expensive) that we have seen is a sys-
tem which recorded the complete set of deductive dependencies between statements (see
Section 7.2.3).
The degree of this information constrains our ability to make trustworthiness assess-
ments. The rst level is insucient for any worthwhile trustworthiness assessment. The
second allows us to judge the trustworthiness of inferred information separately from the
rest of the knowledge-base, however, the result will only measure the aggregate trust-
worthiness of the whole knowledge-base. The third is better again, but only measures
the aggregate trustworthiness of the graphs included in the inference, rather than the
true trustworthiness of an inferred statement. Finally, while the fourth is sucient for a
good, well focused, trustworthiness assessment, it provides an order of magnitude more
information than is required for our purposes.
7.2.3 Statement Truth Maintenance
The approach of storing a complete deductive dependancy graph is very similar to
what Doyle [1979] described as `justications' stored by his Truth Maintenance Sys-
tems (TMSs). Doyle's TMS operated over two types of data structure; `nodes' rep-
resenting beliefs, and `justications' which represent reasons for beliefs. Broekstra and
Kampman [2003] explore the empirical performance of a per-statement provenance based
retraction-management system, which is eectively a restricted version of Doyle's TMS.
This implementation tracks deductive dependencies between statements so that when it
removes statements from the knowledge-base it can also easily remove any statements
which were deduced from them and so forth.
While this approach is named `truth' maintenance, it does not mean that it can only
be used to track trustworthy and `true' information. Rather, it tracks dependencies
between beliefs, facts or statements { true or otherwise. The approach is so named
because, as originally concieved, it existed within a system which assumed all stored
information to be true [Doyle 1979].
Table 7.1 illustrates this form of dependency record. Statement 2 is dependent on
statement 1, and statement 3 is dependent on both statements 1 and 2. Therefore if106 Chapter 7 E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Statement ID Dependency ID
2 1
3 1
3 2
5 4
Table 7.1: Example dependency table
statement 1 were to be removed, so too would statements 1 and 2. We note that these
records are a tabular representation of a directed acyclic graph, which we may refer to
as an entailment graph.
This approach has a space complexity of O(jIj) where I is the set of inferred statements,
as it must create at least one extra record (though likely more) for every entailment
stored. Performing the removal of a single statement and its consequences requires the
traversal of its full entailment graph, this has a time and space complexity of O(jEj) and
O(jV j) where E is the set of dependency records, and V is the set of statements which
are dependent on the statement in question. Thus the complexity of removing a single
statement varies depending on the number of statements which have been inferred from
it.
Perhaps as a result of this complexity, very few triplestores oer any form of `justication'
records or truth maintenance features. The need for truth maintenance in information
management systems has, perhaps for the time being, been overshadowed by the desire
to build triplestores capable of storing, retrieving and querying large numbers of triples,
with high performance. The implementation described by Broekstra and Kampman
[2003] has since dropped this feature, due to the computational and space costs of
calculating and storing dependencies in large scale environments1. The Bigdata RDF
Database2 retains per-statement truth maintenance capabilities, however at the time of
writing the documentation states that it does not support `quads', so therefore does also
not support named graphs.
7.2.4 A Graph-Based Approach
Rather than recording provenance on a per-statement basis, instead we propose to
record provenance on a per-graph basis. In more detail, we assert inferred statements
in dierent graphs depending on the set of asserted graphs which were inferred from,
and it is against these graphs which provenance is recorded. The granularity of per-
statement provenance information goes beyond the requirement of most Semantic Web
1Sesame mailing list post: See http://sourceforge.net/mailarchive/message.php?msg_id=
28761869
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applications. Since reasoning is repeatable, if we nd that we require ne-grained, per-
statement, information, we can simply repeat the reasoning process { so long as we store
sucient information to do so.
Unless ne-grained information is required regularly, the amortised cost of repeating the
reasoning process may be less than the long term cost of storing and maintaining the
information. This approach is likely to have improved scaling properties as metadata is
recorded about groups of statements, rather than single statements.
In most cases, unless constraints prevent it, reasoning agents aim to operate over the total
deductive closure of their knowledge base. However, as we discussed in Section 7.1.1,
reasoning will not always be a one-o process. Semantic Web agents will need to add
and remove graphs from their knowledge bases over time as documents are updated or
corrected, or if new reputation informations alters trustworthiness judgements.
e({a,b})
e({b,c})
e({a,c})
a
b
c
e({a})
e({b})
e({c})
e({a,b,c})
Time →
Figure 7.1: Global entailment graph construction over time
We use the function e(G) to denote the deductive closure over the set of graphs G, where
the entailment is performed over the union of the graphs in G. Figure 7.1 illustrates
the successive global entailment graphs through the incremental addition of 3 graphs
a, b and c to a knowledge base. Each time a graph is added the global entailment
graph must be recomputed. In this gure, the dashed arrows and ovals indicate the
possible entailment graphs which do not represent the global entailment graph and its
computation. As new documents are added, a complete re-computation of the global
entailment closure will involve a certain amount of repeated computation. That is, at
step t, a re-computation will duplicate the computation undertaken at step t 1, resulting
in a signicant overhead, which continues to grow as the knowledge-base grows.108 Chapter 7 E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Given a set S of 3 graphs a, b and c, the possible entailment graphs of S is the powerset
of S less the empty set (P(S) n ;)3. Thus for a set S of asserted graphs there will
be a maximum of 2jSj   1 dierent entailment graphs. Figure 7.2(a) illustrates the
7 possible entailment graphs in this scenario, indicating the entailment relationships
between graphs with arrows between nodes, from source graph to entailment graph.
Figures 7.2(b) and 7.2(c) illustrate the subset relationships between the graphs from
Figure 7.2(a). A set of statements (a graph) is by denition a subset of its own en-
tailment. When considering graphs, we refer to subset relationships between graphs as
subgraph relationships.
Given a set of graphs S, our graph-based approach has the potential to create 2jSj   1
inferred graphs in the worst case. For our approach, the worst case is when the inference
results in each possible inference graph containing only one statement each, as this results
in the highest storage overhead per inferred statement. Thus, in the worst case, the space
complexity of our approach is O(2jSj 1), as we store a constant number of statements to
describe the provenance of a graph. Therefore, our approach will, in the worst case, have
the same complexity as Broekstra and Kampman's justication records, O(n), where n
is the number of inferred triples.
In any case but the worst, either some inferred graphs will be empty, or some inferred
graphs will contain multiple triples. The rst will eectively terminate the dependency
tree early, which has the potential to signicantly reduce the number of inferred graphs.
The second will result in a lower per inferred statement overhead.
Thus, the benets of this graph-based approach are two-fold; rst, it gives us the means
by which to record provenance data at higher granularity, scaling with the number
of graphs rather than the number of triples. Second, it provides us with the means of
identifying which subsets of a global entailment graph are aected by any changes to the
knowledge-base. Enabling us to perform a much smaller inference task than computing
the entire deductive closure.
For example, with graphs a, b and c, where c has been added, the optimal approach would
compute only e(fa;b;cg)ne(fa;bg) to ensure the global deductive closure is re-computed
(which includes e(fcg), e(fa;cg) and e(fb;cg)). The shaded portion of Figure 7.3 demon-
strates the portion of the entailment graph which needs to be freshly computed.
7.2.5 Graph Delta Storage
Building on this graph-based provenance approach, we identify another opportunity for
optimisation. Given the antecedents of an entailment graph are each subgraphs of it, if
these graphs are all stored independently there is a signicant information duplication.
3The power-set of a set S is the set of all possible subsets of S, according to set theory.Chapter 7 Eective Trust-Aware Information Management 109
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(a) Graphs a, b and c and their possible entailment graphs.
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(b) Subgraph relationships between a, b and c and their entailment
graphs.
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gure 7.2(b)
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Figure 7.3: The portions of Figure 7.2(c) which are dependent on c (shaded).
We can exploit this subgraph relationship to store only newly-inferred triples in each
graph, using the subgraph tree to retrieve inherited statements.
I(X) = e(X) n
[
Y 2P(X)
Y (X
e(Y ) (7.1)
Equation 7.1 formally denes this approach; for a set of graphs X, the result of the
function is the deductive closure of X, minus any statements in the deductive closure of
any subset of X. For example, where X is a three graph set, as in Figure 7.2(c), this
is represented by the region inside e(a;b;c) which is not also inside e(a;b), e(b;c) and
e(a;c).
Succinctly, this approach stores only the delta between the entailment graph and the
union of the subgraphs, thus reducing duplicate information. Without this optimisation
the storage requirements of entailed graphs monotonically increase with each new graph
added to the knowledge-base.
7.2.6 Implementation
In order to explore the viability of our two proposals we developed a prototype imple-
mentation built upon the Apache Jena4 RDF knowledge-base, and the Named Graphs
API for Jena (NG4J)5 support library.
We created a Semantic Web client agent which demonstrated our unique graph naming
proposals. When our agent retrieves RDF content through URI resolution, it applies our
naming proposals to the data before it is added to our knowledge-base. In addition, it
records provenance information for retrieved data, expressed using the prov vocabulary.
4Apache Jena: See https://jena.apache.org/
5NG4J: See http://wifo5-03.informatik.uni-mannheim.de/bizer/ng4j/Chapter 7 E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Our prototype reasoner separated inferred triples into separate graphs based on their
antecedent graphs, and recorded in a provenance log that those graphs were the result
of an inference action.
_:g1 { test:a test:some_prop test:b . }
_:g2 { test:some_prop rdfs:subPropertyOf test:other_prop . }
_:g3 { test:some_prop rdfs:subPropertyOf test:third_prop . }
_:ig1 { test:a test:other_prop test:b . }
_:ig2 { test:a test:third_prop test:b . }
_:ig3 {}
:provenance {
_:g1 rdf:type rdfg:Graph .
_:g1 prv:retrievedBy _:da1 .
_:g1 rdfg2:encodedBy <http://www.example.org/1.rdf> .
_:g2 rdf:type rdfg:Graph .
_:g2 prv:retrievedBy _:da2 .
_:g2 rdfg2:encodedBy <http://www.example.org/2.rdf> .
_:g3 rdf:type rdfg:Graph .
_:g3 prv:retrievedBy _:da3 .
_:g3 rdfg2:encodedBy <http://www.example.org/3.rdf> .
_:da1 rdf:type prv:DataAccess .
_:da1 prv:performedAt "..." .
_:da1 prv:accessedResource <http://www.example.org/1.rdf> .
_:da1 prv:performedBy :self .
_:da2 rdf:type prv:DataAccess .
_:da2 prv:performedAt "..." .
_:da2 prv:accessedResource <http://www.example.org/2.rdf> .
_:da2 prv:performedBy :self .
_:da3 rdf:type prv:DataAccess .
_:da3 prv:performedAt "..." .
_:da3 prv:accessedResource <http://www.example.org/3.rdf> .
_:da3 prv:performedBy :self .
_:ig1 rdf:type rdfg:Graph .
_:ig1 :inferredFromGraph _:g1 .
_:ig1 :inferredFromGraph _:g2 .
_:ig2 rdf:type rdfg:Graph .
_:ig2 :inferredFromGraph _:g1 .
_:ig2 :inferredFromGraph _:g3 .
_:ig3 rdf:type rdfg:Graph .
_:ig1 rdfg:subGraphOf _:ig3 .
_:ig2 rdfg:subGraphOf _:ig3 .
_:ig3 :inferredFromGraph _:g1 .
_:ig3 :inferredFromGraph _:g2 .
_:ig3 :inferredFromGraph _:g3 .
}
Listing 7.8: Inferred triples separated into graphs (TriG Syntax)
Listing 7.8 illustrates, using TriG syntax6, the separation of inferred information into
graphs, our unique graph naming proposals, and the provenance records we mentioned
above.
6TriG Syntax specication: See http://wifo5-03.informatik.uni-mannheim.de/bizer/trig/112 Chapter 7 E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While we proved that out approach was viable, unfortunately our implementation was
far from optimal. An ideal design would be a reasoner which accepted `quads' as input,
and exibly allowed the `graph' of newly-inferred quads to be set through a pluggable
mechanism.
However, due to the architecture and complexity of the Jena Reasoner codebase, we
were unable to achieve our idealised design goals. There were a number of issues which
contributed to this:
 Internally, the reasoner uses a hybrid algorithm combining forward and backward
chaining; which results in the creation of `rules' which are no longer associated
with a named graph.
 Derivation logging does not record the creation of rules from triples, only the
creation of triples from rules.
 At the point where new rules or triples are derived, there remains no reference to
the original antecedent triples, so their source graphs can not be easily identied.
While we were able to work around these issues in order to build our prototype, it was
not a trivial process. Addressing the rst two issues involved fairly invasive changes
to the Jena Reasoner, as there were no good extension points for our purposes. Our
workaround for the last of the above issues amounted to searching our existing named
graphs to see which of them contained each antecedent triple. As one might suspect, this
is a particularly expensive operation, which scales poorly as the size of the knowledge-
base grows.
As a result of this, while we understand the scaling properties of our provenance records
in terms of triples stored, we were not able to explore the performance implications on
the reasoning process.
7.2.7 Future Work
Further work is required to explore the empirical performance of our approach as it will
vary depending on the properties of the input data. We plan to undertake this on two
fronts:
First, after addressing the implementation issues of our prototype, we plan to perform
some benchmarking of our proposals. Popular reasoning-based benchmarks, such as
Lehigh University Benchmark (LUBM) [Guo et al. 2005], are generally intended to test
OWL-based reasoners, and so are not immediately applicable. Therefore, we may either
have to create new benchmark datasets for RDFS reasoning, or explore the compatibility
of OWL-based reasoning with our approach. To test our approach, an RDFS reasoningChapter 7 E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benchmark would need to provide a variable frequency distribution of entailment types,
entailment chain lengths, the number of graphs and statements per graph.
Secondly, in order to investigate how our two proposals perform with real-world data
we wish to study the inference characteristics of real-world RDF datasets. We wish
to better understand how much information is inferred in practice, and how deep the
entailment trees grow to be. Also we would seek to identify how much or little these
characteristics vary across subject domains and data sources.
Finally, our work makes the assumption that the statements entailed from a given graph
are always a superset of the original graph. Future work could investigate the ramica-
tions of this assumption as other forms of reasoning, or other application processes may
not have this property.
7.3 Summary
In this chapter we targeted challenges involving the management of information and
provenance records, which are critical prerequisites for well-founded trustworthiness
judgements. Communicating provenance information is one of many applications for
named graphs, however we identify some fundamental problems with the named graph
proposal. First, that the named graph `acceptance' lter is not appropriate in a range
of applications, and second, that there are situations in the current data model where
it is impossible to distinguish two separate graphs sharing the same name. To address
this, we proposed replacing the graph name in the RDF Named Graph data model with
a unique identier, representing the name as a separate statement.
Next, we explored the provenance of information derived through processes such as infer-
ence. We proposed a novel graph-based approach to truth maintenance records, which
trades the granularity of per-statement metadata for the computational and memory
savings aorded by working with groups of statements. Building on this, we proposed a
delta-based storage strategy for derived data, as a further storage space optimisation.Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
Trust, in the context of the Semantic Web, presents a number of challenges, many of
which are socio-technical in nature. In this thesis, we took an end-to-end look at these
problems, identifying areas where technical innovation can make progress towards larger
socio-technical problems. We took a pragmatic approach to some of these problems,
developing a number of contributions across the breadth of this research area. In brief,
our contributions are: i) an identity ontology for describing web-based agents, ii) a novel
approach to addressing the trust network bootstrapping problem, iii) an improvement
to the RDF Named Graph semantics, and iv) a novel graph-based approach to recording
provenance, which enables us to make intelligent computational and storage savings.
In the sections which follow we summarise and discuss our contributions in more detail,
also discussing avenues of future work which build upon them.
8.1 Identity
Work to date has generally represented Semantic Web agents only as members of the
foaf:Agent class, providing little other information. A notion of agent identity is critical
to enabling eective inter-agent discourse, and the growth of trust and reputation within
the Semantic Web environment. Thus, we identied a strong need for a more descriptive
Semantic Web agent identity vocabulary.
Against this background, we developed an identity ontology for describing web-based
agents. It is designed to allow the description of any web-based agent, not just those
which adopt support for it, so that it is not beset with a bootstrapping problem. This
ontology provides a foundation for future research and for the growth of trust and
reputation within the Semantic Web.
We plan to apply this vocabulary in future applications, in order to further evaluate
its suitability. We anticipate that co-reference (Section 4.4.3) will be an issue with our
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vocabulary, as we have taken an intensional denition stance, so this will involve the
development of co-reference resolution strategies for use with our vocabulary. Future
work could also address the lack of an ontology for describing DNS queries and responses,
as this information underpins the operation of the Web.
8.2 Bootstrapping Trust
Against the background of our contribution thus far, we focussed on the acknowledged
research problem of bootstrapping trust in new environments, such as the Semantic
Web. We proposed a novel approach which harnesses open data to bootstrap trust in
new trust environments. This approach brings together public records published by
a range of trusted institutions in order to build condence in an identity in this new
environment. It is this condence in identity which encourages trust transfer into the
trust environment.
To demonstrate this approach, we developed a website identity service which integrates
this freely available information into a common dashboard. We combine network address
information, domain name records, encryption certicate metadata and, where possible,
company registration information. Each of these information sources acts as a link to
some real-world authority, and its role and reputation in society. Through this dashboard
we demonstrate how records from these institutions can be correlated to build condence
in an identity and ultimately encourage trust transfer.
Summarising from Section 6.4.1, our work has given rise to a number of dierent avenues
for future work:
Formal Evaluation
We are conscious that trust transfer is highly subjective, therefore a formal study
to determine the eectiveness of our system is desirable. In addition, varying
the combinations of information panel presented would allow us to measure their
eectiveness, as well as which work well together.
Public records improvement and open data activism
Promoting open data publishing, Semantic Web data publishing, and seeking new
applications for existing datasets represents a signicant avenue for future work.
Our work has demonstrated a new situation where we can draw value from existing
public records. This is another argument in favour of the open publishing of
government data.
In addition to this, our service has highlighted an opportunity to add value to
existing datasets. The task of mapping domain names to companies would be
signicantly easier if there was canonical method for doing so. Currently, by UKChapter 8 Conclusions and Future Work 117
law, companies are required to publish their company number on their websites,
however the format and means of doing so is not specied. Mandating centralised
records, or specifying a machine-readable disclosure process, would greatly simplify
this task.
New information sources or subjects
The integration of information sources of new types or in new jurisdictions is an
obvious area of future work which we may investigate. We could also extend our
platform to help build condence and trust in other online entities, such as people.
In which case, we could provide links between people's online identities and mem-
bership endorsements for professional organisations, or to proofs of qualication
and certication.
8.3 Information Integrity and Provenance
Lastly, we presented contributions in the areas of information integrity and provenance,
which are both critical prerequisites for well-founded judgements of information trust-
worthiness.
Named graphs are necessary for a range of advanced tasks such as inter-agent discourse,
and recording or communicating provenance information. We identify serious represen-
tational limitations with the named graph proposal which aect the ability to cleanly
represent claims of other agents.
Against this background, in order to address these concerns we proposed changes to
the graph naming mechanisms in the RDF Named Graph data model. It goes almost
without saying that future work is required in this area. Our proposed changes to the
Named Graph data model will require peer review by the Semantic Web community,
and collaboration with W3C working groups.
Next, we explored the provenance of information derived through processes such as
inference. We proposed a novel graph-based approach for recording the provenance of
information derived from a range of sources, such as inference. It trades the granularity of
per-statement metadata for the computational and memory savings aorded by working
with groups of statements. This approach maintains the ability to answer graph-level
provenance questions and allows new optimisations through which we can avoid needless
repeat computation. Building on this further, we proposed a delta-based storage strategy
for derived data which allow us to avoid duplication.
We plan to undertake further work to explore the empirical performance of our approach,
as its performance will vary depending on the properties of the input data. In addition,
we wish to study the inference characteristics of real-world RDF datasets, to look for
patterns and characteristics which may aect our performance with real data.Appendix A
Identity Ontology
This appendix reproduces our Web Server identity introduced in Chapter 5. An elec-
tronic copy can be retrieved from http://purl.org/mcobden/identity.
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE rdf:RDF [
<!ENTITY wot "http://xmlns.com/wot/0.1/" >
<!ENTITY terms "http://purl.org/dc/terms/" >
<!ENTITY foaf "http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" >
<!ENTITY owl "http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#" >
<!ENTITY WebArch "http://sw.nokia.com/WebArch -1/" >
<!ENTITY xsd "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" >
<!ENTITY prov "http://purl.org/net/provenance/ns#" >
<!ENTITY powder -s "http://www.w3.org/2007/05/powder -s#" >
<!ENTITY rdfs "http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#" >
<!ENTITY rdfg "http://www.w3.org/2004/03/trix/rdfg -1/" >
<!ENTITY rdf "http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax -ns#" >
<!ENTITY contact "http://www.w3.org/2000/10/swap/pim/contact#" >
<!ENTITY irw "http://www.ontologydesignpatterns.org/ont/web/irw.owl#" >
]>
<rdf:RDF xmlns="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#"
xml:base="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity"
xmlns:irw="http://www.ontologydesignpatterns.org/ont/web/irw.owl#"
xmlns:prov="http://purl.org/net/provenance/ns#"
xmlns:foaf="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"
xmlns:terms="http://purl.org/dc/terms/"
xmlns:contact="http://www.w3.org/2000/10/swap/pim/contact#"
xmlns:wot="http://xmlns.com/wot/0.1/"
xmlns:rdfs="http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#"
xmlns:powder -s="http://www.w3.org/2007/05/powder -s#"
xmlns:WebArch="http://sw.nokia.com/WebArch -1/"
xmlns:xsd="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#"
xmlns:owl="http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#"
xmlns:rdf="http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax -ns#"
xmlns:rdfg="http://www.w3.org/2004/03/trix/rdfg -1/">
<owl:Ontology rdf:about="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity">
<owl:imports rdf:resource="http://purl.org/net/provenance/ns#"/>
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<owl:imports rdf:resource="http://sw.nokia.com/schemas/general/WebArch -
-1.4.owl"/>
<owl:imports rdf:resource="http://www.ontologydesignpatterns.org/ont/web -
/irw.owl"/>
<owl:imports rdf:resource="http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/"/>
<owl:imports rdf:resource="http://xmlns.com/wot/0.1/"/>
</owl:Ontology >
<!--
 -
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// -
//
// Annotation properties
//
 -
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// -
-->
<owl:AnnotationProperty rdf:about="&rdfs;label"/>
<owl:AnnotationProperty rdf:about="&rdfs;comment"/>
<!--
 -
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// -
//
// Datatypes
//
 -
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// -
-->
<!-- http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema -datatypes#string -->
<rdfs:Datatype rdf:about="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema -datatypes#string -
"/>
<!--
 -
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// -
//
// Object Properties
//
 -
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// -Appendix A Identity Ontology 121
-->
<!-- http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#delegatedBy -->
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#delegatedBy -
">
<rdf:type rdf:resource="&owl;FunctionalProperty"/>
<rdfs:label xml:lang="en">delegated by</rdfs:label >
<rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">Denotes the HTTP server which enacts this  -
delegation.</rdfs:comment >
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#Delegation -
"/>
<rdfs:range rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
HTTPServerBehaviour"/>
<owl:inverseOf rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
hasDelegation"/>
</owl:ObjectProperty >
<!-- http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#delegatedLocation -->
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
delegatedLocation">
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#Delegation -
"/>
<rdfs:range rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#WebLocation -
"/>
</owl:ObjectProperty >
<!-- http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#delegates -->
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#delegates">
<rdfs:label xml:lang="en">delegates </rdfs:label >
<rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">This HTTP Server Behaviour delegates  -
requests matching specified HTTP Location to another Server.</rdfs:comment >
<rdfs:subPropertyOf rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
serves"/>
</owl:ObjectProperty >
<!-- http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#delegationTarget -->
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
delegationTarget">
<rdf:type rdf:resource="&owl;FunctionalProperty"/>
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#Delegation -
"/>
<rdfs:range rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
HTTPServerBehaviour"/>
<owl:inverseOf rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
targetOfDelegation"/>
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<!-- http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#encompasses -->
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#encompasses -
">
<rdf:type rdf:resource="&owl;AsymmetricProperty"/>
<rdf:type rdf:resource="&owl;IrreflexiveProperty"/>
<rdf:type rdf:resource="&owl;TransitiveProperty"/>
<rdfs:label xml:lang="en">encompasses </rdfs:label >
<rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">This Web location specification encompasses  -
the following Web location specification.</rdfs:comment >
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#WebLocation -
"/>
<rdfs:range rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#WebLocation -
"/>
</owl:ObjectProperty >
<!-- http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#hasBehaviour -->
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#hasBehaviour -
">
<rdfs:label xml:lang="en">has behaviour </rdfs:label >
<rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">This Agent Behaviour comprises a part of  -
this Agent.</rdfs:comment >
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#Agent"/>
<rdfs:range rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
AgentBehaviour"/>
<owl:inverseOf rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
isBehaviourOf"/>
</owl:ObjectProperty >
<!-- http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#hasDelegation -->
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
hasDelegation">
<rdfs:label xml:lang="en">delegates HTTP Location </rdfs:label >
<rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">This HTTP Server enacts the specified  -
delegation.</rdfs:comment >
<rdfs:range rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#Delegation"/>
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
HTTPServerBehaviour"/>
</owl:ObjectProperty >
<!-- http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#isBehaviourOf -->
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
isBehaviourOf">
<rdfs:label xml:lang="en">is behaviour of</rdfs:label >
<rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">This Agent Behaviour comprises a part of the -
specified Agent.</rdfs:comment >
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<rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
AgentBehaviour"/>
</owl:ObjectProperty >
<!-- http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#isDelegated -->
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#isDelegated -
">
<rdfs:range rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#Delegation"/>
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#WebLocation -
"/>
<owl:inverseOf rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
delegatedLocation"/>
</owl:ObjectProperty >
<!-- http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#isEncompassedBy -->
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
isEncompassedBy">
<rdf:type rdf:resource="&owl;AsymmetricProperty"/>
<rdf:type rdf:resource="&owl;IrreflexiveProperty"/>
<rdf:type rdf:resource="&owl;TransitiveProperty"/>
<rdfs:label xml:lang="en">is encompassed by</rdfs:label >
<rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">This Web location specification is  -
encompassed by the following Web location specification.</rdfs:comment >
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#WebLocation -
"/>
<rdfs:range rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#WebLocation -
"/>
<owl:inverseOf rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
encompasses"/>
</owl:ObjectProperty >
<!-- http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#isServedBy -->
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#isServedBy">
<rdfs:label xml:lang="en">is served by</rdfs:label >
<rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">The specified HTTP Sever Behaviour serves  -
requests matching this HTTP Location specification.</rdfs:comment >
<rdfs:range rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
HTTPServerBehaviour"/>
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#WebLocation -
"/>
</owl:ObjectProperty >
<!-- http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#serves -->
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#serves">
<rdfs:label xml:lang="en">serves </rdfs:label >
<rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">This HTTP Server Behaviour serves requests  -
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<rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
HTTPServerBehaviour"/>
<rdfs:range rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#WebLocation -
"/>
<owl:inverseOf rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#isServedBy -
"/>
</owl:ObjectProperty >
<!-- http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#targetOfDelegation -->
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
targetOfDelegation">
<rdfs:range rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#Delegation"/>
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
HTTPServerBehaviour"/>
</owl:ObjectProperty >
<!-- http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#usesPublicKey -->
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
usesPublicKey">
<rdfs:label rdf:datatype="&xsd;string">uses public key</rdfs:label >
<rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">This Agent Behaviour is known to employ a  -
key-pair with the specified Public Key.</rdfs:comment >
<rdfs:domain rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
AgentBehaviour"/>
<rdfs:range rdf:resource="&wot;PubKey"/>
<rdfs:subPropertyOf rdf:resource="&wot;hasKey"/>
</owl:ObjectProperty >
<!-- http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#topObjectProperty -->
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="&owl;topObjectProperty"/>
<!--
 -
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// -
//
// Data properties
//
 -
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// -
-->
<!-- http://www.w3.org/2007/05/powder -s#matchesregex -->Appendix A Identity Ontology 125
<owl:DatatypeProperty rdf:about="&powder -s;matchesregex"/>
<!--
 -
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// -
//
// Classes
//
 -
/////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////// -
-->
<!-- http://purl.org/dc/terms/Agent -->
<owl:Class rdf:about="&terms;Agent">
<owl:equivalentClass rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
Agent"/>
</owl:Class >
<!-- http://purl.org/net/provenance/ns#Actor -->
<owl:Class rdf:about="&prov;Actor">
<owl:equivalentClass rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
Agent"/>
</owl:Class >
<!-- http://sw.nokia.com/WebArch -1/Server -->
<owl:Class rdf:about="&WebArch;Server">
<owl:equivalentClass rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
WebServerAgent"/>
</owl:Class >
<!-- http://www.ontologydesignpatterns.org/ont/web/irw.owl#URI -->
<owl:Class rdf:about="&irw;URI">
<owl:equivalentClass rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
WebLocation"/>
</owl:Class >
<!-- http://www.ontologydesignpatterns.org/ont/web/irw.owl#WebClient -->
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<owl:equivalentClass rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
WebClientAgent"/>
</rdf:Description >
<!-- http://www.ontologydesignpatterns.org/ont/web/irw.owl#WebServer -->
<owl:Class rdf:about="&irw;WebServer">
<owl:equivalentClass rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
WebServerAgent"/>
</owl:Class >
<!-- http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#Agent -->
<owl:Class rdf:about="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#Agent">
<rdfs:label xml:lang="en">Agent </rdfs:label >
<owl:equivalentClass rdf:resource="&foaf;Agent"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
AgentBehaviour"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
Delegation"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
WebLocation"/>
<rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">An Agent </rdfs:comment >
</owl:Class >
<!-- http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#AgentBehaviour -->
<owl:Class rdf:about="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#AgentBehaviour">
<rdfs:label xml:lang="en">Agent Behaviour </rdfs:label >
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
Delegation"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
WebLocation"/>
<rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">An aspect or part of the inherent behaviour  -
of an Agent.</rdfs:comment >
</owl:Class >
<!-- http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#Delegation -->
<owl:Class rdf:about="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#Delegation">
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
WebLocation"/>
</owl:Class >
<!-- http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#HTTPBehaviour -->
<owl:Class rdf:about="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#HTTPBehaviour">
<rdfs:label xml:lang="en">HTTP Behaviour </rdfs:label >
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<owl:Class >
<owl:unionOf rdf:parseType="Collection">
<rdf:Description rdf:about="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity -
#HTTPClientBehaviour"/>
<rdf:Description rdf:about="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity -
#HTTPServerBehaviour"/>
</owl:unionOf >
</owl:Class >
</owl:equivalentClass >
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
AgentBehaviour"/>
<rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">A facet of an agent which specialises in  -
HTTP.</rdfs:comment >
</owl:Class >
<!-- http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#HTTPClientBehaviour -->
<owl:Class rdf:about="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#HTTPClientBehaviour">
<rdfs:label xml:lang="en">HTTP Client Behaviour </rdfs:label >
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
HTTPBehaviour"/>
<owl:disjointWith rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
HTTPServerBehaviour"/>
<rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">A facet of an agent which is responsible for -
making HTTP requests.</rdfs:comment >
</owl:Class >
<!-- http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#HTTPSServerBehaviour -->
<owl:Class rdf:about="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#HTTPSServerBehaviour -
">
<rdfs:label xml:lang="en">HTTPS Server Behaviour </rdfs:label >
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
HTTPServerBehaviour"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf >
<owl:Restriction >
<owl:onProperty rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
usesPublicKey"/>
<owl:onClass rdf:resource="&wot;PubKey"/>
<owl:minQualifiedCardinality rdf:datatype="&xsd; -
nonNegativeInteger">1</owl:minQualifiedCardinality >
</owl:Restriction >
</rdfs:subClassOf >
<rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">A facet of an agent which responds to HTTP  -
Requests using Transport Layer Security (TLS).</rdfs:comment >
</owl:Class >
<!-- http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#HTTPServerBehaviour -->
<owl:Class rdf:about="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#HTTPServerBehaviour">
<rdfs:label xml:lang="en">HTTP Server Behaviour </rdfs:label >
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
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<rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">A facet of an agent which responds to HTTP  -
Requests.</rdfs:comment >
</owl:Class >
<!-- http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#WebAgent -->
<owl:Class rdf:about="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#WebAgent">
<rdfs:label xml:lang="en">Web Agent </rdfs:label >
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#Agent"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf >
<owl:Restriction >
<owl:onProperty rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
hasBehaviour"/>
<owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/ -
identity#HTTPBehaviour"/>
</owl:Restriction >
</rdfs:subClassOf >
<rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">An agent which interats with the web via  -
HTTP.</rdfs:comment >
</owl:Class >
<!-- http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#WebClientAgent -->
<owl:Class rdf:about="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#WebClientAgent">
<rdfs:label xml:lang="en">WebClient Agent </rdfs:label >
<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#WebAgent -
"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf >
<owl:Restriction >
<owl:onProperty rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
hasBehaviour"/>
<owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/ -
identity#HTTPClientBehaviour"/>
</owl:Restriction >
</rdfs:subClassOf >
<rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">An agent which makes HTTP requests to HTTP  -
servers.</rdfs:comment >
</owl:Class >
<!-- http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#WebLocation -->
<owl:Class rdf:about="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#WebLocation">
<rdfs:label xml:lang="en">Web Location </rdfs:label >
<rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">A resource which describes a specific Web  -
IRI, or matches defined group thereof.</rdfs:comment >
</owl:Class >
<!-- http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#WebServerAgent -->
<owl:Class rdf:about="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#WebServerAgent">
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<rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity#WebAgent -
"/>
<rdfs:subClassOf >
<owl:Restriction >
<owl:onProperty rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/identity# -
hasBehaviour"/>
<owl:someValuesFrom rdf:resource="http://purl.org/mcobden/ -
identity#HTTPServerBehaviour"/>
</owl:Restriction >
</rdfs:subClassOf >
<rdfs:comment xml:lang="en">An agent which understands and responds to  -
HTTP requests.</rdfs:comment >
</owl:Class >
<!-- http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/Agent -->
<rdf:Description rdf:about="&foaf;Agent"/>
</rdf:RDF>
<!-- Generated by the OWL API (version 3.3.1957) http://owlapi.sourceforge.net  -
-->
Listing A.1: Our Web Server identity ontologyBibliography
B Adida, M Birbeck, S McCarron, and S Pemberton. RDFa in XHTML: Syntax
and Processing. Recommendation, W3C, October 2008. http://www.w3.org/TR/
2008/REC-rdfa-syntax-20081014. Latest version available at http://www.w3.org/
TR/rdfa-syntax.
R Allbery. DNS SRV Resource Records for AFS. RFC 5864 (Proposed Standard), April
2010. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5864.txt.
P Almquist. Type of Service in the Internet Protocol Suite. RFC 1349 (Proposed
Standard), July 1992. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1349.txt. Obsoleted by
RFC 2474 (Nichols et al. [1998]).
M Andrews. Negative Caching of DNS Queries (DNS NCACHE). RFC 2308 (Proposed
Standard), March 1998. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2308.txt. Updated
by RFCs 4035 (Arends et al. [2005c]), 4033 (Arends et al. [2005a]), 4034 (Arends et al.
[2005b]).
P Archer, M Meimaris, and A Papantoniou. Registered Organization Vocabu-
lary. Working group note, W3C, August 2013. http://www.w3.org/TR/2013/
NOTE-vocab-regorg-20130801/. Latest version available at http://www.w3.org/
TR/vocab-regorg/.
R Arends, R Austein, M Larson, D Massey, and S Rose. DNS Security Introduction and
Requirements. RFC 4033 (Proposed Standard), March 2005a. URL: http://www.
ietf.org/rfc/rfc4033.txt. Updated by RFC 6014 (Homan [2010]).
R Arends, R Austein, M Larson, D Massey, and S Rose. Resource Records for the
DNS Security Extensions. RFC 4034 (Proposed Standard), March 2005b. URL:
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4034.txt. Updated by RFCs 4470 (Weiler and Ihren
[2006]), 6014 (Homan [2010]).
R Arends, R Austein, M Larson, D Massey, and S Rose. Protocol Modications for
the DNS Security Extensions. RFC 4035 (Proposed Standard), March 2005c. URL:
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4035.txt. Updated by RFCs 4470 (Weiler and Ihren
[2006]), 6014 (Homan [2010]).
131132 BIBLIOGRAPHY
C Arthur, Rogue web certicate could have been used to attack Iran dissi-
dents, August 2011. URL: http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2011/aug/30/
faked-web-certificate-iran-dissidents.
D Artz and Y Gil. A survey of trust in computer science and the Semantic Web. Web
Semantics: Science, Services and Agents on the World Wide Web, 5(2):58{71, 2007.
R Axelrod and W. D Hamilton. The evolution of cooperation. Science, 211(4489):
1390{1396, 1981.
D Beckett. RDF/XML Syntax Specication (Revised). Recommendation, W3C, Febru-
ary 2004. http://www.w3.org/TR/2004/REC-rdf-syntax-grammar-20040210/.
Latest version available at http://www.w3.org/TR/rdf-syntax-grammar/.
D Beckett and T Berners-Lee. Turtle - Terse RDF Triple Language, W3C Team Sub-
mission, 2008. URL: http://www.w3.org/TeamSubmission/turtle/.
J Berger, N Noorderhaven, and B Nooteboom. Determinants of supplier dependence:
An empirical study, pages 195{212. Edward Elgar, 1995.
T Berners-Lee and D Connolly. Hypertext Markup Language - 2.0. RFC 1866 (Historic),
November 1995. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1866.txt. Obsoleted by RFC
2854 (Connolly and Masinter [2000]).
T Berners-Lee, R Fielding, and H Frystyk. Hypertext Transfer Protocol { HTTP/1.0.
RFC 1945 (Informational), May 1996. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1945.
txt.
T Berners-Lee, R Fielding, and L Masinter. Uniform Resource Identier (URI): Generic
Syntax. RFC 3986 (Standard), January 2005. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/
rfc3986.txt.
T Berners-Lee. Information management: A proposal, 1989. URL: http://www.w3.
org/History/1989/proposal-msw.html.
T Berners-Lee. Linked Data - Design Issues, 2006a. URL: http://www.w3.org/
DesignIssues/LinkedData.html.
T Berners-Lee. Notation 3: A readable language for data on the Web. Available online
at http://www.w3.org/DesignIssues/Notation3.html, March 2006b.
T Berners-Lee, R Cailliau, J.-F Gro, and B Pollermann. World-Wide Web: The In-
formation Universe. Electronic Networking: Research, Applications and Policy, 1(2):
74{82, 1992.
T Berners-Lee, J Hendler, and O Lassila. The Semantic Web. Scientic American, 284
(5):28{37, 2001.BIBLIOGRAPHY 133
D Berrueta and J Phipps. Best Practice Recipes for Publishing RDF Vo-
cabularies. Technical report, 2008. URL: http://www.w3.org/TR/2008/
NOTE-swbp-vocab-pub-20080828/. Latest version available at http://www.w3.org/
TR/swbp-vocab-pub/.
T Bray, J Paoli, M Sperberg-McQueen, E Maler, and F Yergeau. Extensible
Markup Language (XML) 1.0 (Fifth Edition). Recommendation, W3C, November
2008. http://www.w3.org/TR/2008/REC-xml-20081126/. Latest version available
at http://www.w3.org/TR/xml.
D Brickley and R Guha. RDF Vocabulary Description Language 1.0: RDF
Schema. Recommendation, W3C, February 2004. http://www.w3.org/TR/2004/
REC-rdf-schema-20040210/. Latest version available at http://www.w3.org/TR/
rdf-schema/.
B Briscoe. Tunnelling of Explicit Congestion Notication. RFC 6040 (Proposed Stan-
dard), November 2010. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc6040.txt.
British Broadcasting Corporation, Iran accused in 'dire' net security attack, March 2011.
URL: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-12847072.
J Broekstra and A Kampman. Inferencing and Truth Maintenance in RDF Schema:
Exploring a naive practical approach. In Workshop on Practical and Scalable Semantic
Systems (PSSS), 2003.
J Callas, L Donnerhacke, H Finney, D Shaw, and R Thayer. OpenPGP Message Format.
RFC 4880 (Proposed Standard), November 2007. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/
rfc4880.txt. Updated by RFC 5581 (Shaw [2009]).
J. J Carroll. Signing RDF Graphs. In The SemanticWeb - ISWC 2003, volume 2870
of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 369{384. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg,
2003.
J. J Carroll, C Bizer, P Hayes, and P Stickler. Named graphs, provenance and trust.
In WWW '05: Proceedings of the 14th international conference on World Wide Web,
pages 613{622, New York, NY, USA, 2005. ACM.
D Connolly and L Masinter. The 'text/html' Media Type. RFC 2854 (Informational),
June 2000. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2854.txt.
D Connolly. A Pragmatic Theory of Reference for the Web. In Proceedings of Identity,
Reference, and the Web Workshop at the 15th WWW Conference, 2006.
J Cook and T Wall. New work attitude measures of trust, organizational commitment
and personal need non-fullment. Journal of Occupational Psychology, 53(1):39{52,
March 1980.134 BIBLIOGRAPHY
D Crockford. The application/json Media Type for JavaScript Object Notation (JSON).
RFC 4627 (Informational), July 2006. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4627.
txt.
S Currall and T Judge. Measuring trust between organizational boundary role persons.
Organizational behavior and human decision processes, 64(2):151{170, 1995.
R Cyganiak, Top 100 most popular RDF namespace prexes, Febru-
ary 2011. URL: http://richard.cyganiak.de/blog/2011/02/
top-100-most-popular-rdf-namespace-prefixes/.
L Daigle. WHOIS Protocol Specication. RFC 3912 (Draft Standard), September 2004.
URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3912.txt.
C Davis, P Vixie, T Goodwin, and I Dickinson. A Means for Expressing Location
Information in the Domain Name System. RFC 1876 (Experimental), January 1996.
URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1876.txt.
M Deutsch. Cooperation and trust: Some theoretical notes., pages 275{320. University
of Nebraska Press, Oxford, England, 1962.
M Deutsch. The Resolution of Conict. Yale University Press, 1973.
R Dhamija, J. D Tygar, and M Hearst. Why phishing works. In CHI '06: Proceedings
of the SIGCHI conference on Human Factors in computing systems, pages 581{590,
New York, NY, USA, 2006. ACM.
J Doyle. A Truth Maintenance System. Articial Intelligence, 12(3):231 { 272, 1979.
ISSN 0004-3702.
D Eastlake 3rd. Domain Name System Security Extensions. RFC 2535 (Proposed Stan-
dard), March 1999. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2535.txt. Obsoleted by
RFCs 4033 (Arends et al. [2005a]), 4034 (Arends et al. [2005b]), 4035 (Arends et al.
[2005c]), updated by RFCs 2931 (Eastlake 3rd [2000]), 3007 (Wellington [2000a]),
3008 (Wellington [2000b]), 3090 (Lewis [2001]), 3226 (Gudmundsson [2001]), 3445
(Massey and Rose [2002]), 3597 (Gustafsson [2003]), 3655 (Wellington and Gudmunds-
son [2003]), 3658 (Gudmundsson [2003]), 3755 (Weiler [2004]), 3757 (Kolkman et al.
[2004]), 3845 (Schlyter [2004]).
D Eastlake 3rd. DNS Request and Transaction Signatures ( SIG(0)s ). RFC 2931
(Proposed Standard), September 2000. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2931.
txt.
D Eastlake 3rd. Domain Name System (DNS) Case Insensitivity Clarication. RFC 4343
(Proposed Standard), January 2006. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4343.txt.
D Eastlake 3rd. Domain Name System (DNS) IANA Considerations. RFC 5395 (Best
Current Practice), November 2008. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5395.txt.BIBLIOGRAPHY 135
D Eastlake 3rd and C Kaufman. Domain Name System Security Extensions. RFC 2065
(Proposed Standard), January 1997. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2065.txt.
Obsoleted by RFC 2535 (Eastlake 3rd [1999]).
R Elz and R Bush. Serial Number Arithmetic. RFC 1982 (Proposed Standard), August
1996. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1982.txt.
R Elz and R Bush. Clarications to the DNS Specication. RFC 2181 (Proposed
Standard), July 1997. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2181.txt. Updated by
RFCs 4035 (Arends et al. [2005c]), 2535 (Eastlake 3rd [1999]), 4343 (Eastlake 3rd
[2006]), 4033 (Arends et al. [2005a]), 4034 (Arends et al. [2005b]), 5452 (Hubert and
van Mook [2009]).
E Erikson. Identity: Youth & Crisis. Austen Riggs Monograph. W.W. Norton & Co.,
1994.
C Everhart, L Mamakos, R Ullmann, and P Mockapetris. New DNS RR Denitions. RFC
1183 (Experimental), October 1990. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1183.txt.
Updated by RFCs 5395 (Eastlake 3rd [2008]), 5864 (Allbery [2010]).
D Fensel and F van Harmelen. Unifying Reasoning and Search to Web Scale. Internet
Computing, IEEE, 11(2):96 {95, march-april 2007. ISSN 1089-7801.
R Fielding, J Gettys, J Mogul, H Frystyk, and T Berners-Lee. Hypertext Transfer
Protocol { HTTP/1.1. RFC 2068 (Proposed Standard), January 1997. URL: http:
//www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2068.txt. Obsoleted by RFC 2616 (Fielding et al. [1999]).
R Fielding, J Gettys, J Mogul, H Frystyk, L Masinter, P Leach, and T Berners-Lee.
Hypertext Transfer Protocol { HTTP/1.1. RFC 2616 (Draft Standard), June 1999.
URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2616.txt. Updated by RFCs 2817 (Khare and
Lawrence [2000]), 5785 (Nottingham and Hammer-Lahav [2010]).
T Finin and A Joshi. Agents, trust, and information access on the semantic web.
SIGMOD Rec., 31:30{35, December 2002.
F Fukuyama. Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. 1995.
Y Gil and V Ratnakar. Trusting Information Sources One Citizen at a Time. volume
2342/2002, pages 162{176, 2002.
J Golbeck. Trust on the World Wide Web: a survey. Foundations and Trends Web
Science, 1(2):131{197, 2006.
J Golbeck and J Hendler. Inferring binary trust relationships in Web-based social net-
works. ACM Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT), Jan 2006.136 BIBLIOGRAPHY
J Golbeck, B Parsia, and J Hendler. Trust Networks on the Semantic Web. In M Klusch,
A Omicini, S Ossowski, and H Laamanen, editors, Cooperative Information Agents
VII, volume 2782 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 238{249. Springer
Berlin / Heidelberg, 2003.
J. A Golbeck. Computing and Applying Trust in Web-based Social Networks. PhD thesis,
College Park, MD, USA, 2005.
T Grandison and M Sloman. A Survey of Trust in Internet Applications. IEEE Com-
munications Surveys and Tutorials, 3(4):2{16, 2000.
D Grossman. New Terminology and Clarications for Diserv. RFC 3260 (Informa-
tional), April 2002. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3260.txt.
O Gudmundsson. DNSSEC and IPv6 A6 aware server/resolver message size require-
ments. RFC 3226 (Proposed Standard), December 2001. URL: http://www.ietf.
org/rfc/rfc3226.txt. Updated by RFCs 4033 (Arends et al. [2005a]), 4034 (Arends
et al. [2005b]), 4035 (Arends et al. [2005c]).
O Gudmundsson. Delegation Signer (DS) Resource Record (RR). RFC 3658 (Proposed
Standard), December 2003. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3658.txt. Obso-
leted by RFCs 4033 (Arends et al. [2005a]), 4034 (Arends et al. [2005b]), 4035 (Arends
et al. [2005c]), updated by RFC 3755 (Weiler [2004]).
Y Guo, Z Pan, and J Hein. LUBM: A benchmark for OWL knowledge base systems.
Web Semantics: Science, Services and Agents on the World Wide Web, 3(2 - 3):158
{ 182, 2005. ISSN 1570-8268.
A Gustafsson. Handling of Unknown DNS Resource Record (RR) Types. RFC 3597
(Proposed Standard), September 2003. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3597.
txt. Updated by RFCs 4033 (Arends et al. [2005a]), 4034 (Arends et al. [2005b]),
4035 (Arends et al. [2005c]), 5395 (Eastlake 3rd [2008]).
J Hakala and H Walravens. Using International Standard Book Numbers as Uniform
Resource Names. RFC 3187 (Informational), October 2001. URL: http://www.ietf.
org/rfc/rfc3187.txt.
F Halasz and M Schwartz. The Dexter hypertext reference model. Communications of
the ACM, 37(2):30{39, 1994.
F. G Halasz, T. P Moran, and R. H Trigg. Notecards in a nutshell. In CHI+GI 1987:
Proceedings of the SIGCHI/GI Conference on Human Factors in Computing systems
and Graphics Interface, pages 45{52, Toronto, Ontario, Canada, 1987. ACM.
H Halpin. Provenance: The Missing Component of the Semantic Web. In Proceed-
ings of the First Workshop on Trust and Privacy on the Social and Semantic Web
(SPOT2009), 2009.BIBLIOGRAPHY 137
H Halpin and V Presutti. An Ontology of Resources: Solving the Identity Crisis. In
L Aroyo, P Traverso, F Ciravegna, P Cimiano, T Heath, E Hyv onen, R Mizoguchi,
E Oren, M Sabou, and E Simperl, editors, The Semantic Web: Research and Appli-
cations, volume 5554 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 521{534. Springer
Berlin / Heidelberg, 2009.
H Halpin, P Hayes, J McCusker, D McGuinness, and H Thompson. When owl:sameAs
Isn't the Same: An Analysis of Identity in Linked Data. In P Patel-Schneider, Y Pan,
P Hitzler, P Mika, L Zhang, J Pan, I Horrocks, and B Glimm, editors, The Semantic
Web { ISWC 2010, volume 6496 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 305{320.
Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2010.
D Hamilton, S Sherman, and B Lickel. Perceiving Social Groups: The Importance of
the Entitativity. Intergroup cognition and intergroup behavior, page 47, 1997.
S Harris and N Gibbins. 3store: Ecient Bulk RDF Storage. In R Volz, S Decker, and
I. F Cruz, editors, PSSS1 - Practical and Scalable Semantic Systems, Proceedings of
the First International Workshop on Practical and Scalable Semantic Systems, Sanibel
Island, Florida, USA, October 20, 2003, volume 89 of CEUR Workshop Proceedings.
CEUR-WS.org, 2003.
S Harris and A Seaborne. SPARQL 1.1 Query Language. Recommendation, W3C,
March 2013. http://www.w3.org/TR/2013/REC-sparql11-query-20130321/. Lat-
est version available at http://www.w3.org/TR/sparql11-query/.
O Hartig. Querying Trust in RDF Data with tSPARQL. In L Aroyo, P Traverso,
F Ciravegna, P Cimiano, T Heath, E Hyv onen, R Mizoguchi, E Oren, M Sabou, and
E Simperl, editors, The Semantic Web: Research and Applications, volume 5554 of
Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 5{20. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2009a.
O Hartig. Provenance Information in the Web of Data. In C Bizer, T Heath, T Berners-
Lee, and K Idehen, editors, Proceedings of the WWW2009 Workshop on Linked Data
on the Web, Madrid, Spain, April 20, 2009, volume 538 of CEUR Workshop Proceed-
ings. CEUR-WS.org, 2009b.
O Hartig. Towards a Data-Centric Notion of Trust in the Semantic Web. In P K arger,
D Olmedilla, A Passant, and A Polleres, editors, Proceedings of the Second Workshop
on Trust and Privacy on the Social and Semantic Web (SPOT2010), volume 576 of
CEUR Workshop Proceedings. CEUR-WS.org, May 2010.
O Hartig and J Zhao. Publishing and Consuming Provenance Metadata on the Web of
Linked Data. In D McGuinness, J Michaelis, and L Moreau, editors, Provenance and
Annotation of Data and Processes, volume 6378 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 78{90. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2010. 10.1007/978-3-642-17819-1 10.138 BIBLIOGRAPHY
P Hayes. RDF Semantics. Recommendation, W3C, February 2004. http://www.w3.
org/TR/2004/REC-rdf-mt-20040210/. Latest version available at http://www.w3.
org/TR/rdf-mt/.
T Heath and C Bizer. Linked Data: Evolving the Web into a Global Data Space. Morgan
& Claypool, 1st edition, 2011.
P Homan. Cryptographic Algorithm Identier Allocation for DNSSEC. RFC 6014
(Proposed Standard), November 2010. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc6014.
txt.
A Hubert and R van Mook. Measures for Making DNS More Resilient against Forged
Answers. RFC 5452 (Proposed Standard), January 2009. URL: http://www.ietf.
org/rfc/rfc5452.txt.
T. D Huynh, N. R Jennings, and N. R Shadbolt. Certied reputation: how an agent
can trust a stranger. In Proceedings of the fth international joint conference on
Autonomous agents and multiagent systems, AAMAS '06, pages 1217{1224, New York,
NY, USA, 2006. ACM.
A Jari, H Glaser, and I Millard. URI Identity Management for Semantic Web Data
Integration and Linkage. In On the Move to Meaningful Internet Systems 2007: OTM
2007 Workshops, volume 4806 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 1125{
1134. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2007.
L Kagal, T Finin, and A Joshi. A Policy Based Approach to Security for the Semantic
Web. In The SemanticWeb - ISWC 2003, volume 2870 of Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, pages 402{418. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2003.
Y Kalfoglou, H Alani, M Schorlemmer, and C Walton. On the Emergent Semantic Web
and Overlooked Issues. In S McIlraith, D Plexousakis, and F van Harmelen, editors,
The Semantic Web { ISWC 2004, volume 3298 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 576{590. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2004.
S. D Kamvar, M. T Schlosser, and H Garcia-Molina. The Eigentrust algorithm for
reputation management in P2P networks. In Proceedings of the 12th international
conference on World Wide Web, WWW '03, pages 640{651, New York, NY, USA,
2003. ACM.
M. L Katz and C Shapiro. Systems Competition and Network Eects. Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 8(2):93{115, 1994.
S Kent and K Seo. Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol. RFC 4301 (Pro-
posed Standard), December 2005. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4301.txt.
Updated by RFC 6040 (Briscoe [2010]).BIBLIOGRAPHY 139
R Khare and S Lawrence. Upgrading to TLS Within HTTP/1.1. RFC 2817 (Proposed
Standard), May 2000. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2817.txt.
J K obler, U Schc6ning, and J Tor an. The Graph Isomorphism Problem: Its Structural
Complexity. Progress in Theoretical Computer Science Series. Birkh auser, 1993.
J Koch, C. A Velasco, and P Ackermann. HTTP Vocabulary in RDF 1.0. Working draft,
W3C, May 2011. http://www.w3.org/TR/2011/WD-HTTP-in-RDF10-20110510/.
Latest version available at http://www.w3.org/TR/HTTP-in-RDF10/.
O Kolkman, J Schlyter, and E Lewis. Domain Name System KEY (DNSKEY) Re-
source Record (RR) Secure Entry Point (SEP) Flag. RFC 3757 (Proposed Standard),
April 2004. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3757.txt. Obsoleted by RFCs 4033
(Arends et al. [2005a]), 4034 (Arends et al. [2005b]), 4035 (Arends et al. [2005c]).
S Konstantopoulos and P Archer. Protocol for Web Description Resources (POWDER):
Formal Semantics. Recommendation, W3C, September 2009. http://www.w3.org/
TR/2009/REC-powder-formal-20090901/. Latest version available at http://www.
w3.org/TR/powder-formal/.
M Koster. A Method for Web Robots Control. Network Working Group, Internet Draft,
1996.
J Krebs and N Davies. Behavioural ecology: an evolutionary approach. Sinauer Asso-
ciates, 1978.
T Lebo, S Sahoo, and D McGuinness. PROV-O: The PROV Ontology. Recommen-
dation, W3C, April 2013. http://www.w3.org/TR/2013/REC-prov-o-20130430/.
Latest version available at http://www.w3.org/TR/prov-o/.
E Lewis. DNS Security Extension Clarication on Zone Status. RFC 3090 (Proposed
Standard), March 2001. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3090.txt. Obsoleted
by RFCs 4033 (Arends et al. [2005a]), 4034 (Arends et al. [2005b]), 4035 (Arends et al.
[2005c]), updated by RFC 3658 (Gudmundsson [2003]).
E Lewis. The Role of Wildcards in the Domain Name System. RFC 4592 (Proposed
Standard), July 2006. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc4592.txt.
E Lewis and A Hoenes. DNS Zone Transfer Protocol (AXFR). RFC 5936 (Proposed
Standard), June 2010. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5936.txt.
R Lewis. Dereferencing HTTP URIs. Technical report, World Wide Web Consortium,
May 2007. URL: http://www.w3.org/2001/tag/doc/httpRange-14/2007-05-31/
HttpRange-14.
B Manning. DNS NSAP RRs. RFC 1348 (Experimental), July 1992. URL: http:
//www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1348.txt. Obsoleted by RFC 1637 (Manning and Colella
[1994a]).140 BIBLIOGRAPHY
B Manning and R Colella. DNS NSAP Resource Records. RFC 1637 (Experimental),
June 1994a. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1637.txt. Obsoleted by RFC 1706
(Manning and Colella [1994b]).
B Manning and R Colella. DNS NSAP Resource Records. RFC 1706 (Informational),
October 1994b. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1706.txt.
F Manola and E Miller. RDF Primer. Recommendation, W3C, February 2004.
http://www.w3.org/TR/2004/REC-rdf-primer-20040210/. Latest version available
at http://www.w3.org/TR/rdf-primer/.
S Marsh and M Dibben. Trust, Untrust, Distrust and Mistrust { An Exploration of the
Dark(er) Side. In P Herrmann, V Issarny, and S Shiu, editors, Trust Management,
volume 3477 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 17{33. Springer Berlin /
Heidelberg, 2005.
S. P Marsh. Formalising Trust as a Computational Concept. PhD thesis, University
of Stirling, April 1994. URL: http://homepage.mac.com/smarsh2003/SteveMarsh/
Publications_files/Trust-thesis.pdf.
D Massey and S Rose. Limiting the Scope of the KEY Resource Record (RR). RFC 3445
(Proposed Standard), December 2002. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3445.
txt. Obsoleted by RFCs 4033 (Arends et al. [2005a]), 4034 (Arends et al. [2005b]),
4035 (Arends et al. [2005c]).
S McCarron and M Ishikawa. XHTML 1.1 - Module-based XHTML - Second
Edition. Recommendation, W3C, November 2010. http://www.w3.org/TR/
2010/REC-xhtml11-20101123. Latest version available at http://www.w3.org/TR/
xhtml11/.
D McGuinness and F van Harmelen. OWL Web Ontology Language
Overview. Recommendation, W3C, February 2004. http://www.w3.
org/TR/2004/REC-owl-features-20040210/. Latest version available at
http://www.w3.org/TR/owl-features/.
D. H McKnight and N. L Chervany. The Meanings of Trust. Working Paper, 1996. URL:
http://www.misrc.umn.edu/workingpapers/fullPapers/1996/9604_040100.pdf.
D. H McKnight, V Choudhury, and C. J Kacmar. Developing and Validating Trust
Measures for e-Commerce: An Integrative Typology. Information Systems Research,
13(3):334{359, 2002.
P Mockapetris. Domain names - concepts and facilities. RFC 1034 (Standard), Novem-
ber 1987. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1034.txt. Updated by RFCs 1101
(Mockapetris [1989]), 1183 (Everhart et al. [1990]), 1348 (Manning [1992]), 1876 (Davis
et al. [1996]), 1982 (Elz and Bush [1996]), 2065 (Eastlake 3rd and Kaufman [1997]),BIBLIOGRAPHY 141
2181 (Elz and Bush [1997]), 2308 (Andrews [1998]), 2535 (Eastlake 3rd [1999]), 4033
(Arends et al. [2005a]), 4034 (Arends et al. [2005b]), 4035 (Arends et al. [2005c]), 4343
(Eastlake 3rd [2006]), 4035 (Arends et al. [2005c]), 4592 (Lewis [2006]), 5936 (Lewis
and Hoenes [2010]).
P Mockapetris. DNS encoding of network names and other types. RFC 1101, April
1989. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc1101.txt.
T Moore and R Clayton. Evil Searching: Compromise and Recompromise of Internet
Hosts for Phishing. In R Dingledine and P Golle, editors, Financial Cryptography and
Data Security, volume 5628 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 256{272.
Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009.
L Moreau and P Missier. PROV-DM: The PROV Data Model. Recommendation, W3C,
April 2013. http://www.w3.org/TR/2013/REC-prov-dm-20130430/. Latest version
available at http://www.w3.org/TR/prov-dm/.
L Moreau, B Cliord, J Freire, J Futrelle, Y Gil, P Groth, N Kwasnikowska, S Miles,
P Missier, J Myers, B Plale, Y Simmhan, E Stephan, and J. V den Bussche. The Open
Provenance Model core specication (v1.1). Future Generation Computer Systems,
July 2010.
B Motik, B. C Grau, I Horrocks, Z Wu, and A Fokoue. OWL 2 Web Ontology Lan-
guage Proles. Recommendation, W3C, October 2009a. http://www.w3.org/TR/
2009/REC-owl2-profiles-20091027/. Latest version available at http://www.w3.
org/TR/owl2-profiles/.
B Motik, B Parsia, and P Patel-Schneider. OWL 2 Web Ontology Language XML
Serialization. Recommendation, W3C, October 2009b. http://www.w3.org/TR/
2009/REC-owl2-xml-serialization-20091027/. Latest version available at http:
//www.w3.org/TR/owl2-xml-serialization/.
F Naumann. Information Quality Criteria. In Quality-Driven Query Answering for
Integrated Information Systems, volume 2261 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
pages 269{289. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2002.
W Nejdl, D Olmedilla, and M Winslett. PeerTrust: Automated Trust Negotiation for
Peers on the Semantic Web. In W Jonker and M Petkovi c, editors, Secure Data
Management, volume 3178 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 118{132.
Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2004.
K Nichols, S Blake, F Baker, and D Black. Denition of the Dierentiated Services
Field (DS Field) in the IPv4 and IPv6 Headers. RFC 2474 (Proposed Standard),
December 1998. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2474.txt. Updated by RFCs
3168 (Ramakrishnan et al. [2001]), 3260 (Grossman [2002]).142 BIBLIOGRAPHY
M Nottingham. Web Linking. RFC 5988 (Proposed Standard), October 2010. URL:
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5988.txt.
M Nottingham and E Hammer-Lahav. Dening Well-Known Uniform Resource Identi-
ers (URIs). RFC 5785 (Proposed Standard), April 2010. URL: http://www.ietf.
org/rfc/rfc5785.txt.
K O'Hara. Trust: From Socrates to Spin. Icon Books, 2004.
K O'Hara and W Hall. Trust on the Web: Some Web Science Research Challenges. UoC
Papers: E-Journal on the Knowledge Society, (7), Oct 2008.
K O'Hara, H Alani, Y Kalfoglou, and N Shadbolt. Trust Strategies for the Semantic
Web. Proceedings of Workshop on Trust, Jan 2004.
D Olmedilla, O. F Rana, B Matthews, and W Nejdl. Security and Trust Issues in
Semantic Grids. In Semantic Grid: The Convergence of Technologies, volume 05271 of
Dagstuhl Seminar Proceedings. Internationales Begegnungs- und Forschungszentrum
(IBFI), Schloss Dagstuhl, Germany, July 2005.
ORDI-Triplesets, ORDI SG Tripleset Model. URL: http://www.ontotext.com/ordi/
tripleset-model.
Oxford English Dictionary, "trust, noun.", September 2011. URL: http://www.oed.
com/view/Entry/207004.
J Postel. Internet Protocol. RFC 791 (Standard), September 1981. URL: http://www.
ietf.org/rfc/rfc791.txt. Updated by RFC 1349 (Almquist [1992]).
E Prud'hommeaux and A Seaborne. SPARQL Query Language for RDF.
Recommendation, W3C, January 2008. http://www.w3.org/TR/2008/
REC-rdf-sparql-query-20080115/. Latest version available at http:
//www.w3.org/TR/rdf-sparql-query/.
Y Raimond, S Abdallah, M Sandler, and F Giasson. The music ontology. In Proceed-
ings of the International Conference on Music Information Retrieval, pages 417{422.
Citeseer, 2007.
K Ramakrishnan, S Floyd, and D Black. The Addition of Explicit Congestion No-
tication (ECN) to IP. RFC 3168 (Proposed Standard), September 2001. URL:
http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3168.txt. Updated by RFCs 4301 (Kent and Seo
[2005]), 6040 (Briscoe [2010]).
I.-T REC. X.509 : Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Direc-
tory: Public-key and attribute certicate frameworks. Technical report, International
Telecommunication Union, March 2008.BIBLIOGRAPHY 143
E Rescorla. HTTP Over TLS. RFC 2818 (Informational), May 2000. URL: http://
www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc2818.txt. Updated by RFC 5785 (Nottingham and Hammer-
Lahav [2010]).
P Resnick and R Zeckhauser. Trust Among Strangers in Internet Transactions: Em-
pirical Analysis of eBay's Reputation System. The Economics of the Internet and
E-Commerce, Jan 2002.
M Richardson, R Agrawal, and P Domingos. Trust Management for the Semantic Web.
In D Fensel, K Sycara, and J Mylopoulos, editors, The Semantic Web - ISWC 2003,
volume 2870 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages 351{368. Springer Berlin /
Heidelberg, 2003.
S. J Russell and P Norvig. Articial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (Second Edition).
Prentice Hall, 2003.
M Salvadores, G Correndo, M Szomszor, Y Yang, N Gibbins, I Millard, H Glaser,
and N Shadbolt. Domain-Specic Backlinking Services in the Web of Data. In Web
Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology (WI-IAT), 2010 IEEE/WIC/ACM In-
ternational Conference on, volume 1, pages 318 {323, 31 2010-sept. 3 2010.
J Schlyter. DNS Security (DNSSEC) NextSECure (NSEC) RDATA Format. RFC 3845
(Proposed Standard), August 2004. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3845.txt.
Obsoleted by RFCs 4033 (Arends et al. [2005a]), 4034 (Arends et al. [2005b]), 4035
(Arends et al. [2005c]).
S. P Shapiro. The Social Control of Impersonal Trust. American Journal of Sociology,
93(3):pp. 623{658, 1987. ISSN 00029602.
D Shaw. The Camellia Cipher in OpenPGP. RFC 5581 (Informational), June 2009.
URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc5581.txt.
Six Apart, TrackBack Technical Specication, August 2002. URL: http://www.
sixapart.com/pronet/docs/trackback_spec.
K. J Stewart. Trust transfer on the World Wide Web. Organization Science, pages 5{17,
2003.
P Stickler, Denition of the Web Architecture Vocabulary v1.4. URL: http://sw.
nokia.com/schemas/general/WebArch-1.4.owl.
P Stickler, URIQA: The URI Query Agent Model, 2003. URL: http://sw.nokia.com/
uriqa/URIQA.html.
P Stickler, CBD - Concise Bounded Description, June 2005. URL: http://www.w3.
org/Submission/CBD/. W3C Member Submission.
F. R Stockton. The Lady or the Tiger? The Century, 25(1):83{86, November 1884.144 BIBLIOGRAPHY
H Story, B Harbulot, I Jacobi, and M Jones. FOAF+ SSL: RESTful Authentication for
the Social Web. In Proceedings of the First Workshop on Trust and Privacy on the
Social and Semantic Web (SPOT2009), 2009.
W. T. L Teacy, N. R Jennings, A Rogers, and M Luck. A Hierarchical Bayesian Trust
Model based on Reputation and Group Behaviour. In 6th European Workshop on
Multi-Agent Systems (EUMAS 2008), December 2008.
S Tramp, P Frischmuth, T Ermilov, and S Auer. Weaving a Social Data Web with
Semantic Pingback. In P Cimiano and H Pinto, editors, Knowledge Engineering and
Management by the Masses, volume 6317 of Lecture Notes in Computer Science, pages
135{149. Springer Berlin / Heidelberg, 2010.
Y. D Wang and H. H Emurian. An overview of online trust: Concepts, elements, and
implications. Computers in Human Behavior, Jan 2005.
E. R Watkins and D. A Nicole. Named Graphs as a Mechanism for Reasoning About
Provenance. In X Zhou, J Li, H Shen, M Kitsuregawa, and Y Zhang, editors, Frontiers
of WWW Research and Development - APWeb 2006, volume 3841 of Lecture Notes
in Computer Science, pages 943{948. Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2006.
S Weiler. Legacy Resolver Compatibility for Delegation Signer (DS). RFC 3755 (Pro-
posed Standard), May 2004. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3755.txt. Obso-
leted by RFCs 4033 (Arends et al. [2005a]), 4034 (Arends et al. [2005b]), 4035 (Arends
et al. [2005c]), updated by RFCs 3757 (Kolkman et al. [2004]), 3845 (Schlyter [2004]).
S Weiler and J Ihren. Minimally Covering NSEC Records and DNSSEC On-line Sign-
ing. RFC 4470 (Proposed Standard), April 2006. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/
rfc4470.txt.
B Wellington. Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Dynamic Update. RFC 3007 (Pro-
posed Standard), November 2000a. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3007.txt.
Updated by RFCs 4033 (Arends et al. [2005a]), 4034 (Arends et al. [2005b]), 4035
(Arends et al. [2005c]).
B Wellington. Domain Name System Security (DNSSEC) Signing Authority. RFC 3008
(Proposed Standard), November 2000b. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3008.
txt. Obsoleted by RFCs 4035 (Arends et al. [2005c]), 4033 (Arends et al. [2005a]),
4034 (Arends et al. [2005b]), updated by RFC 3658 (Gudmundsson [2003]).
B Wellington and O Gudmundsson. Redenition of DNS Authenticated Data (AD) bit.
RFC 3655 (Proposed Standard), November 2003. URL: http://www.ietf.org/rfc/
rfc3655.txt. Obsoleted by RFCs 4033 (Arends et al. [2005a]), 4034 (Arends et al.
[2005b]), 4035 (Arends et al. [2005c]).
M Winslett, T Yu, K. E Seamons, A Hess, J Jacobson, R Jarvis, B Smith, and L Yu.
Negotiating trust in the Web. Internet Computing, IEEE, 6(6):30{37, nov/dec 2002.BIBLIOGRAPHY 145
M. J Wooldridge and N. R Jennings. Intelligent Agents: Theory and Practice. The
Knowledge Engineering Review, 10(2):115{152, 1995.